# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – Antitrust CP

#### The United State federal government should increase antitrust enforcement under the consumer welfare standard by substantially increasing resources and enforcement of those laws.

#### More aggressive enforcement antitrust enforcement solves the aff.

Baker 15 – Jonathan B. Baker, Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality,” *Georgetown Law Journal Online*, 2015, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 1

Agency antitrust enforcement could account for inequality concerns by systematically directing resources towards products purchased by middle- and lower-class consumers. Under this approach, greater efforts could be devoted to investigating concerns in markets such as food manufacturing and retailing, fuel, and healthcare products. For example, a 1985 study concluded that in forty-five broadly defined food industries, the exercise of market power led prices to rise more for low-income households than for high-income households in all but nine industries. 63 A greater focus could also be given to concerns about monopsony power exercised against workers and small businesses.

We do not intend to criticize the enforcement agencies. To a noticeable extent, this policy focus is implemented today. 64 However, the approach could be given more emphasis and coupled with expanded budgets. In addition, the agencies might forgo using scarce agency resources for matters where the bulk of harms are suffered by the rich.6 5 In their prosecutorial discretion, the agencies also might attach lower priority to enforcement against allegedly anticompetitive conduct that likely benefits the disadvan-taged.66 For example, the agencies might consider forgoing a hypothetical case involving concerted monopsony conduct by organizations to negotiate lower interest rates from sellers of payday loans. 67 These actions would not require a change in antitrust law.

D. DESIGNING REMEDIES TO BENEFIT LESS ADVANTAGED CONSUMERS

Within current antitrust law, inequality might be addressed in individual cases by adopting remedies designed primarily to benefit less advantaged consumers. For example, this might involve divestitures or price caps placed on certain products and technologies targeted at less advantaged buyers. For example, a drug merger might be permitted if the merged firm were to commit to low-price distribution of the product to patients with lower-quality insurance coverage. Regulatory agencies could do the same. For example, the FCC conditioned its approval in 2011 of Comcast's NBCU acquisition on Comcast's commitment to subsidize broadband to low-income buyers. 68

This policy would not require accounting for distribution in determining whether the antitrust laws were violated. Instead, in specific cases where violations have been demonstrated, courts and agencies would use existing remedial tools to ensure that the distributional effects reduce inequality, which will also help deter anticompetitive conduct in other markets that target the less well off. For example, the Department of Justice might pursue stronger remedies (higher fines and longer executive prison sentences) when firms fix the prices of products purchased by lower-income consumers. Of course, such remedial actions would be predicated on whether the agencies and courts can target less affluent consumers, which would need to take into account the potential for resale. In addition, when a case presents multiple remedial options or the possibility of benefitting multiple disadvantaged groups, courts and agencies would need to develop a principled basis for allocating limited remedial resources.

E. REBALANCING TOWARDS MORE INTERVENTIONIST ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STANDARDS

The formulation of legal standards strikes a balance between the cost of under-deterrence versus over-deterrence of conduct that would achieve, maintain, or enhance market power. 69 But the Supreme Court has recently been shifting that balance by making it more difficult to prove meritorious cases. While raising concerns about false positives, the Court has not analyzed the incidence and consequences of false positives, nor compared the resulting costs with the social benefits of antitrust enforcement or the incidence and consequences of false negatives and under-deterrence. 70 If growing concerns about inequality lead to the recognition that there are additional harms from market power, that recognition would justify reconsideration of the balance and the adoption of more interventionist antitrust rules.

This policy adjustment would not require new legislative action. It would be implemented in the agencies through case selection decisions that place more weight on deterring the exercise of market power relative to concerns about over-deterrence. It would be implemented in the courts through a common law approach that simply recognizes greater harm from market power than previously has been identified. 71 This type of policy adjustment also might be implemented by the Federal Trade Commission under its statute. 72

### 1NC – Economy DA

#### Moving away from the consumer welfare standard in antitrust destroys innovation and growth

Auer 18 – Dick Auer, Senior Fellow, International Center for Law & Economics, “Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics: Topic 4: Antitrust law and the consumer welfare standard,” FTC Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public\_comments/2018/10/ftc-2018-0074-d-0071-155999.pdf

The adoption of the consumer welfare standard was an enormous improvement over what came before it. Yet no one would assert that every aspect of antitrust policy in furtherance of the consumer welfare standard is perfect and should remain unchanged. There will always be grounds for critique and improvement of specific policy decisions and processes. But none of these arguments undercuts the basic merits of the standard and its supremacy over alternatives.

Antitrust enforcers and courts have a difficult time as it is ensuring that their decisions actually benefit consumers. As Robert Pitofsky once said, “antitrust enforcement along economic lines al-ready incorporates large doses of hunch, faith, and intuition.”40 But the existence of imperfections does not justify intervention that would move us further away from economic objectives. Indeed, such intervention would more than likely make the imperfections worse.

When antitrust policy is unmoored from economic analysis, it exhibits fundamental and highly problematic contradictions, as Herbert Hovenkamp highlighted in a recent paper:

As a movement, antitrust often succeeds at capturing political attention and engaging at least some voters, but it fails at making effective or even coherent policy. The result is goals that are unmeasurable and fundamentally inconsistent, although with their contra-dictions rarely exposed. Among the most problematic contradictions is the one between small business protection and consumer welfare. In a nutshell, consumers benefit from low prices, high output and high quality and variety of products and services. But when a firm or a technology is able to offer these things they invariably injure rivals, typically those who are smaller or heavily invested in older technologies. Although movement antitrust rhetoric is often opaque about specifics, its general effect is invariably to encourage higher prices or reduced output or innovation, mainly for the protection of small business or those whose technology or other investments have become obsolete.41

Even with careful economic analysis, it will not always be clear how to resolve the inevitable tensions between consumer welfare and other policy preferences. In 1978, then-FTC-Chairman Michael Pertschuk laid out his vision for a “new competition policy” at the FTC. In it, he asserted that anti-trust policy must consider

the social and environmental harms produced as unwelcome by-products of the market-place: resource depletion, energy waste, environmental contamination, worker alienation, the psychological and social consequences of market-stimulated demands.”42

It is not clear what it would mean to take account of these things in the context of anything approaching a rigorous policy framework. But even more troublingly, many, if not all of them call for a rejection of the core, competition-focused objective of antitrust.

For instance, Jonathan Adler has described the collision between antitrust and environmental protection in cases where, precisely because of reduced output, collusion might lead to better environ-mental outcomes, such as improved conservation of wild fish and other common pool resources.43 How would a court or enforcer conceivably evaluate that trade-off? It is difficult enough to evaluate the procompetitive justifications for certain conduct already — including in somewhat similar circumstances where intrabrand price or distribution constraints, for example, may be aimed at pre-serving the “common pool resource” of brand value or consumer goodwill. But that difficulty is only magnified where the trade-off is between incommensurate benefits, distributed over entirely different populations, and without any operational connection between them within the firm undertaking the conduct in question.

Whatever benefits might conceivably come from giving weight to non-economic values, even just at the margin, they would inevitably come at the expense of the core, competitive values of modern antitrust. As Ernest Gellhorn noted in his masterful critique of Pertschuk’s “socially conscious” vision for the FTC:

Competitive values must be sacrificed if social values are to be given primacy — or else the new policy is nothing more than rhetoric and official deception. The second and equally important point is that the new chairman’s “humanistic model” for antitrust is formless, shapeless, and unpredictable. There simply are no generally accepted “democratic and social norms” for applying the antitrust laws — and some of the new chairman’s announced values are worrisome, at least to the extent they are offered as the basis for determining the shape and operation of much of our economy.

The problem is that unless antitrust law has an objective and principled foundation, antitrust enforcement can become the personal plaything of enforcement personnel, or the stock in trade of lobbyists and influence-peddlers.44

While it is perfectly reasonable to care about political corruption, worker welfare, and income ine-quality, it is not at all reasonable to try to shoehorn goals based on these political concerns into antitrust — a body of legal doctrine whose tools are wholly inappropriate for achieving those ends. As Carl Shapiro has noted, “The fundamental danger that 21st century populism poses to antitrust is that populism will cause us to abandon this core principle and thereby undermine economic growth and deprive consumers of many of the benefits of vigorous but fair competition.”45

#### Extended COVID economic decline causes multilateral meltdown – causes nuclear war, climate change, Arctic and space war.

McLennan 21 – Strategic Partners Marsh McLennan SK Group Zurich Insurance Group, Academic Advisers National University of Singapore Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, “The Global Risks Report 2021 16th Edition” “http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\_The\_Global\_Risks\_Report\_2021.pdf

Forced to choose sides, governments may face economic or diplomatic consequences, as proxy disputes play out in control over economic or geographic resources. The deepening of geopolitical fault lines and the lack of viable middle power alternatives make it harder for countries to cultivate connective tissue with a diverse set of partner countries based on mutual values and maximizing efficiencies. Instead, networks will become thick in some directions and non-existent in others. The COVID-19 crisis has amplified this dynamic, as digital interactions represent a “huge loss in efficiency for diplomacy” compared with face-to-face discussions.23 With some alliances weakening, diplomatic relationships will become more unstable at points where superpower tectonic plates meet or withdraw.

At the same time, without superpower referees or middle power enforcement, global norms may no longer govern state behaviour. Some governments will thus see the solidification of rival blocs as an opportunity to engage in regional posturing, which will have destabilizing effects.24 Across societies, domestic discord and economic crises will increase the risk of autocracy, with corresponding censorship, surveillance, restriction of movement and abrogation of rights.25 Economic crises will also amplify the challenges for middle powers as they navigate geopolitical competition. ASEAN countries, for example, had offered a potential new manufacturing base as the United States and China decouple, but the pandemic has left these countries strapped for cash to invest in the necessary infrastructure and productive capacity.26 Economic fallout is pushing many countries to debt distress (see Chapter 1, Global Risks 2021). While G20 countries are supporting debt restructure for poorer nations,27 larger economies too may be at risk of default in the longer term;28 this would leave them further stranded—and unable to exercise leadership—on the global stage.

Multilateral meltdown Middle power weaknesses will be reinforced in weakened institutions, which may translate to more uncertainty and lagging progress on shared global challenges such as climate change, health, poverty reduction and technology governance. In the absence of strong regulating institutions, the Arctic and space represent new realms for potential conflict as the superpowers and middle powers alike compete to extract resources and secure strategic advantage.29 If the global superpowers continue to accumulate economic, military and technological power in a zero-sum playing field, some middle powers could increasingly fall behind. Without cooperation nor access to important innovations, middle powers will struggle to define solutions to the world’s problems. In the long term, GRPS respondents forecasted “weapons of mass destruction” and “state collapse” as the two top critical threats: in the absence of strong institutions or clear rules, clashes— such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Galwan Valley—may more frequently flare into full-fledged interstate conflicts,30 which is particularly worrisome where unresolved tensions among nuclear powers are concerned. These conflicts may lead to state collapse, with weakened middle powers less willing or less able to step in to find a peaceful solution.

### 1NC – T

#### Topical affirmatives must advocate a policy whereby the United States federal government expands the scope of one or more of its core antitrust laws.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases ’64 [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law ‘4 [Black’s Law Dictionary; 6/1/4; 8th Edition, p. 716]

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### Should means mandating something be done.

Nieto ‘9 [Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)]

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### Prohibitions are legal restrictions against certain conduct.

DLD ‘ND [Duhaime's Law Dictionary; “Prohibition Definition”; http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prohibition.aspx; AS]

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman, FTC, and Clayton Acts.

CoC ‘ND [Chamber of Commerce; “Antitrust Laws”; https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-laws; AS]

America’s Antitrust Laws Protect Competition and Benefit Consumers

Antitrust laws ensure competition in a free and open market economy, which is the foundation of any vibrant economy. And healthy competition among sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation.

The core of U.S. antitrust law was created by three pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. These laws have evolved along with the market, vigilantly guarding against anti-competitive harm that arises from abuse of dominance, bid rigging, price fixing, and customer allocation.

#### Debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means procedural questions like T come first. The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question.

#### Vote neg:

#### First is procedural fairness – their interpretation eviscerates predictable limits – all negative strategy is premised off a stable reading of the resolution. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable. That outweighs and precedes their offense – debate is a game that we’ve all chosen to participate in and requires effective negation. It makes no sense to skew a competitive activity in favor of one side.

#### Second is clash – you should privilege rigorous debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm. Unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate.

### 1NC – Race K

#### Cosmo-solidarity is the new civilizing mission of humanity. Calling on a transcendent humanity to rein in nationalism re-activates the global color line between the civil and barbaric.

Ida **DANEWID** PhD Philosophy **’18** *Race, Capital, and the Politics of Solidarity: Radical Internationalism in the 21st Century* p. 9-11

Race and the Politics of Solidarity

What would it mean for the philosophical literature on global justice and cosmopolitan ethics to take seriously the enduring logic of race and the many afterlives of historical and ongoing colonialism? In this thesis I provide a tentative answer to this question through a close engagement with contemporary cosmopolitan debates on the meaning and purpose of international solidarity. Solidarity provides a particularly useful lens for analysing cosmopolitanism's racial caesuras. This is not only because all cosmopolitan approaches are underpinned by some form of solidaristic commitment, but also because the concept of solidarity has gained a sense of urgency over the last few years. In the wake of the global migrant crisis, the movement for Black lives in the United States and beyond, #StandWithStandingRock, the ongoing occupation of Palestine, and the rise of populist, far right, anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist political parties throughout the global North, a growing number of academics, activists, and artists have called for solidarity with the plight of migrants, racialized minorities, and Indigenous peoples. In the field of IR, the cosmopolitan literature on solidarity has “ballooned” since the early 1990s, in part because of the public adoption of the term in global activist and civil society campaigns, but also because of the renewed philosophical interest in questions of global ethics and responsibility.33 There is of course no such thing as a cosmopolitan conception of solidarity: definitions range from “the disposition to act towards vulnerable others without the anticipation of reciprocation”34 (Chouliaraki); the obligation “to help people who are beyond one’s own borders”35 (Coicaud and Wheeler); the preparedness of “taking responsibility” for one who “has formed his identity under completely different circumstances”36 (Habermas); a general feeling of sympathy or empathy for others37 (Rorty); a precondition for global democracy38 (Brunkhorst); “a struggle against powerful tendencies in the modern age to divide the world into camps and to idealise one camp as much as we demonise the other”39 (Fine); and the inclination to view all human lives as equally grievable40 (Butler). In spite of these differences, these cosmopolitan approaches all put forward a vision of solidarity that transcends historical, cultural, and territorial borders, and that offers an alternative to communitarian and nationalist accounts that limit solidarity to those bound by common nationality, ethnicity, religion, citizenship, and so on. As Vivienne Jabri explains, cosmopolitan theories of solidarity are based on “the assumption that the realm of the international, a location defined in terms of sovereign statehood, is somehow reined in, challenged, by another realm, that of the human.”41 Ultimately, for these thinkers a global, cosmopolitan solidarity is necessary to confront the large-scale dilemmas of the contemporary world, including global poverty, widespread human rights abuse, international mass migration, environmental catastrophes, civil wars, and the ever-present growing disparity between the privileged and the poor.

In this thesis I explore the limits and possibilities of such calls for solidarity beyond borders. In the first part I examine how, why, and with what effect questions of race and colonialism continue to be silenced in discussions about international (or cosmopolitan) solidarity. I argue that liberal as well as critical approaches work to reproduce and legitimise, rather than challenge and transcend, the current unjust and unequal racialized global order. While cosmopolitan calls for solidarity with the vulnerable, downtrodden, and marginalised peoples of the world might give the appearance of contributing to an emancipatory political project, in reality they obfuscate how the modern world system was founded on, and continues as, a hierarchical racial order. Like the civilising missions of the 19th century, these discourses are heavily dependent on a racialized and gendered “imaginative geography”42 that divides the world into “the third world individual living within a nation of danger and the first world rescuers residing in a space of safety and enlightened freedom.”43 By addressing the first world as a bystander to, rather than beneficiary of, current injustices, cosmopolitan calls for solidarity not only produce the first world as intrinsically “good”, “ethical”, and “humanitarian”, but they also render invisible the continuities between past and current forms of violence and privilege. The result is a grand narrative structured around binaries of good/evil and saviours/victims which, as Stephen Hopgood has argued, “gives an ideological alibi to a global system whose governance structures sustain persistent unfairness and blatant injustice.”44

#### Cosmopolitan imaginary constitutively linked to racialized humanitarian intervention.

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The historical imbrication of solidarity with colonialism should make us cautious about the ways in which cosmopolitan theorists use and understand the concept today. Indeed, as Pierluigi Musarò has argued, contemporary liberal articulations of solidarity continue to be premised on a “religious-salvational narrative of rescue”, based on “the noblesse oblige of the powerful (rights holders) toward the powerless (those who cannot enact their human rights on their own).”30 Such understandings are ultimately premised on a certain dislocation from history: it is only by removing from view the long history of empire, transatlantic slavery, and colonial conquest that thinkers such as Brunkhorst, Habermas, and Wheeler are able to formulate the problem of cosmopolitan solidarity as one of how to shift from solidarity among “friends” to solidarity with “strangers.” The effects of this erasure is clearly visible in contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P). At a base level, these discussions revolve around the question if, and at what point, the international community should intervene to stop human rights violation perpetrated by states against their populations. What, in other words, are our responsibilities towards those who are not our fellow citizens? As Anne Orford has argued, these debates take for granted that the people we are concerned to help are “strangers” and, hence, that the choice facing the international community is one between (military) action and inaction, presence and absence. As Orford makes clear, these debates are underpinned by a deeply racialized and gendered “imaginative geography... according to which the international community is absent from the scene of violence and suffering until it intervenes as a heroic saviour.”31 Such imaginative geographies sanction the idea that humanitarian crises are inherently “local”, and the exclusive result of homegrown ethnic hatreds and age-old animosities. This obscures the systemic and structural violence that often is complicit in creating the conditions that lead to humanitarian crises. As Robert Meister has argued, this means that the R2P and human rights can oppose genocide, but not the global structures that make such violence possible; indeed, “[a] perverse effect of a globalized 'ethic' of protecting local human rights is to take the global causes of human suffering off the political agenda.”32 For some, including French philosopher Alain Badiou, this is why the liberal paradigm of human rights and humanitarian intervention must be considered the very foundations of imperialism: indeed, “Who can fail to see that un our humanitarian expeditions, interventions, embarkations of charitable légionnaires, the Subject presumed to be universal is split? On the side of the victims, the haggard animal exposed on television screens. On the side of the benefactors, conscience and the imperative to intervene. Any why does this splitting always assign the same roles to the same sides? Who cannot see that this ethics which rests on the misery of the world hides, behind its victim-Man, the good-Man, the white-Man?”33

The liberal self-congratulatory discourse on moral responsibility, Badiou argues, ultimately amounts to little more than a “sordid self-satisfaction in the 'West', with the insistent argument according to which the misery of the Third World is the result of its own incompetence, its own inanity—in short, its own subhumanity.”34 There now exists a well-established feminist, poststructuralist, and post/decolonial literature that critically interrogates the ways in which liberal cosmopolitanism assists in the consolidation of Western hegemony. By calling into question the assumptions about humanity that underlie liberal cosmopolitanism, these critics have demonstrated that the rational sovereign subject must be understood as a reflection of parochial, historically specific values and experiences—typically those of the well-off citizen; a heterosexual, white, urban male. As Enrique Dussel has shown, René Descartes' dictum “I think, therefore I am”—the epitome of the liberal ontology of the sovereign subject—is in fact preceded by 150 years of “I conquer, therefore I am.”35 Descartes formulated his philosophy in Amsterdam at the very moment in the mid-17th century when Holland occupied the core of the world-system. The idolatrous universalism of Cartesian philosophy—which claims to be able to speak from a zeropoint, possessing a perspective equivalent to God's Eye—thus arises from a subject whose geopolitical location is determined by its existence as a colonizer/conqueror. The Cartesian subject, Dussel argues, is in fact the Imperial Being: in actual history, the ego cogito is not simply the homo sapiens but the conqueror. In other words, while liberal cosmopolitanism claims to speak from a neutral and universal perspective, in actuality it reflects parochial interests cloaked in the moral imperative to save other, distant populations. Although liberal cosmopolitanism might give the appearance of contributing to an emancipatory political project that extends solidarity to the poor, the vulnerable, and the downtrodden, as Jabri makes clear, in reality it is “a project complicit in the perpetuation of structures of domination generative of the very conditions which are then framed in a discursive politics of human solidarity.”36

**Alternative: Internationalism grounded in opposition to the global colorline captures a universal OBJECTIVE, without the baggage of assuming a disembodied universal POSITION.**

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In the second half of the thesis, I demonstrate that a materialist reading of the global colour line opens up space for new forms of solidarity and internationalism— beyond the “master's tools”, in Audre Lorde's famous formulation. The concept of racial capitalism demonstrates how different systems of oppression rely on one another in complex ways: racism, sexism, and classism are not separate forms of oppression that sometimes intersect, but an entangled and constitutive part of the capitalist world system. This does not deny the uniqueness and specificity of local struggles, but highlights their transnational character. That is, while the struggles against empire, white supremacy, settler colonialism, gender subordination, and workers' exploitation are not the same, they are fundamentally interlinked. By reconnecting and aligning different struggles—struggles which might seem distinct and unrelated but which, when viewed through the lens of racial capitalism, turn out to be closely related—a materialist reading of the global colour line thus points to the importance of addressing racism, patriarchy, settler colonialism, imperialism, and other interlocking violences simultaneously.45

The solidarity that emerges from this analysis is fundamentally different from cosmopolitanism. In cosmopolitan scholarship, the question of solidarity has typically been understood as a problem of how to overcome difference. While different thinkers disagree on the exact foundation for solidarity, they typically understand it as a universalising relation: as something that unfolds from the belief that all human beings have equal moral standing within and belong to a single world community. In contrast to these perspectives—which, as I argue in chapter 1, are haunted by a colonial logic—a materialist reading of the global colour line opens up space for a different kind of solidarity, based not on sameness but the struggle against interlocking oppressions under racial capitalism. This is a revolutionary solidarity anchored in the intersectionality of freedom struggles**,** rather than on abstract notions of what it means to be human**.** The overall goal here not the creation of some form of a universal community based on law, rights, and citizenship, as it is for many cosmopolitan thinkers. Instead, and as Bradley Macdonald has argued, it seeks “to articulate localized issues and struggles into an overall internationalism... It sees the necessity of understanding each particular struggle in the world as part of larger drama.”46 Consequently, where cosmopolitan perspectives often depict solidarity as a one-way street whereby powerful and privileged actors extend empathy and charity to silent victims, solidarity thus conceived figures subalterns as agents in a collective struggle against interlocking systems of oppression under racial capitalism. While this is a project that is underwritten by universalism, it is not one that follows from any supposed unity of humankind. Instead, I suggest, it arises in opposition to the universalising thrust of racial capitalism—including the way in which it depends on gender subordination, border-making practices, ongoing primitive accumulation, the production of surplus populations, and the growth of a global “security archipelago.”47

Radical Internationalism in Dark Times

The revolutionary solidarity outlined in this thesis has much to offer in our contemporary era of Trumpism, Brexit, and global fascist resurgence. As Kyriakides and Torres make clear, ours is an age where solidarity has come to seem difficult at best; where older visions of Third World, non-aligned, and coalitional politics have fractured into multiple “ethnically determined subjects of identity in competition not only for a shred of an ever-shrinking economic settlement but for recognition of their suffering conferred by a nation-state in which the Right won the political battle and the Left won the culture war.”48 The juxtaposition of the “white working class” with “immigrants” offers one of the starkest example of this fracturing of solidarity. Indeed, according to hegemonic narratives white workers were not only responsible for the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump, but are also the main engine behind the rise of populist, far-right, anti-immigrant, xenophobic, and racist political parties throughout the global North. The rise of fascist populism, it is often argued, has to be seen as a counterrevolution to the post-WWII period, which has privileged identity politics at the expense of socio-economic inequality, and thus paid too much attention to questions of race, gender, and sexuality, and not enough to class. A New York Times column by Columbia professor Mark Lilla published shortly after the US presidential election captures this sentiment: a focus on identity politics, Lilla argued, had cost the Democrats the election.49 By emphasising difference at the expense of commonalities and fetishising the virtues of minorities, identity politics had alienated “the demos living between the coasts” and undermined the possibility of creating a progressive coalition based on class. “Left behind” by deindustrialisation, globalisation, affirmative action, and identity politics, white workers had increasingly begun to feel like “strangers in their own land.”50 In 2016 they thus voted to take back control.

This narrative is problematic for a number of reasons, as several commentators have shown: indeed, the vote to leave the European Union was delivered by the propertied, pensioned, well-off, white middle class based in southern England, and not the working class in the North51; similarly, the swing to Trump was predominantly carried by the white middle class, and not the white working class.52 In attributing Brexit and the Trump vote to the white working class, this widespread narrative not only contradicts the available empirical evidence. By scapegoating minorities—women, Blacks, immigrants, refugees, etc.—it also suggests that class and race (and gender and sexuality) are distinct and separate, and thus need to be ranked in order of importance. As Frederick Douglass once argued, to insist on such divisions is to overlook that it is in the interest of capital to pit white workers against black workers; “The slaveholders, by encouraging the enmity of the poor laboring white man against the blacks, succeeded in making the said white man almost as much of a slave as the black himself.” In fact, “both are plundered by the same plunderer.”53

Taking issue with this narrative of the “left behind”, this thesis argues that it is a mistake to separate anti-capitalist politics from the struggle against white supremacy, patriarchy, settler colonialism, and empire. A materialist reading of the global colour line uncovers the political possibilities that are inhibited by theoretical frameworks and political elites that insist on a neat separation between “race” and “class.” Race-making practices are fundamental (not epiphenomenal) to the operation of capital, because racism supplies the precarious and exploitable lives capitalism needs to extract land and labour. Consequently, where hegemonic narratives imply that countering right-wing populism necessitates a privileging of the needs of the white working class, a focus on racial capitalism reveals that there can be no politics of class that is not already racialized. As Robbie Shilliam has recently argued, “this blunt demographic sensibility entirely obscures the operation of power, which is always to cut the social fabric at its weakest, i.e. through the bodies of those racialized, gendered and nationalized as undeserving.”54 Rather than separating race and class—which post-Brexit and post- Trump commentary insists that we should—a materialist reading of the global colour line thus points towards the necessity of weaving together anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-capitalist critique. A focus on race (and gender) need not detract attention from questions of class: quite the opposite, a truly anti-capitalist politics has to be anti-racist, anti-sexist, and internationalist.

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#### Deconstructing the nation-state causes total war in the name of liberal humanitarianism.

Mikkel Thorup 10, Associate Professor at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, “Cosmopolitanism: Sovereignty denied or sovereignty restated?” *International Politics*, Volume 47, Number 6, 2010, pp. 659-679

This article will explore the cosmopolitan critique of the principle of national sovereignty and why it may unwittingly become a cosmopolitanism, which helps to frame and legitimate a new sovereigntist language based on an inequality of recognition and status. The article engages in a critical exploration of the cosmopolitan literature and disscusses the theories of power, sovereignty and conflict that the literature subscribes to and how it informs a particular view on both past, present and future politics.

Basically, what I want to argue is that the cosmopolitan critique of the principle of national sovereignty may not be the critical thinking and practice it believes itself to be. Perhaps cosmopolitans and other critics of state sovereignty are ‘the champions of a new consensus’ (Bickerton et al, 2007, p. 4); a consensus that is ultimately the continuation of Western power. Rather than opposing the powers that be, the critiques may be in conformity with power system trends; and in that case, the cosmopolitan language risks being taken over by other non-cosmopolitan forces using the new post-national, moralist language for power purposes. Facilitating this possible take-over, I will argue, is a deficient understanding of power and of sovereignty’s durability and adaptability coupled with a basically optimistic understanding of historical development. The concrete expression of these understandings is a dichotomous historical view of a sovereign age of war and internal repression and a coming post-sovereign age of cooperation and peace. Somewhat unfair to the diverse standpoint of the cosmopolitans, I argue that this linkage between sovereignty and power and its consequent abolition of both is what informs cosmopolitan thinking, and is what tends to hide from cosmopolitans the reconfiguration of sovereignty in a post-nation state age. Perhaps one could say that it is the coupling of sovereignty, power and state that obscures how both power and sovereignty re-establish themselves in – among others – humanitarian and cosmopolitan languages and institutions.

Post-sovereignty is the powerful new language of intervention because it comes with the assumption of not having any expansionist or nationally egoistic purposes with the intervention. Post-sovereign language excludes all the currently illegitimate motives for war and intervention, thereby making going to war easier rather than more difficult. What we have witnessed – and which is obviously not the fault of cosmopolitans and the likeminded – is a basic change in what can legitimate an armed response (Finnemore, 2003). In addition to the older requirements for legitimate international violence – clear and present danger, all peaceful means exhausted, contained violence and so on – the new minimum requirements for legitimate post-sovereign international violence are based on the following standpoints:

unilateralism is suspicious and a very last resort only;

the goal must be universal and not national;

the intervention must not result in any material gains for the intervening

party;

international norms and institutions must sanction the intervention.

Most of these requirements exclude the classical sovereign motives for war – honour, land, resources, and so on – and in that sense makes war more difficult. But they also facilitate war because they render some interventions not only legitimate, but perhaps also morally required. Once activated the post- sovereign, humanitarian language can authorize and legitimate violence like no other language. And the reference to the old reasons for war becomes a legitimization of the new post-sovereign wars because the argument now is that the old wars were fought for basically nationally egotistical and non-legitimate reasons, whereas the new wars are grounded in the opposite, namely in the nationally indifferent and morally superior.

The humanitarian sovereign and the post-national state may emerge through the fog of humanitarian wars. Ju ̈ rgen Habermas has called the intervention in Kosovo an ‘anticipation of an effective cosmopolitan law’ (in Mendieta, 2004, p. 86). Ironically, Kosovo Polje is now the cradle of Serbian nationalism and of liberal globalism. It is telling that this birth was made possible through the breaking of international law. This is exactly the placing of morality over law that Habermas, as we saw earlier, warns against in the actions of America. But here, in the name of global justice, as interpreted from Europe, another principle applies. In an interview, Habermas scorns America for breaking international law in the Iraq war, but then continues about the war in Kosovo:

Still there were two legitimizing reasons, one formal and one informal and this is so even if they couldn’t replace the consent by the Security Council required by the UN charter. Firstly, one could refer to the erga omnes – which applies to all states – and calls for help in the face of an imminent genocide. This has always been a part of international customary law. Secondly, the fact that NATO is a union of liberal states, that it in its inner workings takes the UN declaration of human rights seriously, can also be thrown on the scale [in favour of intervention]. Compare that with the ‘coalition of the willing’ that has split the West and which included such despicable regimes as Usbekistan and Taylor’s Liberia. (Habermas in Mendieta, 2004, p. 86)

The first reason has turned out to be at least questionable. The second reason is really interesting. One has to interpret Habermas as saying that if the European NATO countries had joined the Iraq war, then the disregard for UN law had been justified. The West is effectively the international community – the problem is the ‘splitting of the West’, as one of his books is called (Habermas, 2004). One might wonder if Germany and France would not have claimed that the ‘international community’ was waging a war against Iraq, if they had been part of the coalition? Liberals speaking on behalf of the international community or humanity is a lot like Nixon speaking on behalf of the silent majority. It gives an authority without accountability; it is an unsubstantiated claim of representation. But, of course, not everyone can speak in the name of something/someone universal and be taken seriously. The interstate system at least guaranteed that sovereigns were considered legitimate voices of their communities, giving the system an aura of accountability and equality. This is what the discussion of Carl Schmitt taught us: The imperialism of voice, or the dominance of interpretation (Thorup, 2006a). The core of the matter is that the West once again and with remarkably similar arguments (minus the racism (sort of) but certainly still with ‘the white man’s burden’) is proclaiming a ‘historic responsibility’, ‘duty of global leadership’, and so on to remake societies and the structure of relations among societies. This inevitably gives rise to a new imperialism, humanitarian or liberal, as the quest is out once again for remaking the world in Western colours. Post-sovereignty is now to be everyone’s reality.

The new post-sovereign language, often thought to be a language of peace, is also the new language of war. In his self-critical book, The Dark Sides of Virtue. Reassessing International Humanitarianism, David Kennedy says:

The human rights movement consistently underestimates the usefulness of the human rights vocabulary and machinery for people whose hearts are hard and whose political projects are repressive. The United States, The United Kingdom, Russia – but also Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians – have taken military action, intervened politically, and justified their governmental policies on the grounds of protecting human rights. Far from being a defense of the individual against the state, human rights has become a standard part of the justification for the external use of force by the state against other states and individuals. (Kennedy, 2004, p. 25)

He goes on to say that ‘humanitarian rulership is so often rulership denied’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. 329), and just as the blurring of the boundaries between policing and warfare, or humanitarianism and militarism first and foremost makes policing and humanitarianism part of the military arsenal, Kennedy says, that the present humanitarian language spoken by power is making human rights a smaller part of governance ‘as it makes humanitarianism the voice of sovereignty’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. 344).

Cosmopolitans help frame the new post-sovereign language of dominance and intervention by not being attentive enough to the ‘new alliance of humanitarian and military interest’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. xii). The modern nation state was born in and through war; so is the post-national. The new wars are frontier wars, and they are instrumental in reinstating order by drawing new distinctions between the West and the rest, between order and chaos, the civilized and the barbaric, between friends and enemies.

#### Letting the nation-state die just means neoliberalism takes over

Mikkel Thorup 10, Associate Professor at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, “Cosmopolitanism: Sovereignty denied or sovereignty restated?” *International Politics*, Volume 47, Number 6, 2010, pp. 659-679

The nation state logic is now ‘singularly inadequate and inappropriate’ (Held, 1996, p. 261, my italics). It is empirically untenable and morally unacceptable; and those are the two arguments most often heard and whose mutual strengthening makes it a compelling form of argumentation. Historical and moral developments combine into a falsification and demoralization of state sovereignty. The modern nation state can now only be upheld as a communitarian resistance in opposition to the values and principles of liberal democracy and the global network. Manuel Castells writes that ‘nation-states survive beyond historical inertia because of the defensive communalism of nations and people in their territories, hanging onto their last refuge not to be pulled away by the whirlwind of global flows’ (1997, p. 308, my italics). They survive – for a while – by entrenching themselves in the defence of particularistic identities, or ‘resistance identities’ as Castells calls them (1997, Chapters 1 and 2). The attempt to maintain the nation state is refuted as a doomed attempt to block the forces of the global flows and, as it were, of history, the nation state ‘clawing back from history to the principle of power for the sake of power, sometimes wrapping it in nationalist rhetoric’ (1997, p. 355). What used to be the precondition of democracy has now become its deathblow. The particular is now in contradiction to the liberal democracy, which is then supposedly thought to be global, although the implications of this are never mentioned or hinted at. The argument serves only as a critique of the re-description of the nation state.

This willingness to restrict access and legitimacy to speak in and for the global community, to use moral language, is also evident in Mary Kaldor’s work on the global civil society. In order to get included within the circle of friends one has to pass a political-moral test, and prove one’s democratic and globalist credentials. Kaldor says:

Civil society thus consists of groups, individuals and institutions which are independent of the state and state boundaries, but which are, at the same time, preoccupied with public affairs. They are, in effect, the guarantors of civil behaviour both by official institutions (states and international institutions) and in the world at large. Defined in this way, civil society does not encompass all groups or associations independent of the state. It does not include groups which advocate violence. It does not include self-organised groups and associations which campaign for exclusivist communitarian concepts. Nor does it include self-interested private associations. (Quoted from Chandler, 2002, p. 118)

A democratic nation state insisting on its sovereignty, a civil society defending its particularistic culture and autonomy, or even a private association working for its own interests will not qualify as a legitimate partner. Cosmopolitanism adds to the liberal anti-pluralism a globalization and post-nationalism requisite, which asks states and civil societies to copy and accept a European experience and project as the global and only condition.

Held says that the sovereignty principle ‘has a highly problematic history, and has led to many brutal regimes being wrongly regarded as equally legiti- mate members of the international community’ (Held, 2005, p. 155). The sovereignty-critical discourse fails to ask in an adequate way, what the sovereignty system created in addition to oppression and what might be the consequences of its dissolution. The new post-sovereign, post-national discourse narrows those who are accepted as legitimate representatives for their community and for themselves, and consequently it broadens the field of moral and military intervention.

Cosmopolitans tend to equate ‘power logic’ with the realist nation state (Held, 2003a, p. 163), which causes them to misrepresent the continuance of power logic and even reasons of state within the new globalized system. When confronted with the endurance of inequality and power within the global system, the answer tends to focus on residual nation state elements – not least the United States (Thorup, 2006b) – which stand in the way of a fully cosmopolitan and post-political order. When Held says that the Iraq war is ‘in danger of dragging us back to a pre-legal order and a deeply uncivil international society’ (Held, 2003b), one gets the impression that we are, with the exception of a few obstacles, living in a legal and civilized global order. Notice also the historical teleology and not least the description of the ‘uncivil international society’ as ‘pre-legal’. This is further evidence of a re-description of the nation state era.

We find a similar tendency to conflate the nation state with war in the common argument that the European states have moved beyond their bellicose past. War is being defined solely as inter-state war and the European experience is, again, being projected as a universal truth. ‘War no longer pays’, we hear (Held and McGrew, 2002a, p. 68). But this may only be true for the European post-borderland. It may not be true for the rest of the world or for the European projection of humanitarian armed force. Kaldor says in a very typical remark that: ‘In the aftermath of the Cold War, war on the inter-state model seems to have become an anachronism. Another war on the scale of the two world wars, let alone a nuclear war, seems unimaginable. Military technology has become so destructive that the capacity to capture territory militarily, even for the most advanced military powers, is severely circum- scribed’ (Kaldor, 2000, pp. 57–58).

A common observation is that present trends ‘imply a move away from absolute control of territory and from geopolitics, that is to say, the control of foreign territory in the national interest’ (Kaldor, 2003a, p. 5) and she also says: ‘The end of the Cold War probably meant the end of wars of the modern type – wars between states and groups of states’ (Kaldor, 2003b, p. 119). What both quotes indicate is the presumption that the modern state is obsolete and that the world is becoming bifurcated into what Robert Cooper (2000) called postmodern and premodern states. What, we are left with, is wars coming out of chaos, because it is ‘no longer possible to insulate territory from anarchy and disorder’ (Kaldor, 2003b, p. 6) and its (Western response). The answer to traditional war is ‘the humanitarian alternative’, which presents humanitar- ian interventions as ‘international law enforcement’ (Kaldor, 2003b, p. 134). The moral discourse and the re-description of contemporary military interventions as police operations is another potent example of the blurring of distinctions, which tend to hide problematic features of the new globalist intervention-regime. ‘Cosmopolitan law enforcement’ is another name for a new fact, the post-1989 reestablishment of the military’s task of creating not only a purpose for itself but a new state. War is still, even when coined ‘humanitarian’, the maker of states; and states are still founded on the repression of the borderland, on making in/out-distinctions. This time there is the help of cosmopolitans making the distinction between the friends (the cosmopolitans) and the enemies (the particularists, the nationalists, the statists), where only the first are considered legitimate. Cosmopolitans fail to acknowledge the role of the new humanitarian warfare in creating both a new Western state and a new constellation of global power. Mark Duffield writes very perceptively about the liberal peace (by military means):

The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way to avoid future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of authority. The imperial power dealt with opposition using physical and juridical forms of pacification, sometimes in an extreme and violent manner. Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of governance. The aim of the strategic state-non-state complexes that embody global governance is not the direct control of territory. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes. It is power through the control and management of non-territorial systems and networks. (Duffield, 2001, p. 34)

This goes to show that the lack of a new urge for territorial domination, that Kaldor, Cooper and others talk about, may actually serve the forces of domination more than hinder it. Zygmunt Bauman (2002, Chapter 3) says that one used to be able to tell the victor by the fact that he was the only one standing on the battlefield after the battle. Nowadays, the one standing is the conquered one, left behind to live in the ruins, whereas the victor is long gone. Dominance is no longer territorial, but that doesn’t make it any less oppressive.

#### Cosmo accelerates inequality and devours culture. Borders key to preserve identity.

Mearsheimer, John J. Professor of IR @ Uchicago, ’19, “Bound to Fail.” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4

The liberal international order also adopts policies that clash with national identity, which matters greatly to people all around the world, including those in the United States and Western Europe.65 At its core, liberalism is an individualistic ideology that places great weight on the concept of inalienable rights. This belief, which says that every individual on Earth has the same set of basic rights, is what underpins the universalistic dimension of liberalism. This universalistic or transnational perspective stands in marked contrast to the profound particularism of nationalism, which is built on the belief that the world is divided into discrete nations, each with its own culture. Preserving that culture is best served by having one’s own state, so that the nation can survive in the face of threats from the “other.”66

Given liberalism’s emphasis on individuals with equal rights, coupled with its tendency to downplay if not ignore national identity, it is unsurprising that the liberal international order emphasizes that countries should axiomatically accept refugees seeking shelter and that individuals should encounter few obstacles to moving from one nation-state to another for economic or other reasons. The paradigmatic example of this policy is the EU’s Schengen Agreement, which has largely eliminated borders among most of that institution’s member states. Furthermore, the EU is deeply committed in principle to opening its doors to refugees ºeeing trouble spots.

In a world where national identity matters greatly, mixing different peoples together, which is what happens when there are open borders and broadminded refugee policies, is usually a prescription for serious trouble. It seems clear, for example, that immigration was the main reason British voters supported Brexit. They were especially unhappy that people from Eastern Europe used the EU’s policy of open borders to migrate easily to Britain.67 Britain is hardly an exception in this regard, as anti-immigrant sentiment is widespread in Europe and fuels hostility toward the EU.68 The large numbers of refugees from the Greater Middle East that began arriving in Europe in 2015 have certainly not been accorded the kind of welcome one would expect from states that are at the center of the liberal international order. Indeed, there has been enormous resistance to accepting those refugees, especially in Eastern Europe, but also in Germany, where Chancellor Merkel hurt herself politically by initially welcoming them. This trouble over open borders and refugees has not only called into question the EU’s commitment to liberal values, but it has also created rifts among the member states—rifts that have shaken the foundation of that venerable institution.

#### The nation-state isn’t inherently violent, and they allow all of the exact same inside/outside distinctions to be reified in a cosmopolitan world.

Mikkel Thorup 10, Associate Professor at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, “Cosmopolitanism: Sovereignty denied or sovereignty restated?” *International Politics*, Volume 47, Number 6, 2010, pp. 659-679

[Modified for language]

Kaldor subscribes to the in/out-distinction between an anti-borderland process emanating (mainly) from the West and from cosmopolitanism and then a nationalist borderland. New nationalism is a ‘form of particularistic politicization’ (Kaldor, 1996, p. 47) that is foreign to cosmopolitanism. The latter is non-political in the sense of politics as the distinction between friend and enemies, as Kaldor restricts the friend/enemy distinction to nationalism: ‘All nationalisms are based on a “we-them” distinction in which the “them” are enemies who generally pose potential military threats and have to be excluded from the claimed territory’ (Kaldor, 1996, p. 48). Ulrich Beck says in a similar vein that ‘in the mid-seventeenth century, a secular state was inconceivable, even synonymous with the end of the world, and today a non-national state is almost equally unthinkable; it breaks with the most basic political idea: the antagonism of friend and foe’ (Beck, 2001, p. 87). The friend/enemy distinction is reserved for the nation state.

In the cosmopolitan thinking the political is high politics, security and survival between states. The anti-political tendency is the argument that we (in and among the West) need not concern ourselves any longer with ‘hard politics’, that there is, in a certain sense, no longer international politics but only what Habermas (1994, p. 22) calls ‘world domestic politics’. Put very shortly, world domestic policy is domesticated foreign policy. In fact, it is the abolition of all classical foreign policy, of all pursuits of national interests, the denial of the doctrine of legitimate self-assertion in a conflictual international environment. World domestic policy subscribes to the idea that domestic policy is more peaceful than foreign policy (a common but not necessarily true assertion). This means that there are no longer any meaningful differences between internal and external, national and international, domestic and foreign policy, and therefore also no difference between what we can expect from the ‘two’ spheres. World domestic policy is the pacified externality; the rejection of the inherent conflictual nature of the ‘international’. Ultimately, it is the denial of the international as any meaningful category and by extension, therefore, also of the national and the statist and the concept of the political claimed to reside therein.

The anti-political tendency of liberalism that this text is interested in, concerns the conflict component of the political. Post-politics, then, becomes the argument of the end of enmity. Liberal globalist endism is basically an argument of the end of the enemy. In this text the enemy is understood in its political sense as the recognized other, with whom one fights, but who is also acknowledged as one’s equal, so that the fighting is conducted within some rules and restraints; it can stop before final extermination; and fighting can then give way for negotiations, peace treaties and eventually peace, friendship and cooperation. What is significant about political enmity is its symmetry between enemies. Non-political enmities are characterized by asymmetry, that is, one does not recognize the other as one’s armed equal, but as someone inferior, morally, biologically, civilly, and so on. These are, of course, ideal types. The real world of politics is a lot more muddy and messy. Still, one can distinguish between two main forms of enmity: the symmetrical and the asymmetrical.

This text alleges that contemporary liberal globalism and cosmopolitanism operate with both registers. Internally in liberal societies and in liberal Europe the symmetrical or political enmity is being observed: Diplomacy, rules of warfare and the sovereignty principle are manifestations of political enmity (liberal societies have obviously also conducted asymmetrical wars internally against ‘domestic enemies’ or ‘domestic strangers’). Outside or beyond the line of liberalism the asymmetrical enmity reigns. This is an enmity where one side is not recognized and the conflicts tend to be exterminalist, as colonial wars testified to in the past and which humanitarian interventions may testify to in the present.

Cosmopolitanism, I argue, espouses the European liberal claim to have overcome conflictuality. This is mainly ‘achieved’ by not seeing the asymmetrical enmity as an actual relation of enmity or as something perpetrated by liberal societies; and by declaring political enmity over (at least in the West or in Europe). What is not seen in this perspective is that the European or Western abolition of symmetric enmity contained within the state system tends to produce asymmetrical enmities with non-Western states.

What it, in fact, shows is that cosmopolitanism is every bit as capable (and willing) to construct enemy-images, only not out of ethnic markers but out of the liberal fear of passions. When Held says that ‘the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes all states insecure and problematizes the very notion of “friends” and “enemies” ’(Held, 1997, p. 260, my italics), then it reserves the friend/enemy distinction to the nation state era and it becomes difficult to see its endurance in the globalist era. The same goes when he and Anthony McGrew says: ‘The idea of “global politics” challenges the traditional distinctions between the domestic/international, inside/outside, territorial/ non-territorial politics, as embedded in conventional conceptions of “the political” ’ (Held and McGrew, 1998, p. 232; 2002b, p. 6). We see ‘the political’ reduced to the nation state era and the claim of its obsolescence. Politics is not longer about the ‘other’ or ‘interests’ in a classic way. As David Chandler says in his recent book Empire in Denial:

Where national interests appear in the speeches of Western leaders and in policy documents they are generally constructed as secondary, achieved as the by-product of meeting the security and development needs of the Other. There is no longer a context of ‘friend/enemy’: the Other – the object of foreign policy – is more likely to be defined on the basis of needs: the threat is not a traditional one but is framed in the context of unmet needs: the threat stemming from the weakness and incapacity of the Other. (Chandler, 2006, pp. 72–73)

This is the kind of shift in language that the cosmopolitan discourse helps make credible. Paulina Ochoa says of cosmopolitanism that ‘it cannot account for the possibility of fundamental differences and, therefore, of conflict between them’ (Ochoa, 2001, p. 106). It is probably more correct to say that cosmopolitanism cannot account for political conflictuality because it describes it as barbarian and old-fashioned and is therefore ‘forced’ to comprehend conflict as one between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, whichever way those two terms are named in the actual case. Just as liberals in general tend to confine the political to the state, cosmopolitans and the likeminded tend to restrict the friend/ enemy-naming to the state or to belligerent movements, who, in the words of Kaldor, are ‘claiming state power’. This limited understanding of the political obscures the persistence of the political:

Bounded civil society depended on the existence of an ‘other’ even if there were different categories of ‘other’ – ‘civilized’ Europeans and ‘less civilized’ outsiders. The end of war as a unilateral option for state politics presupposes an acceptance of human equality; it eliminates the justification for the preservation of statist politics and the distinction between the inside and outside. (Kaldor, 2003b, pp. 115–116)

Kaldor is proposing a post-political scenario, but only because the political – as the naming of the ‘other’ and the ‘outside’ – is confined to the nation state era. But what she and other cosmopolitans do is to turn what she calls the ‘multilateral state’ into the inside and the ‘unilateral state’ (modern state) and the ‘failed state’ into the outside (Kaldor, 2003b, pp. 136–141) and, again, she confines ‘ideologies of the other’ (Kaldor, 2003b, p. 140) to the modern or unilateral state.

There is nothing inherently progressive or anti-statist in proclaiming an end to inside/outside or friend/enemy. It serves the interests of the powers that be to re-describe inside/outside, friend/enemy in supposedly non-statist terms. When giving the state the monopoly on this exclusion process and then proclaim the decline or end of the state, one tends to become blind [ignorant] to the new manifestations of the very same processes which were formally criticised.

The Western states can safely appropriate the post-sovereign re-description of international/global relations as they are the ones interpreting and enforcing the new conditions of legitimate statehood. The new discourse gives the Western powers a formidable new system of legitimacy, defaming and intervention. It allows them to re-describe imperial control as protection of human rights and humanitarianism. The new moral discourse depoliticizes the inherent inequalities of the system and hides the fact that not all states can authorize the discourse of humanity. The weak states are left to play the role of either victims or murderers while the strong states sentence and punish.

We are now in a situation where state sovereignty is apparently generally and universally questioned. But in actual fact only the weak states are having their sovereignty weakened and questioned. The post-modern or post-national Western states are strengthening their effective agency by sharing sovereignty whereas modern states like China, India and Brazil maintain their ‘classic’ claim to national sovereignty. What we are witnessing is an institutionalization of sovereign inequality (Chandler, 2002, pp. 139–151). The classical state system operated in principle (though not in practice) with a sovereign equality, which secured all states, even the weakest, a certain measure of protection from outside interference.

Today the move from international politics to globalist moralism expresses a redistribution of sovereignty which systematically favours some states (the interventionist ones) and disfavours others (the intervened ones). The new global system hands to the strong a new legitimacy used to control the weaker by re-describing their control as humanitarianism, protection of human rights and the like: a repression of the borderland. The new moralist discourse depoliticizes the inherent inequality in the system and hides the fact that not all states or actors can authorize the moral or humanitarian discourse. Weaker states are reduced to play the role of perpetrators or victims, both of which invite interventionism. Sovereignty is being re-described away from indepen-dence and the promise of non-interference to doctrines of good governance, inviting Western states to help weak states gain actual sovereignty at the cost of formal sovereignty: ‘In fact, governments which resisted this external assistance could, in the Orwellian language of international state-builders, be accused of undermining their own sovereignty’ (Chandler, 2006, p. 36). Stronger Western states are given, or have rather taken upon themselves, the role of judge, jury and executioner. The weaker states are submitted to a rigid control regime characterized by liberal anti-pluralism, which only accepts the liberal- democratic-capitalist regime as legitimate.

Pluralism turns out to be a liberal monism. The degrees of freedom for the weaker states are progressively getting smaller. They are not allowed transgressions of codified or moral laws, as non-liberal states are presumed guilty, whereas the humanist-moralist discourse allows the stronger Western states to violate the same laws, the codified international law (as in the Kosovo-war) and moral law (high altitude bombing, cluster bombs, and so on) because they have, what Danilo Zolo calls, ‘the presumption of humanitarian innocence’ (Zolo, 2002, pp. 109–114).

Schmitt refers our attention to the important question of who can invoke the humanitarian discourse: ‘The question is: Who actually determines what peace is? Who decides if a given situation is tolerable or not; if peace is threatened or not?’ (Schmitt, 2005, p. 342). There is, as already mentioned, a systematic inequality as to who can convincingly and legitimately invoke humanity. This is an inequality aggravated by the new post-sovereign discourse. Western states can safely rely on the verdict of the international society as it is by and large defined and constituted by them. Just like ‘humanity’ the concept of ‘international society’ is an empty one until filled with content by interested parties. A content which may be formulated and motivated in humanitarian terms but which is also highly and inescapably political and therefore principally open for critique and debate. But this conflictual open-endedness is covered up by the humanist rhetoric, which makes every critique illegitimate. Schmitt says: ‘With every decisive political concept the important thing is, who interprets, defines and uses it; who, through a concrete decision, says what is to count as peace and disarmament, what intervention, public peace and security is’ (Schmitt, 1994b, p. 202).

#### The state is sustainable.

Aristotle Kallis 18, School of Humanities, Keele University, “Populism, Sovereignty, and the Unlikely Re-Emergence of the Territorial Nation-State,” *Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci.*, Volume 11, 2018, pp. 285-302

The kind of de facto passing of the so-called Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states that MacCormick was celebrating in 1993 has been repeatedly proclaimed in the post-1945 period. Both international and transnational institutions and norms, it has been argued, have consistently eroded the sovereignty of traditional states—the majority of which have been constituted and behaved as nation-states. This is a process that is not unique to the post-World War II period. In fact, what modern political thinkers define as the ‘Westphalian system’ corresponds only partly and imperfectly with the granular reality of politics and international relations in the past four centuries. As Krasner (2001, 22) notes, the view that the erosion of traditional state sovereignty since 1945 is an exceptional trend is in itself ‘myopic’. It assumes that there was a golden era of state sovereignty that puts the twentieth century at odds with the Westphalian model; and yet various levels and degrees of compromise and conflict, resulting in contestation, cession or loss of sovereignty, have marked the entire history of the sovereign nation-state. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the contradictions and flimsy assumptions of the Westphalian model have been unravelling faster and more extensively. Challenges have come from both outside the state (trans- and international) and inside it (sub-national) (Gue ́henno 1995). As a result, state sovereignty has been receding by choice and necessity alike. On the one hand, nation-states have ceded voluntarily significant aspects—in varying degrees—of their sovereignty to a higher level of governance. On the other hand, the growing corpus of international obligations and the proliferation of transnational flows in the globalising world have de facto diluted or infringed on the norms of Westphalian sovereignty (Cuchillo 2006).

But does all this amount to a genuine post-Westphalian/sovereigntist turn? In the last two decades of the twentieth century, a number of academics, politicians, and journalists wore their confident belief in the demise of the old Westphalian world on their sleeves. The growth of inter- and transnational trade; the dramatic proliferation of international organisations and of their ability to influence decisions; the exponential expansion of technological interconnectedness; all pointed, it seemed to them, to the dawn of a new epoch of globalisation that was disrupting beyond redress the traditional authority of the nation-state (Rosenberg 2005, 3–5). Writing on the cusp of the new millennium, Elemer Hankiss discussed the globalisation- nation state dialectics and identified five main scenarios for the future. In four out of these scenarios, the power of the nation-state would suffer decline—a decline that ranged from outright implosion to transformation into an unrecognisable new political and social settlement, a ‘post-modern’ nation-state. Only one scenario envisaged the strengthening of the power of the nation-state—and this would be only be in the direction of growing authoritarianism (Hankiss 1999, 135–137). Still, in all scenarios, the fate of the nation-state was directly linked to the dynamics and direction of globalisation, the latter being the major determining factor of the future international constellation. Tellingly, the 350th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia came and passed with little fanfare in 1998 (Osiander 2001).

The prospect of a post-Westphalian future looks much less plausible from the vantage point of 2018. Since the turn of the millennium, a new era of sovereigntism has been predicated on the urgent need to reverse the trend of political and economic globalisation as inherently undemocratic and dangerous to the interests of the people (Goodhart and Taninchev 2011). The confident predictions of the 1990s regarding the wholesale universalisation of the liberal settlement, let alone about its unabashed final victory at the end of the historical time (Fukuyama 2006), appear nothing less than hubristic today. It is supranational organisations and initiatives like the EU or the International Criminal Court (Scheipers 2013, 82–102), rather than nation-states, that now fight to shore up their political legitimacy against calls for scaling back or abandoning altogether the vision of global governance.

#### General ethical principles fail to create political change.

Simon **HAILWOOD** Philosophy @ University of Liverpool **’19** in *Rethinking the Environment for the Anthropocene* eds. Manuel Arias-Maldonado & Zev Trachtenberg p. 123-126

Over recent decades a critique of the allegedly excessive moralism of much Anglophone political philosophy has developed under the heading of ‘political realism’. This comes in different forms with different points of emphasis. It is useful to distinguish four interrelated components of the critique.1 Firstly, much political philosophy distorts our understanding of politics by focusing on specific moral values (often justice) to the detriment of a range of ‘political’ values, such as legitimacy, order and stability. Secondly, moralistic political philosophy under-appreciates the extent to which the values it asserts as fundamental may be ideological. Thirdly, it under-appreciates the importance of strongly contextual forms of political judgement sensitive to concrete political conditions. This is badly served by abstract ‘grand theories’ apparently supposed to generate prescriptions for all political situations.

I will be touching on each of these issues, and especially, towards the end of the chapter, the matter of ideology. But I take the central charge to be this fourth one: much political philosophy proceeds with little or no regard to the concerns of politics as a realm more or less autonomous from morality. It presents itself as applied moral philosophy, adopting a moral standpoint prior to politics that is then expected simply to conform to that standpoint. Bernard Williams, for example, criticises ‘political moralism’ for either regarding the political as a mere instrument of the moral, or for taking morality to constrain what politics ‘...can rightfully do. In both cases, political theory is something like applied morality’ (Williams 2005, p.2). In full moralist mode, then, political philosophy proceeds ‘unrealistically’ by ignoring features internal to ‘the political’ that aren’t a matter simply of ‘doing the right thing’ as defined by an independent moral standard.

The dichotomy here between morality and politics can be drawn more or less strictly, depending on the degree of autonomy the political is given from the moral or ethical2 (Rossi & Sleat 2014, pp.690–93). Thus we can think of a ‘realism’ dimension at one end of which the logically strongest political realism (hereafter SPR) asserts full autonomy: moral normativity is unsuitable to politics, where specifically political forms of normativity hold sway. At the opposite end is pure political moralism, which regards politics as ideally a domain entirely of moral enactment or constraint. Lying between these two extremes weaker forms of realism don’t deny a place for morality in politics, but claim that political philosophy should give greater weight than it often does to the autonomy of distinctively political concerns and constraints. This is probably Williams’ view. I think weaker versions are the most defensible and their definitive central claim plausible: morality is hardly unimportant in politics, but political philosophy shouldn’t proceed simply as applied moral philosophy without regard to distinctively political concerns. I will shortly offer some reasons in favour of weaker political realism and argue that the figure of the political moralist is at least often a strawman. I will then go on to discuss parallels with analogously strong forms of Anthropocene advocacy; analogous that is to SPR. Firstly though, it might be thought that I am myself setting up a strawman in talking about the strongest form of political realism as if it was actually held by anyone. Surely no one thinks that politics ought to be thought a completely autonomous domain where morality is altogether out of place? Maybe not. I am not committed to claiming that anyone does hold SPR in a fully unqualified form;3 I am taking it as an ideal limit defining the end of a spectrum of views.

There are clearly strong and familiar reasons for preferring weaker forms of rea- lism over SPR. One is motivated by sensitivity to our historical context as one of value pluralism and disagreement. The fact of pluralism and disagreement is a definitive problem of modernity and this is a reason for us not to identify political philosophy with a comprehensive ethical standpoint. Many are bound to disagree, and it is pointless to posit a merely theoretical consensus and derive normative political conclusions from that. On the other hand, although political thought is needed to consider how to accommodate pervasive disagreement and secure the legitimacy of coercive institutions despite it, it is difficult not to see this as a moral question as well as a political question.

#### Production of rupture does not equate to change.

Andrew **HOM** School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh **’18** “Silent Order: the Temporal Turn in Critical International Relations” *Millennium* 46(3) p. 324-330

These silent assumptions and hidden logics help ‘characterize’ and thus ‘control’ times of rupture,200 transforming it from a description of traumatic and unlivable conditions to the foundation of a novel ethics that insists we ‘remain with uncertainty’ and ‘hope that something different’ will emerge.201 They are what take us from difference itself to a future ‘deemed worthy of being aspired towards’.202 They thus obscure the need to make alternatives tangible, which is vital for critique’s sake and for the everyday politics of individuals who do not enjoy the privilege of remaining in sheer contingency and indeterminacy.203 And they inhibit any evaluation of ruptured time as a ‘practical question’ of what it actually ‘does’, its ‘effects’, and how it works.204

To drive this point home, recall an earlier vision of novelty and difference tinged by tragedy. Hannah Arendt embraced ‘natality’ as moments of pure possibility but insisted these be tempered by a political sensitivity to potentially catastrophic unintended consequences. Each birth, in her formulation, is ‘uniquely new’ but includes no guarantees – ‘authentic’ novelty might be ‘all-destructive’.205 Ignoring these implications depoliticises and gentrifies novelty and leaves us poorly prepared to resist depredation when it (re-) emerges.206 Only by ignoring or sublimating the heavy lifting can critical scholars pass over a ‘rainbow bridge’207 of sorts that turns the start of the political problem – radical change – into the self-sufficient conclusion of ‘another politics’**,** which occludes the need to reduce contingency while avoiding catastrophe. So while deeply suspicious of promises to ‘take us from here to there’ or move us from past through present toward a better future,208 the critical discourse of rupture works – like the rapture itself – on the assumption ‘of being carried onward or swept along’ by ‘forces of movement’ that emerge independent of conscious effort.209 The rapture of rupture thus marks a missed opportunity, beginning with a legitimately ‘different perspective on time and politics’210 but producing a concept with ‘little relevance to life’211 because it demurs at precisely the point when it becomes necessary to lean on the scales, to encourage this time (or these times) instead of that and thereby privilege some purposes and politics over others. Ruptures are golden opportunities to develop another, better or less awful politics – as such they require more than hope, nebulous experimentation,212 or the refusal to say any more than ‘what I think it does for me’.213 Unless we think novel harms impossible and better outcomes naturally assured, ruptures mark a moment when it is vital to wilfully construct or at least reflexively delimit political time anew.214

#### Value shifts don’t produce new societies or institutions – they cement inequality and the squo.

Schlosberg and Coles 15 (David Schlosberg is Professor of Environmental Politics in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, and co-Director of the Sydney Environment Institute and Romand Coles is a research professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University, “The new environmentalism of everyday life: Sustainability, material flows and movements” June 30 2015, http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/296/art%253A10.1057%252Fcpt.2015.34.pdf?originUrl=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1057%2Fcpt.2015.34&token2=exp=1466870824~acl=%2Fstatic%2Fpdf%2F296%2Fart%25253A10.1057%25252Fcpt.2015.34.pdf%3ForiginUrl%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Flink.springer.com%252Farticle%252F10.1057%252Fcpt.2015.34\*~hmac=7c6cf3d799fe7e1284f74bb28db00898ccce56c07eabdbcfd6c5e2b5dd6ddac8)

Politically, Inglehart was originally interested in explaining social movements of the type that developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and the way that values were being expressed both traditionally, in standard electoral and legislative interest group pressure processes, and in grassroots political engagements such as protests, boycotts and direct action. While recent work focuses on broader comparative studies of postmaterial or post-modern values (Inglehart, 1997) and the cultural shift they collectively bring, the ongoing idea is that political change comes from individual citizens who insist (either directly or through public opinion polling) that such values be represented and addressed by interest groups and/or their representatives in democratic states. The basis of this post-materialist thesis is that there will be a fairly direct link between the **shift in individual values**, **a larger cultural shift, and a change in the political environment**, such that policies will then be reflective of these new values; this post-materialism assumes liberal pluralism. There have been numerous critiques of the way post-materialism assumes less developed nations and peoples would have less interest in environment – for example, the literature on ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Guha and MartinezAlier, 1997, along with many of Vandana Shiva’s works), as well as the reality of environmental justice struggles in relation to toxic waste and myriad other issues in poor communities in the United States (Bullard, 1993; Szasz, 1994). In addition, work by Dunlap on environmental values has long illustrated their presence in many countries, cultures, and economic conditions, contradicting the tight association of environmental values with post-material conditions (for example, Dunlap and Mertig, 1997). So the idea of material preconditions for environmental values has already been problematized in theory and practice. Our argument is that the assumptions of the post-material thesis about both politics and disembodiment are also **problematic.** One issue is that **the predicted political flow, from changed individual or collective values to the adoption of related public policies, faces an important counter-flow**, long noted by critics of liberal pluralism. Contemporary actors are laden with a set of values that are reflected neither in formal politics and policy nor in the everyday interactions with the materials of basic needs. There is, thus, an **implementation deficit** that has become increasingly obvious and salient. Frustration with the disconnect between political and ecological values and both the everyday and large-scale political, cultural and industrial landscape and flows in which we find ourselves, we argue, has led to a growth of new groups and movements with a different – much more **embodied and applied** – idea of appropriate and **necessary political action.** **It is more than simply an** **awareness of values** **not being implemented, or of existing practices being destructive** and counter to those values. This awareness of the disconnect is tied to an understanding of our concern below, about circulatory power. Political actors in the movements we discuss understand the process of translating these values into policy to be: **thwarted by political economies of circulatory power** (including the flows between corporate power and the megastate (Wolin, 2008)); and unstable insofar as they undergo reversals that appear to be a consequence of both concerted misinformation from vested corporate interests, and poor framing and organizing on the part of environmental organizations. This type of analysis has led to an increasingly widespread **rethinking of power and the place of values in contemporary society**, and this rethinking is in turn beginning to engender **potent disruptions.** These later take the form of counter- and alter-practices, powers and flows that pose new challenges to both the current biopolitical regime achieved through political economies of megacirculation and the post-materialist theoretical frame that has had substantial purchase during the period of this regime’s greatest intensification and dominance. Insofar as materiality comes to be understood in terms of flows among people, non-human beings, things, and ecosystems, as we will elaborate in our third frame, **values are no longer conceived as a realm somehow added from outside to material facts.** Rather they are increasingly understood as **immanent to the relations and orientations among moving beings** – the practices, impacts, extractions, deposits, accumulations, dynamics, flourishing, degradations and enhancements in a world of **becoming** (for example, Connolly, 2011). From this vantage point, the sharp distinction between materialism and values makes little sense either as an ethical or a political frame. This is a post-postmaterialism – a politics made as an alternative to the idea of a post-materialist politics where one’s values are represented in existing political practice. The movements at the center of this project are focused on **replacing unsustainable practices**, and forging alternative productive and sustainable flows and **institutions** – inserting themselves into wholly new **material flows** that are both politically and ecologically a **form of resistance**. No longer willing to take part in unsustainable practices and institutions, and not satisfied with a purely individualistic consumer, organization member or electoral response, the focus is increasingly on building new collective institutions around everyday practices of **material sustainability**. We are – to paraphrase a venerable tradition of thinking that is at odds with modern subjectivism and the discourse of post-materialism – far more being, or material becoming, than thinking. If this is so, then to understand much about contemporary ‘values’ – and **to work to transform our everyday lives, economies, polities and the values with which they are intertwined – will require** **political interventions at the level of** bodies and **materi**al practices: How and what food do we produce? What relationships do those of us who do not produce most of what we eat have with those who do, and the animals, plants, soil and water on their farms? What habits of eating do and might we have? What practices of sharing and distributing food? What micro practices and disciplines of agro-ecological pedagogy do we cultivate in our schools? How are our rural and urban landscapes intertwined? How do we exchange seeds? Similar questions of bodies and material practices are being raised in relation to energy, crafts, water, medicines, currency and more. Power, Flows, Circulations Clearly related, we see these movements serving as embodied responses and counters to circulatory power. For Foucault, security and governmentality begin with the ‘suppression of city walls’, which started to come down in the eighteenth century in response to economic growth and increasing trade; circulation of grains, goods, and people; and problems of hygiene in the midst of overcrowding. (Foucault, 2009, p. 18). The ‘problem of circulation’ – of which towns were to become ‘the perfect agents’ – is increasingly the crucial context in the exercise of power Yet circulation is not merely a context for the apparatus of security; rather it becomes integral to the operation of this new mode of power. Governmentality works with, insinuates itself into, juxtaposes and utilizes circulations. Security operates by infiltrating, influencing and utilizing flows of criminals, goods, grains, unemployed, illegal immigrants, disease, trade and so on, in order to achieve macro outcomes that are deemed power enhancing and thus desirable. Moreover, institutions of securitized power function not only by infiltrating, but also by producing and proliferating circulations in ways that tend to reconstruct the world and human beings in order to maximize flows that generate power. While the increased circulation of grain in the eighteenth century is among the conditions that spur the development of governmentality, Pollan’s (2007) discussion of the circulation of a global ‘river of corn’ illustrates the extreme form such power takes today – to which new food movements reply. The human body has a relatively limited capacity to absorb food, but the industrial food circulation complex has increasingly overcome this limit by, for example, adding high-fructose corn syrup into what we eat and drink, thereby overriding biological mechanisms which otherwise shut down hunger. Our bodies, desires and lifeworlds are being reworked daily to transform us into ‘industrial eaters’. Thus three-fifths of the US population is now overweight and increasingly plagued by numerous associated diseases. Americans, Pollen argues, even have particular isotopes in their bodies that mark the flow and power of the corn-based industrialized agriculture industry in their country. ‘So that’s us: processed corn, walking’ (2007, p. 23). Berry (2010) poignantly summarizes our situation: ‘The ideal industrial food consumer would be strapped to a table with a tube running from the food factory directly into his or her stomach’ (p. 146) – an image even Disney illustrated in the animated film ‘Wall-E’ (Stanton et al, 2008). The economic circulation of corn represents and exemplifies the embodiment and functioning of contemporary power. In response, new food and agricultural movements are developing alternative circulations to replace problematic industrialized and power-driven practices. The point is to step outside of the industrialized circulation of power through food and its associated institutions and practices, and develop alternative flows of food – from more sustainable and small-scale farm practices, to direct-to-seller farmers markets, community-supported agriculture arrangements, Food Policy Councils, urban The new environmentalism of everyday life © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 15, 2, 160–181 169 gardens and more. Our argument is that contemporary movements around food, energy, water, transport and basic needs are often consciously responding to circulatory power. Some of the most interesting loci of alternative flows have emerged from people struggling to create new forms of life that draw upon legacies of those **struggling on the undersides of power**. Indeed, many parts of the environmental justice movement have long focused on the circulation and infusion of toxins into the bodies of women, children and people of color (Sze, 2006; Gabrielson, 2011), and they are attentive to the fact that these groups remain disproportionately excluded from circulations of healthy food (Alcon and Agyeman, 2011). Typical of growing numbers of initiatives across the United States, in Austin, Texas, the Sustainable Food Center has established Happy Kitchen/La Cocina Alegre, in which mostly women (many immigrants of color) share recipes, nutritional information and incorporate fresh seasonal foods into their meals. Graduates of this program often become its future teachers, thus creating alternatives to typical ‘expert’ flows of information, and advocating for food justice aimed at disrupting dominant flows of power (Winne, 2011). On the farming side, Women, Food, and Agriculture Network has organized the women who own almost one-half of the farmland in the United States to advance more sustainable agricultural flows (http://wfan.or/about/). Movements indebted to Chicana feminism and the United Farm Workers increasingly problematize borders and dominant circulations of food and farm workers, while embracing new flows of people, sustainable modes of agricultural production, and alternatives to the racing course of things in food processing plants (for example, Apostolidis, 2010). In all these ways, those who have been subjected to the most damaging impacts of contemporary mega-circulations are among those co-creating a politics of just and sustainable material flows. In each of these cases, movements **move beyond critique** and seek to **replace practices and circulations of power that have devastating consequences for human health and ecological sustainability**, **generate vast inequalities of power, and separate us from the co-creation and sharing of basic everyday needs**. They unplug individuals and collectives from these flows of industrialized food, **destructive fossil fuels**, and sweat-shopped disposable fashion in order to **interrupt their power**. While part of the attraction is the esthetics and experience of the products themselves, the focus here is on the role both the maker and consumer play in displacing undesirable flows of power and, crucially, embodying new and more, local, productive and sustainable circulations of goods and power in wholly new institutions (see also Coles, 2012). While there are numerous examples of movement organizations taking on specific issues, flows and circulations, we see a range of these themes come together, for example, in the transition and localist movements. Originally begun in the United Kingdom, transition towns have spread across Europe, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. The idea of the movement is to lower or eliminate dependence on Schlosberg and Coles 170 © 2016 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914 Contemporary Political Theory Vol. 15, 2, 160–181 carbon-based energy, and to re-design and re-create various practices of local production while maintaining a high quality of life. As Barry (2012, p. 27) argues, the transition town movement illustrates a ‘creative adaptive management’ approach to building more resilient communities. They are based on the ‘basic belief that communities of people can shape the conditions (socio-ecological and social) for their own flourishing’ (p. 115). Likewise, as Hess (2009) explores, the localist movement in the United States, embodied, for example, in the Business Alliance for Local Living Economies. While quite diverse and pluralist, the localist movement stands as a counter to the practices and impacts of global corporations, and offers ‘ingredients in projects to build more democratic, just, and sustainable politics for the twenty-first century, or at least for mitigating what some believe to be an inevitable future of environmental and social collapse’ (Hess, 2009, p. 22). Building on this, we see in these movements a response to flawed and failing everyday practices that are embedded in steady flows of contemporary power relations, and reconstructive actions that take direct responsibility for interrupting and replacing such flows and re-localizing and regionalizing much of what has been taken away from communities. The goal is not simply resilience against current flows, but a transition away from them. Radical transformations of such power will require vast networks, practices, **institutions** and emergent powers of counter- and alter-circulation. These new materialist movements illustrate a growing resistance to participating in the flows of power that reproduce **practices** that **damage ecosystems or contribute to climate change**. In embodying new forms of power, and being part of more sustainable flows of food, energy, and other everyday needs, these movements simultaneously express forms of resistance and empowerment. They are a counter-governmentality, an environmental/sustainable governmentality (Hobson, 2013).

#### The law is a key tool for counter-hegemony. Legal strategies to enforce equality in consumption don’t require a collective subject or shared history.

Alessandro **FERRARA** History, Humanities and Society @ University of Rome Tor Vergata **’17** “Curbing the Absolute Power of Disembedded Financial Markets: The Grammar of Counter-Hegemonic Resistance and the Polanyian Narrative” in *Feminism, Capitalism, and Critique* eds. Bargu & Bottici p. 178-180

RETHINKING THE GRAMMAR OF COUNTER-HEGEMONIC RESISTANCE

I would like here to highlight an additional facet of the question “why capitalism gone global and disembedded financial markets do not meet a comparable counter-movement aimed at restoring protection, but only rearguard partisans of nationalistic closure?” Fraser rightly draws our attention to the need for addressing, on the part of the social movements of the present, the complicated tripolar tension of marketization, protection, and emancipation. I think another dimension needs to be woven into Fraser’s account, which (like so many emancipatory perspectives of the past) remains primarily focused on social movements: the potential of struggles “about and within the law” for generating a protection that becomes ever more elusive due to the fragmentation of social subjects. In a context where production is outgrown by financial gain, and profit by rent, social class as we know it from the older phases of capitalism is simply gone as the subject of social and political resistance. In the twenty-first century, class may well follow the destiny of pre-modern caste – becoming a relic of the past. Who can then be the subject of social resistance and of opposition against neoliberal financialized capitalism and against the absolute power of disembedded financial markets?

Fraser and other critical theorists share a mistrust of law as the locus and the propagator of a strategic habitus, in turn detrimental to social integration, and against juridification as one of the main causes for widespread “de-politicization.”5 Such attitude in a way leads Fraser to oversee the fact that law has the advantage – crucial in our context – of not presupposing a collective subject, shared narratives and memory in the way politics does. It may presuppose some of these things when it is statutory law, enacted by legislative assemblies composed of parties in perpetual need of electoral victory. But law does not presuppose unified collective subjectivity when it takes the form of common law or when it is applied. Furthermore, if there is one social function that has escaped fragmentation and has remained truly universal, that is the function – again, not highly regarded in critical circles – of consumption. We participate in social production in a variety of capacities, difficult to reconcile in an oppositional and anti-hegemonic project, but we are all consumers and in such capacity we all experience the frustrating and alienating experience of being a dispensable atom confronted with enormous economic forces that dictate rules over which we only have a very tenuous influence as individuals and small groups. Sometimes these forces are private sector companies, sometimes utility or insurance companies, telecommunication companies, at other times regulatory agencies, rating agencies, banks, that often detract from the quality of our life through the arbitrary power they exert and the particular interests they pursue.

Consumer protection through class action was born in certain circles outside the discourse of emancipation, it has acquired public prominence through figures like Ralph Nader and has even been constitutionalized in the EU. In fact, Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Official Journal), now included in the Lisbon Treaty, provides for “a high level of consumer protection.” EU citizens live in a legal order where equality is a principle that inspires, if not strictly regulates, not only the public realm, for which it was originally conceived, but also the sphere of the private relations that unfold in the economy. Whereas antitrust legislation is an application of the principle of equality in the sphere of economic relations among major market players in the interest of everyone else, the aim of Article 38 is to bridge the gap between the influence of the great market players and the single atomized consumer without falling back into the regressive utopia of the abolition of the market.

Nothing prevents us qua theorists of emancipation from injecting a strong normative content into consumer-protection through class-action and from understanding class-action, especially in legal systems that supplement it with provisions about “punitive damages,” as the implementation of a strong principle of equality that forces the market to truly vindicate one of the premises on which its appeal rests – the equal standing of the contracting parties. Thus nothing prevents theorists of emancipation from giving class-action and punitive damages – the indispensable tools of consumer protection – a whole new twist. Nothing except our received image of “resistance” to the neoliberal agenda – shaped after protection-oriented and class-based resistance to manufacturing Fordist capitalism – prevents us from perceiving class-action as a tool as flexible as its enemy’s strategies and also capable of affirming the value of equality. Nothing but our negative prejudice against “consumption” prevents us from seeing that this truly universal and multifaceted social and economic relation can constitute a terrain of contestation where at stake – as it used in the time when wage-labor and exploitation held center-stage – is nothing less than the principle of equality. “Equal protection of the laws” needs to acquire a new meaning, beyond racial and gender equality, connected more firmly with equality of opportunity in the market, where essential goods, services, utilities, and experiences are sold on which often the quality of life depends.

#### Borderless alternative means class fracture and greater inequality.

James **DWYER** Associate Professor of Bioethics and Humanities @ SUNY Upstate Medical University **‘4** “Illegal Immigrants, Health Care, and Social Responsibility” *The Hastings Center Report* 34 (1) p. 38-39

A Matter of Human Rights To deal with the issue of health care and illegal immigrants, some adopt a humanistic framework and employ a discourse of human rights. They tend to emphasize the right of all human beings to medical treatment, as well as the common humanity of aliens and citizens, pointing to the arbitrary nature of national borders. National borders can seem arbitrary. Distinctions based on national borders seem even more arbitrary when one studies how borders were established and the disparities in wealth and health that exist between countries. Since it doesn't seem just that some people should be disadvantaged by arbitrary boundaries, it may also seem that people should have the right to emigrate from wherever they are and to immigrate to wherever they wish. But does this follow from the fact that national borders can be seen as arbitrary? John Rawls thinks not. He writes: It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are historically arbitrary that their role in the Law of Peoples cannot be justified. On the contrary, to fix on their arbitrariness is to fix on the wrong thing. In the absence of a world state, there must be boundaries of some kind, which when viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical circumstances.13 Even if boundaries depend on historical circumstances, a defined territory may allow a people to form a government that acts as their agent in a fair and effective way. A defined territory may allow a people to form a government that enables them to take responsibility for the natural environment, promote the well-being of the human population, deal with social problems, and cultivate just political institutions.14 From functions like these, governments derive a qualified right to regulate immigration. This right is not an unlimited right of communal self-determination. Societies do not have a right to protect institutions and ways of life that are deeply unjust. Furthermore, even when a society has a right to regulate immigration, there are ethical questions about whether and how the society should exercise that right. And there are ethical questions about how immigrants should be treated in that society. The committed humanist, who begins with reflections on the arbitrary nature of national boundaries, sometimes reaches the same conclusion as the global capitalist: that all restrictions on labor mobility are unjustified. In their different ways, both the humanist and the capitalist devalue distinctions based on political community. To be sure, there is much to criticize about existing political communities, but we need to be cautious about some of the alternatives. Michael Walzer warns us about two possibilities. He says that to "tear down the walls of the state is not ... to create a world without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses."'5 Without state regulation of immigration, local communities may become more exclusionary, parochial, and xenophobic. Walzer also notes another possibility: "The fortresses, too, could be torn down: all that is necessary is a global state sufficiently powerful to overwhelm the local communities. Then the result would be ... a world of radically deracinated men and women."'6 Of course, the humanist need not be committed to an abstract position about open borders. The humanist might accept that states have a qualified right to regulate immigration, but insist that all states must respect the human rights of all immigrantslegal and illegal. That idea makes a lot of sense, although much depends on how we specify the content of human rights. The idea that all human beings should have equal access to all beneficial health care is often used to critique both national and international arrangements. In an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine, Paul Farmer reflects on the number of people who go untreated for diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV. He writes: Prevention is, of course, always preferable to treatment. But epidemics of treatable infectious diseases should remind us that although science has revolutionized medicine, we still need a plan for ensuring equal access to care. As study after study shows the power of effective therapies to alter the course of infectious disease, we should be increasingly reluctant to reserve these therapies for the affluent, low-incidence regions of the world where most medical resources are concentrated. Excellence without equity looms as the chief human-rights dilemma of health care in the 21st century.17 I too am critical of the gross inequalities in health within countries and between countries, but here I only want to make explicit the framework and discourse of Farmer's critique. His critique appeals to two ideas: that there is a lack of proportion between the medical resources and the burden of disease and that there is a human right to equal access. What is wrong with the claim that equal access to health care is a human right? First, to claim something as a right is more of a conclusion than an argument. Such claims function more to summarize a position than to further moral discussion. A quick and simple appeal to a comprehensive right avoids all the hard questions about duties and priorities. When faced with grave injustices and huge inequalities, claiming that all human beings have a right to health care is easy. Specifying the kind of care to which people are entitled is harder. Specifying duties is harder yet. And getting those duties institutionalized is hardest of all.

#### Far right internationalism produces the same fears of nationalism.

Grayson and Little 11 (Deborah and Ben, The far right are the masters of network politics, not the 'internationalist' left, 8/4/11, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/deborah-grayson-and-ben-little/far-right-are-masters-of-network-politics-not-internationa)

While Norway mourns and attends to matters of justice, across Europe the left would be wise to pause and reflect upon the mixed responses to the worst case of child murder in northern Europe since the Second World War. We can only hope that Anders Breivik is a lone operator and that we will not see this kind of politically motivated mass murder repeated in the UK or anywhere else, but in showing how right wing ideology is formed and disseminated through increasingly international networks, the Utoya massacre has lessons for us all.

Although globally oriented ‘lefties’ may like to think this is a contradiction in terms, it is the far right who are pioneering the way towards a new form of internationalism. This is not to say that they have lost their attachment to the nation – for all that vigilantes like Breivik may think in civilisational or European terms, “small state” nationalism remains the bedrock of their politics. Those that see the blurring of boundaries between European and national perspectives as a sign of incoherence which will diminish the power of these ideological beliefs are mistaken. In an age of network politics it's a strength, and one that the left needs to understand if we are to reverse the electoral successes of the centre-right and the populist rise of the far-right across Europe. So far, the left has struggled to match the way far-right networks have learned to scale seamlessly from the local to the civilisational through the conceptual space of the national. The English Defence League, for example, explain local opposition to their marches as stemming from the malign influence of the SWP’s campaign, Unite Against Fascism; cite the welfare state as evidence of leftist domination in national politics; and see in the European Court of Human Rights the imposition of socialist, multicultural values across the entire continent. This sense of multiple scales allows the EDL to create a language that reflects their politics at every level, and to communicate their message across local and national boundaries. They create a unified rhetoric that the left, with their suspicion of the national, cannot replicate.

#### Cosmopolitanism props up hegemonic structures and reproduces the status quo — Algerian and Vietnam wars prove

Conversi, Sociology PhD, 2K (Daniele, Ikerbasque research Professor (Italian). Doctor in Sociology 1994 from the London School of Economics, 'Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism', in Athena Leoussi and Anthony D Smith (eds) Encyclopaedia of Nationalism, Oxford: Transaction Books, 2000, pp. 34-39)

The study of the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism raises more questions than answers, because both concepts lend themselves to contradictory interpretations, lacking empirical -- indeed, universal -- clarity. Are nationalism and cosmopolitanism deeply opposed and inconsistent? or, rather, are they mutually compatible ? These questions are pointless if we employ the two terms too loosely. Unfortunately, they are often utilized as either eulogies or pejoratives, without specifying their contextual meanings. For instance, nationalists have often used the term 'cosmopolitan' as an invective, while 'cosmopolitans' have correspondingly abused and distorted the term nationalism. As personal ennoblement, cosmopolitanism implies an emphasis on sophistication, openness to other ideas and cultures, acquaintance with the ways of the world. As affront and offense, it implies lack of loyalty and aristocratic decadence. In a more neutral usage, a cosmopolitan is someone who regards the whole world as his/her native homeland. Ideally, a citizen of the world should be exempt from national prejudices. Yet, an emphasis on cosmopolitan can actually conceal its antithesis and be strategically used as coverture to hide one's own sectional interests (Likewise, a stress on nationalism can occult a dearth of patriotic allegiance). For this reason, cosmopolitanism has been seen as a rhetorical device used by existing elites to justify the status quo, by attempting to 'universalize' the hegemonic pretensions of the dominant culture, while denying legitimacy to minority ones. For instance, the French wars against Algeria and Vietnam were also justified on the ground that independence would have cut these countries off from the stream of universal progress as only accessible through French language and culture. No wonder then that nationalists have often seen cosmopolitan ideas with deep suspicion. Ernest Gellner mentions that nationalists have been hostile "not merely to rival cultures, but also, and perhaps with special venom, to bloodless cosmopolitanism, probably in part because they perceived it an ally of political centralism".

#### Global governance and one-world are bad — nation-states lead to institutional experimentation and diversity — the aff leads to stagnation and homogeneity

Rodrik, PhD, 12 (Dani Rodrik, Prof. in Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard, “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— Who Needs the Nation-State?” *Economic Geography*, 89(1): 1-19)

Finally, since there is no fixed, ideal shape for institutions and diversity is the rule rather than exception, a divided global polity presents an additional advantage. It enables experimentation, competition among institutional forms, and learning from others. To be sure, trial and error can be costly when it comes to society’s rules. Still, institutional diversity among nations is as close as we can expect to come to a laboratory in real life. Ober (2010) discussed how competition among Greek city-states during 800–300 BCE fostered institutional innovation in areas of citizenship, law, and democracy, sustaining the relative prosperity of ancient Greece. There are nasty sides to institutional competition. One of them is the nineteenth- century idea of a Darwinian competition among states, whereby wars are the struggle through which we get progress and self-realization of humanity (Kedourie 1993, 47). The equally silly, if less bloody, modern counterpart of this idea is the notion of economic competition among nations, whereby global commerce is seen as a zero-sum game. Both ideas are based on the belief that the point of competition is to lead us to the one perfect model. But competition works in diverse ways. In economic models of “monopolistic competition,” producers compete not just on price but on variety—by differentiating their products from others’ (Lancaster 1971; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). Similarly, national jurisdictions can compete by offering institutional “services” that are differentiated along the dimensions I discussed earlier. One persistent worry is that institutional competition sets off a race to the bottom. To attract mobile resources—capital, multinational enterprises, and skilled professionals— jurisdictions may lower their standards and relax their regulations in a futile dynamic to outdo other jurisdictions. Once again, this argument overlooks the multidimensional nature of institutional arrangements. Tougher regulations or standards are presumably put in place to achieve certain objectives: they offer compensating benefits elsewhere. We may all wish to be free to drive at any speed we want, but few of us would move to a country with no speed limit at all where, as a result, deadly traffic accidents would be much more common. Similarly, higher labor standards may lead to happier and more productive workers; tougher financial regulation to greater financial stability; and higher taxes to better public services, such as schools, infrastructure, parks, and other amenities. It is interesting that at the time that I wrote this essay, the European debate on bank capital requirements focused not on ensuring that countries do not undercut harmonized rules but on ensuring that they do not raise their requirements too far above Basel III norms.

#### National policymaking is necessary to actualize post-national interests.

Gifford 4 (Christopher, June 2004, University of Huddersfield. “National and post-national dimensions of citizenship education in the UK,” Citizenship Studies 8.2, Informaworld)

Habermas' conception of civic patriotism is linked to a reform of the political system as a solution to the problems of democracy posed by globalisation (1999). An alternative is to begin with the actual lifeworlds of individuals and to consider the opportunities and resources that these provide for realising citizenship. A useful starting point is to consider the extent to which individuals are increasingly participants not in states or other territorial entities but discursive networks of contested information and knowledge ([Castells, 1996](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b4); [Delanty, 1998](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b6)). This is particularly relevant for conceiving of a post-national European citizenship:

Europe is neither a political or cultural community, and neither is it a society, in the conventional sense of this term, based on a principle of consensus. This leads to the conclusion that if Europe cannot be a 'real' community perhaps it can become a 'virtual' one. This virtual society is not one that is constituted as a system of values but a discursive framework. Europe cannot become a democracy in the sense of being based on a citizenship of participation. Under the conditions of societal complexity, we can no longer take for granted a model of democratic participation on the supranational level. There is little point in holding on to a model that has already reached its historical limits on the national level and expecting that it will solve the democratic deficit on the European level. ([Delanty, 2000](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b7), p. 118)

This suggests that constructing a post-national European citizenship may in fact represent a genuine act of political creativity based on the analytical recognition of Europe's contemporary sociological uniqueness. A post-national citizenship emerges within diverse and plural political communities that are imminent and discursively constituted ([Stewart, 2001](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b32), p. 208). This conception of citizenship is specifically related to the decline in trust for institutional elites and technocratic politics. Such a context enables publics, conceived in all their diversity, to become the mediators of fundamental political issues. This has particularly been the case with regards to the politicisation of science and technology and the environment and the role of some social movements as 'sites of political empowerment' (p. 233). This is concomitant with a citizenship education curriculum focused on topical and controversial issues such as the conflict in Iraq, asylum and environmental and development issues. In this respect, the comprehensive range of information and materials currently offered over the internet by European and international N.G.Os is providing a key resource for citizenship education. Notably political and campaigning organisations have been involved in developing materials for the citizenship education curriculum (see, for example, Surfers Against Sewage, 〈www.sas.org〉, and Actionaid, 〈www.actionaid.org〉). From such a perspective, citizenship education should engage with the repositioning of young people's political engagement around single-issue campaigns and global politics. There is now evidence that young people are far from politically apathetic and are indeed acting on their political concerns ([Roker et al., 1999](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b30)) with the potential for establishing new forms of solidarity, locally, nationally and transnationally. This conception of post-national citizenship must prioritise cultural dissensus:

Taking up Habermas's notion of communication as discursive, we can make the observation that knowledge today is increasingly taking the form of contested knowledge in such matters of group boundaries and in the fundamental codes of group membership, as well as matters pertaining to scientific expertise. Thus, what is distinctive about current forms of collective identities is their ability to contest existing social frameworks and cultural codes. The culture of contestation in identity politics is rivalled only by that in knowledge production more generally'. ([Delanty, 2000](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b7), p. 119)

We can see in this argument an implicit application and extension of Iris Young's radical pluralist conception of citizenship that rejects any homogenous universalism ([Young, 1989](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b36), [1990](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b37), [2000](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b38)). From such a perspective, difference is identified not as the problem of late modernity but as a cultural resource fundamental to the expression of an alternative democratic citizenship ([Stewart, 2001](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b32), pp. 205-10). This does not imply denying the possibility of constructing a national citizenry but locating it within a broader post-national context. In the UK, public debates over institutional racism, faith schools and asylum have drawn attention to the problems and failures associated with recreating Britishness. A post-national cultural citizenship implies that these experiences of difference and exclusion are not considered to be evidence of a lack of individual citizenship but are the substance of citizenship learning in diverse and multicultural societies. Osler and Starkey, for instance, question assumptions that young people from ethnic minorities 'require extra instruction in national citizenship' and highlight the failure 'to appreciate that these young people are likely to bring considerable insights to their citizenship learning' (2003, p. 248). In particular, the structural disadvantage and disempowerment of young people should be at the centre of citizenship education. This implies drawing on their experiences of social problems such as racism, bullying, and crime in an attempt to make sense of dangerous journeys to citizenship. The concern is to construct new networks and patterns of activity and publicity within which the experiences of young people can be included. Conclusion Citizenship education potentially becomes an important space amongst many in which we learn to become active citizens creating diverse and complex communities. However, for this to occur it requires a consideration of the deeper dimensions of citizenship learning. This 'shifts the focus away from the fact of membership of a polity onto common experiences, cognitive processes, forms of cultural translation and discourses of empowerment' ([Delanty, 2003b](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b8a), p. 602). I briefly propose three key features that are central for learning citizenship: the sociological, the restorative and the experiential. The sociological element asserts the importance of challenging a culture of individualism through the recognition of the interconnection between personal biography and history ([Mills, 1970](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a713617911&fulltext=713240928#b25)). This recognises that the practice of citizenship is dependent on the kind of self-awareness and self-confidence that can connect personal troubles with public issues. Citizenship must be able to express the uniqueness of a personal identity while recognising that this unique identity is shaped through social interdependence. The purpose here is to generate a critical understanding of competing conceptions of the good life. The second element is concerned with restoring dignity to individual and collective lifeworlds. Specifically, it addresses symbolic violence, such as racism and sexism, and the problem of invisibility and loss of voice within a competitive capitalist economy. This second dimension emphasises that lifeworlds can only be fully restored through forms of collective recognition and action within diverse public spheres that go beyond the national arena. The implication here is that restorative justice is likely to lead to calls for redistributive justice. The third dimension of citizenship education suggests that it must be learnt through the experience of practical political engagement within contexts of plurality and diversity. This is not based on the detached form of rational argumentation put forward by Habermas but on a politics of involvement and experience. The idea that citizenship is an ongoing learning experience as expressed in various UK and European policy documents is itself a radical idea. Thus, despite the real limitations posed by dominant and regressive political discourses and structures of social injustice, these policies allow spaces for genuine experiences of the transformatory potential of becoming a citizen to take place. It has been the argument of this paper that this can be best achieved if citizenship is conceived within a post-national cultural context. The teaching of post-national citizenship would emphasise the sociological, restorative and experiential dimensions of becoming a citizen and their applicability to European and global public spheres. Such initiatives would, however, only be fully realised if they resulted in genuine opportunities for young people not only to become involved in policy making, but to actively transform and create institutional structures in ways that prioritise their active citizenship.

#### Social rights require anchoring nation-state policies

Schwartz, PhD, 7 (Joseph, Political Science @ Temple, “From Domestic to Global Solidarity: The Dialectic of the Particular and Universal in the Building of Social Solidarity” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 38 (1) p. 131-132)

But, thus far, the sharing of social risk has only been achieved at the level of the state (with some social and human rights being institutionalized on a regional level within the European Union [EU]). Transnational movements for environmental, labor, and human rights have had modest successes and, upon occasion, the international community responds generously to natural disasters (but more unevenly to massive violations of human rights, as in Rwanda, the former Zaire, or Darfur). The neo-Kantian position underestimates the difficulty of transforming a transnational “ought” into a regional, let alone international “is” of effective human, labor, and environmental rights. The road to greater international solidarity cannot transcend the politics of the state, but, rather, must run through it. For only states that have achieved an advanced degree of economic security and solidarity are likely to help construct institutions of international governance that “level-up” global human rights and living standards.

Achieving a modicum of social solidarity has been difficult enough to achieve at the level of the state. The neo-liberal pressures of late global capitalism have trimmed, if not seriously weakened, many of the social rights achieved by the labor movement and the left in advanced industrial democracies.3 This has been particularly the case in the United States. Thus, social theorists interested in reviving a politics of social solidarity must first comprehend why there has been such a weak domestic political response to the United States’ emergence as the most inegalitarian of advanced industrial democracies. Only by doing so can we develop the moral and political means by which to revive democratic egalitarian politics at home.

Aspirations for greater international solidarity must be grounded in transnational movements that have sufficient presence in particular states to compel these polities to adopt foreign economic and diplomatic policies that enhance global labor, environmental, and human rights conditions. Just as the moral horizons of democratic polities have expanded only through the struggles of formerly excluded social groups, so will the transition from national to regional to international solidarity occur more through political contestation than by means of abstract philosophical argument. First World citizens are more likely to support policies that will enhance global justice when motivated by enlightened selfinterest than by altruism. Philosophical arguments can inform the ideology of movements for social justice, but it will be the particular politics of democratic polities that determine whether a more equitable world emerges.

#### Politics communities beyond the nation state creates tyranny of the majority and no willingness to redistribute

Faist, PhD, 9 (Thomas, Transnational Relations and Development Studies @ Bielefeld University, Germany, “The Transnational Social Question Social Rights and Citizenship in a Global Context” *International Sociology* 24 (1) p. 13)

For the conceptualization of emergent transnational social rights, there are two types of approaches, one stemming from normative political philosophy, and the other from political sociology, more specifically from differentiation-theoretical assumptions of world society theory. In normative political theory, in turn, two branches can be distinguished: a world citizenship – or cosmopolitan – perspective and a nationality perspective. In a cosmopolitan citizenship perspective, social rights are part of a desirable world citizenship. An optimistic perspective can refer to Max Weber’s social and economic history (Weber, 1980) and argue that citizenship was first conceived and practised at the municipal level in Ancient Greece andMedieval Europe before it moved up one level and became de jure and de facto congruous with membership of a territorial national state. Citizenship and citizenship rights beyond the national state would therefore be an evolutionary leap forward (Heater, 2004). Ultimately, this would, however, require a global political community with sociocultural resources such as generalized reciprocity and diffuse solidarity to be drawn on as required. This would be a broad extension of Immanuel Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan right to hospitality (Linklater, 1999) by means of a rational development of identities beyond the national level. Such a global political identity is today only conceivable as a transparent, constructed affiliation (Habermas, 1998). This perspective would certainly be attractive in terms of the allocation of life chances according to legal citizenship. World citizenship would not acknowledge any privileges passed on by descent or birth within a certain territory. We would all formally have the same status as members of an all-encompassing global polity. Such a community would, however, be greatly endangered by a ‘tyranny of the majority’ (de Tocqueville, 1986) because of the unavailability of exit options. Even more importantly, positive rights would require a willingness to redistribute goods, i.e. reciprocity and solidarity. This notion is even less probable and less conceivable on a global scale than it is in regions like Europe. While these qualities can be observed when disaster strikes or in development policies, they have no legal status and certainly no regulative components like, say, EU social policy.

# 2NC

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# 1NR Round 3

## DA

### 1NR – O/V

#### Even if they are correct that growth may be unsustainable, collapsing it wont produce a transition:

#### No political will.

Milanovic 21 -- visiting presidential professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and an affiliated senior scholar at the Luxembourg Income Study. (Branko,"Degrowth: solving the impasse by magical thinking ," Substack, <https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/degrowth-solving-the-impasse-by-magical?r=16uxt&amp;utm_campaign=post&amp;utm_medium=web&amp;utm_source=twitter> Jun 27 2021)//gcd

Now degrowers are not irrational people. The reason why they are pushed in this magical corner is because when they try to “do the numbers” they are led to an impasse. They do not want to allow for significant increase in world GDP because it will, even if decoupling (of which they are skeptical) happens, drive energy emissions too high. If one wants to keep world GDP more or less as now one must (A) “freeze” today’s global income distributions so that some 10-15% of the world population continue to live below the absolute poverty line, and one-half of the world population below $PPP 7 dollars per day (which is, by the way, significantly below Western poverty lines). This is however unacceptable to the poor people, to the poor countries, and even to degrowers themselves.

Thus they must try something else: introduce a different distribution (B) where everybody who is above the current mean world income ($PPP 16  per day) is driven down to this mean, and the poor countries and people are,  at least for a while, allowed to continue growing until they too achieve the level of $PPP 16 per day. But the problem with that approach is that one would have to engage in a massive reduction of incomes for all those who make more than $PPP 16 which is practically all of the Western population. Only 14% of the population in Western countries live at the level of income less than the global mean. This is probably the most important statistic that one should keep in mind. Degrowers thus need to convince 86% of the population living in rich countries that their incomes are too high and need to be reduced. They would have to preside over economic depressions for about a decade, and then let the new real income stay at that level indefinitely. (Even that would not quite solve the problem because in the meantime, many poor countries would have reached the level of $PPP 16 per day and they too would  have to be prevented from growing further.) It is quite obvious that such a proposition is a political suicide. Thus degrowers do not wish to spell it out.

They are  brought to an impasse. They cannot condemn to perpetual poverty people in developing countries who are just seeing the glimpses of a better life, nor can they reasonably argue that incomes of 9 out of 10 Westerners ought to be reduced.

The way out of the impasse is to engage in semi-magical and then outright magical thinking.

Semi-magical thinking (that is, thinking where the objective—however laudable- is not linked with any tools of achieving it) is to argue that GDP is not a correct measure of welfare, or that better outcomes in certain dimensions can be achieved by countries or peoples with a lower GDP (or lower incomes). Both propositions are correct.

GDP does leave out non-commercialized activities that are welfare-enhancing. It is,  like every other measure, imperfect and one-dimensional.  But if it is imperfect at the edges while fairly accurate overall. Richer countries are countries that are generally better-off in almost all metrics, from education, life expectancy, child mortality to women’s employment etc. Not only that: richer people are also on average healthier, better educated, and happier. Income indeed buys you health and happiness. (It does not guarantee that you are a better person; but that’s a different topic.)  The metric of income or GDP is strongly associated with positive outcomes, whether we compare countries to each other, or people (within a country) to each other. This is something so obvious that it is bizarre that one needs to restate it: people migrate from Morocco to France  because France is a richer country and they will be better-off there. American Blacks are worse off than American Whites in all dimensions, not least in terms of their income. This is the background to the Black Lives Matter movement that wants to make Blacks better off and equal in income and health to Whites.

Since this fails, the next approach taken by degrowers consists in pulling out individual cases of countries the have performed exceptionally well on some metrics (like Cuba on health) and those that have performed exceptionally badly (like US on life expectancy) and to argue that a certain desirable outcome can be achieved with much less money. It is indeed true that some countries or some people, despite their lack of income, have achieved excellent things while others have used their income inefficiently or wastefully. But it does not follow from such individual examples that they overturn the regularities described In the previous paragraph. What degrowers do is to first metaphorically run a regression of a desirable outcome on GDP or income, and when they observe that the two are closely correlated, forget about the regression, pull out an outlier, and claim that the outlier shows that the relationship does not exist.

That is clearly wrong too. So the next stage in semi-magical thinking consists in trying to convince people that they are wrongly pursing the Golden Calf of wealth and that much more modest lives would be better, or at least are feasible. To that effect they use baskets of goods and services that allow “modest” standard of living and satisfy all basic needs. But they fail to show us how such “modest needs” are to be implemented: how will people be obliged to consume only so much and not more? In war situations, this is done through rationing. Indeed, one could ration the number of square meters of textile that each household may be able to buy, introduce meat and gasoline coupons and so forth. It has been done many times. But degrowers know that a wartime economy in the peacetime would not be politically acceptable, so they just do the basket calculation, show that it is compatible with “planetary boundaries”, and leave it at that. How we are going to have that basket accepted by people, or implemented despite their will, is not something they desire to be disturbed with.

#### Profit motive.

Andreoni 20 – (Valeria, "The Trap of Success: A Paradox of Scale for Sharing Economy and Degrowth" Sustainability 12, no. 8: 3153. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12083153> 2020)//gcd

From a theoretical perspective, if large similarities exist between sharing economy and degrowth, then extensive discrepancies occur in the way in which these two concepts are applied. As reported above, the sharing economy is a worldwide phenomenon rapidly growing across sectors and activities. Degrowth, on the contrary, has been developed through a model of living and academic debate and, up to now, a limited number of applications have taken place [50]. One of the inhibiting factors can be related to the difficulties in applying an alternative model in a system when the profit-oriented logic drives the main socio-economic dynamics. For this reason, a consistent overview of the possible implications generated by large-scale applications of degrowth is still missing. Given the fact that degrowth ideas could generate effective transformations only when adopted by the largest part of consumers, a specific analysis would be needed to investigate the impacts and feasibility of large-scale applications. Within this context, the main objective of the next sections is to hypothesize and discuss a paradox of scale, potentially able to drive the failure of alternative economic models. Given the fact that, from a theoretical perspective, many similarities exist between sharing economy and degrowth, the next approximate is the sharing economy as a large-scale application of degrowth. In particular, the main contradictions existing between the promises of the sharing economy and degrowth, are compared to the outcomes generated by practices. The discrepancies are then used to discuss the feasibility of large-scale applications of alternative economic models, such as degrowth. Being aware that the approximations used in this paper inevitably lead to simplifications, the objective of this analysis aligns with the idea previously discussed in other publications [50,69,70]. Testing the degrowth hypothesis through modeling and empirical assessments can contribute to develop the debate around sustainable transitions to build the bridge between academic discourse, socio-political initiatives, and business environment. 3.2. Promises versus Outcomes of Practices: Analysis of the Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts Following the approach previously used by other papers [3,30], the main frames used to define the sharing economy are compared, in this section, with the socio-economic and environmental impacts generated by practices. The main objective is to identify existing tensions and to discuss the sustainability challenges of sharing. Starting from the analytical framework reported in Table 2, the main discrepancies existing between promises and practices are reported below. In Table 3, the main elements of discussion are summarized. 3.3. Economic Dimension: Promises versus Impacts of Practices A. Disrupt centralized institutions and large corporations versus creation of oligopolies: According to previous studies [26,28,30,71], the network externalities and economies of scale generated using Internet platforms, has facilitated the development of oligopolies and has reduced the market for small and local enterprises. In line with the examples reported in Table 1, most of the sharing economy’s submarkets tend to be dominated by a small number of companies that earned the dominating status by designing a specific business model or through an early market entry. The large quantity of transactions, needed to compensate the costs of technological investments, has converged the successful platform toward oligopolistic structures, clearly in contrast with the idea of “disrupt centralized institutions and large corporations” included as one of the promises of sharing [72,73]. B. Encourage small and local enterprise versus small-business competition: Instead of promoting small and local enterprises, the sharing economy has resulted in increased competition [74]. The development of sharing accommodation practices, such as Airbnb or Couchsurfing, for example, has provided a substitute for hotel nights in the cheaper segment of the market and has radically changed consumers’ preferences and behavior. According to [75], the users of the sharing economy (generally looking for cheaper solutions, local authenticity, and more unique experiences) have shifted the demand from the traditional hotel industry toward the sharing hospitality. Therefore, the market share of the small and family-run accommodations has been reduced. In addition, the possibility to supply accommodation without the need to be compliant with the regulations affecting the hospitality sector (such as fire, health and safety standards, and taxation) represents an element of unfair competition affecting the small businesses operating in the market. The lower costs associated with a lack of standards and regulations, has contributed to drive a reduction in the average hospitality price. According to data provided by [76], the increased competition among small accommodation providers has generated 8–10% revenue loss in the hotel sector in Austin, Texas. In a similar way, the estimation provided by [77] calculated that the 416,000 guests staying in Airbnb in July 2013 has generated around one million lost room nights for city hotels in New York. On the contrary, large corporations, offering hospitality solutions for business travelers, medium-high income consumers, and package holidays do not seem to be significantly affected [76,77]. C. Empowering individuals by promoting flexible employment opportunities and additional sources of income versus working-related uncertainties: The sharing economy has framed itself as a provider of flexible employment opportunities, where traditional employment contracts are substituted by short-term and freelance work [78]. The main implications of this working structure, however, seem to benefit businesses more than workers. Classifying workers as independent contractors, allow businesses to reduce the costs and to remove the legal liability for accidents arising at work. The lack of pension and insurance, together with income instability and insecurities is, on the contrary, one of the main downsides affecting the workers involved in the sharing economy’s markets [79,80]. In addition, the rapid expansion of this underregulated and underpaid working logic, is also affecting the traditional working markets. When an increasing number of agents get involved in the logic of less security and more flexibility, the overall working conditions can decline [81–83]. As reported by De Stefano [81] (p. 6), “extreme flexibility, shifting of risks to workers and income instability have long become a reality for a portion of the workforce in current labor markets that goes far beyond the persons employed in the gig-economy.” It can indeed be argued that working on collaborative platforms is part of a much vaster trend toward the casualization of labor [84,85]. D. Promote cheaper and easiest access to goods and services and provide opportunities for income redistribution, revenue, and savings versus prices increase, income disparities, and tax avoidance: As reported above, the easiest and cheapest access to goods and services has been described as an opportunity to increase consumption possibilities, particularly for the lowest-income categories. When considering the supply side of the sharing practices, however, the sharing economy can contribute to amplifying the income disparities existing in society [86]. As reported by [87], for example, the additional revenue generated by sharing accommodation benefits people with a middle or upper-income level. That is because, the lower-income categories, characterized by a limited availability of goods to share, are typically excluded from the supply side of the market. Sharing accommodation, has also been criticized for the negative impacts generated on the price of the long-term renting accommodation. The increase in profitability of short-term renting has driven a reduction of long-term renting supply, with consequent impacts for the lower-income categories living in rented accommodation. According to data provided by [88], the average renting price in New York has increased by 11% between 2005 and 2012, with an average income rise of just 2%. The redistributive factors of the sharing activities have also been largely criticized in relation to taxation. According to data provided by [89], the sharing economy was estimated to be worth about $15 billion in 2015 with the potential to grow to £$335 billion in 2025. The amount of tax collected, however, is limited and controversial. Airbnb, for example, is financially located in Ireland, where the money made from transactions taking place all over the world are collected. The lack of clear accountability and the related difficulties to track income, make tax avoidance an element of unfair market competition and a major social issue. The unclear international regulation and the difficulties in public surveillance, creates a clear opportunity for fiscal avoidance, with consequent implications for social disparities and redistribution [28,72]. In addition, as reported by [10], the fact that platforms do not give governments the access to transactions and user data does not facilitate the enforcement of regulations and the design of clear and consistent taxation systems. The creation of institutional boundaries, such as the cap in the number of nights offered in sharing accommodation is, for example, difficult to apply without a clear track of users and suppliers. A. Increase social bonding and collaboration versus social drivers’ reduction: As reported above, the sharing economy has often been described as a tool to generate a new form of collaborations, solidarity, and social bonding [34,90–93]. Researches have, however, highlighted that most of the sharing economy users have no desire to increase community bonds or to share communal links with other members [29]. The ability of platforms to create social connections seems also to have decreased over scale and time. According to studies published by [94,95], when a market expands, economic reasons prevail, and interpersonal connections became more casual and less durable. In a similar way, an analysis investigating the main car sharing motivations highlight that opportunistic and self-interest behaviors play a much more significant role than socio-environmental motivations [79]. Price convenience, savings, and accessibility seem to be the main factors driving most of the consumers’ choices toward sharing economy options [96–98]. B. Increase conviviality and community trust versus discrimination: Instead of increasing social equality and community trust, the sharing economy seems to be characterized by some degree of exclusionary and discriminatory behaviors [40]. Based on studies published [99–102], prejudicial discriminations in ratings and reviews have been found for Afro-American guests and Afro-American Airbnb owners and Uber drivers have reported to be discriminated in terms of longer average waiting times and more frequent cancellations. C. Networking increases versus reduction of face-to-face interactions: When the market expands and more profit-oriented actors enter in the sharing economy’s businesses, the social contacts and face-to-face interactions seem to reduce. The increasing use of online quality ratings, for example, contributes to the declining importance of personal relationships. In addition, the introduction of technological innovations, such as the smart locks on sharing accommodation, provides users with a digital service of check-in and key handover that allow for a complete avoidance of social interactions [10]. According to [103], 75% of Airbnb’s overall revenue come from rentals where the owners do not share the space with users. The initial idea of social connections, interactions, and trust have been taken over by activities operating with a small degree of social and face-to-face interactions. D. Promote the use of participative online resources such as open access, open sources, and collaborative platform versus income, cultural, and aging constraints: The development of information and communication technologies has been considered as an opportunity to facilitate the use of participative online resources and to democratize the access to information. However, the difficulties that a relevant percentage of the world population are experiencing in catching-up with technological development is de facto an element of exclusion for a large amount of people with income, cultural, and ageing constraints [104]. When applied to the context of the sharing activities, this general downside of information and communication technologies, can then exclude a specific group of people from participating in sharing exchanges. According to [75], for example 53% of the users are under 40 years old and across all the sharing economy industries the usage seems to decrease with an increasing age. 3.5. Environmental Dimension: Promises versus Impacts of Practices A. Reduce consumption versus consumption increase: As highlighted by [105], a relative cost reduction can increase the overall market demand. In the sharing economy, different elements can contribute to generate a “rebound effect” detrimental for resources: • The development of the sharing economy platforms and the creation of new markets expand the volume of commerce and inject additional purchasing power into the economy. In addition, the development of “on demand” economy (e.g., Uber), where the consumer creates new capacity by arranging a service that would not have been made in the first place, is in contrast with the idea of reducing the overall level of demand. The reduction of prices generated by (i) increasing competition, (ii) reduced dependency on ownership, and (iii)reduction of searching costs, can contribute to the rise of consumption [10, 40,106]. • The easiest and cheapest access to goods and services can stimulate unsustainable and indulgent consumption [107,108]. The cost reduction and the accessible increase related to car sharing practices, for example, can generate additional journeys and reduce the public transport demand. The possibility to cover a part of the travelling cost, offered for example by Blablacar and Kangaride, can change the individual decision on the travelling mode and, as reported above, increase the demand for less sustainable practices [4,109]. • The large amount of information made available by the use of the Internet, provides an extensive source of evidence about past usage patterns and consumers’ preferences. The online companies, with an easy access to consumer’s information, can use targeted advertising and tailored promotions to increase sales and market share. In addition, a tension also exists in relation to the fact that city cycle schemes are usually financed through advertising of large and multinational corporations, as Santander in London or Coca-Cola in Belfast. B. Reduction of energy and material demand versus increased use of energy and resources: A lack of clear data investigating the environmental impacts of the sharing practices make it difficult to analyze the transition toward a more sustainable economy. At the present, no clear evidence exists around the reduction of energy and material demand [10]. On the contrary, a study published by [110] shows that the ecological footprint of e-business is greater than conventional shopping. C. Promote reuse and responsible consumption versus lack of care: The short-term social relationships characterizing most of the sharing economy activities and the fact that consumers are paying for a temporary service, generally lead to a lack of caring attitude and reduce the incentives to treat products gently [4]. In line with the idea of moral hazard and information asymmetries, involved with shared resources [111], the deterioration rate of goods can be higher than in the case of a private ownership. In addition, recent studies suggest that users’ environmental motivations are often less important than the economic ones [112,113]. 4. Discussion: Paradox of Scale and Future Research Directions Based on the analysis reported above, the main findings of this paper can be summarized by the fact that the recent developments of the sharing practices seem to be in contrast with the theoretical frameworks used to define the socio-economic and environmental characteristics of sharing. When the scale expands, a profit-oriented logic seems to prevail and the idea of a more sustainable and socially connected economic system fails to be delivered. In particular, the profit opportunities are attracting an increasing number of for-profit businesses that use the socio-environmental and egalitarian statements as a way to increase the market share. In addition, the use of information and communication technologies, the related reduction of interpersonal connections, and the exclusion of people unable to catch up with technological development, impose constraints on social interactions and participation. As a result, the impacts and goals of the sharing economy seem to converge toward those of the traditional economic practices, where profit opportunities prevail on socio-environmental motivations. As previously highlighted by other authors [26,28], the theoretical pathway to equity and sustainability has been successfully reframed as a new form of neoliberal capitalism. Within this context, the findings of this paper highlight the risk of a paradox of scale, where the sharing economy fails to deliver as a consequence of success. If from one side, the more sustainable behaviors can generate effective changes only when applied by the majority of actors, on the other side, large-scale applications and expansion risk converging toward the traditional economic practices. This sort of trap is also highlighted by the recent path taken by the development of some local currencies. Initially organized as a way to sustain local business and promote a more responsible consumption, some of the local currencies have today expanded to include franchising and corporation activities. An example is provided by Colu, the Liverpool Local Pound, where franchising accounts for more than 10% of the businesses listed in the website. In addition, the percentage discount offered to consumers that purchase products by using the local currency is a stimulus for consumption increase, clearly in contrast with the idea of responsible consumption and sustainability. The use of virtual coins and the necessity to have mobile phones and internet connection also represent a factor of exclusion for the oldest and the less wealthy categories of society that in contrast would be those that could benefit the most from the development of a local and fairer economy.

#### Crisis doesn’t cause transition.

Saey-Volckrick et al 20 –Lecturer of Ecological Economics at the Berlin School of Economics and Law (Nathan Barlow, Constanza Hepp, Joe Herbert, Andro Rilović, Joëlle Saey-Volckrick, Jacob Smessaert ,Nick von Andrian, “A degrowth perspective on the coronavirus crisis,” [No 14 (2020) - "Health and Degrowth" (Special Issue)](https://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/visions/issue/view/495), Visions for Sustainability, <https://doi.org/10.13135/2384-8677/5280> June 17 2020)//gcd

This crisis is not degrowth

Just because COVID-19, like an economically triggered recession, has resulted in a downscaling of production, transport, and emissions amongst other things, this does not mean it represents degrowth. Firstly, a degrowth transformation must be planned and democratic. In contrast, the COVID-19 crisis and its responses have been mostly reactive – meaningful measures were implemented only once people started dying – and highly undemocratic, characterised by top-down policies, the enactment of emergency powers, and a murky process of bail-out decisions.

Secondly, degrowth requires a long-term commitment to the downscaling of production and consumption as well as the reorganisation of society in a sustainable and just way. What the COVID-19 crisis has thus far shown is governments’ willingness to slow down the economy in the short run, but without any intention of maintaining these reduced levels of economic activity. Rather, the shutdown of most economies was delayed as long as possible to maintain growth, and it has been conducted with the explicit motivation of rebooting economic growth as soon as possible.

Thirdly, COVID-19 has so far disproportionately affected the most vulnerable in society, and not only the very old and young, as is usually assumed. Many workers who don’t have the option of paid remote work must face the trade-off between risky infection at work or staying at home awaiting unpayable bills (Jones, 2020). Diabetics, many of whom also have a lower income, are at a higher risk of infection from the virus (Fisher and Bubola, 2020). Homeless people are being particularly affected by the corona crisis, as services such as food banks, soup kitchens, crisis centres and overnight shelters have been forced to close due to insufficient access to protective equipment which would allow their safe operation. Making matters worse, in some places the police have issued fines to the homeless for not maintaining social distancing (Boffey, 2020a). Even the most basic sanitation measures, such as washing one’s hands regularly, becomes an impossible task for communities without access to running water, as is the case for example in central Chile (McGowan, 2020). In contrast, the rich have not struggled to access basic needs or services in the same way that the poor and marginalized have. As an example, in March, the complete Utah Jazz professional basketball team was tested immediately following a game, accounting for 20 percent of the state’s total conducted tests up to that point (Harris, 2020a). The corona crisis reveals the deep socio-economic inequalities in society, the unequal access to and distribution of basic goods and services, the uneven impact of crises and the many vulnerabilities faced by large sections of the population. In life under neoliberal capitalism, money saves lives and a lack of it can kill you.

In summary, a degrowth transformation would be planned and proactively pursued, and have justice and equality at its core. As these examples - among a myriad of others - show, none of this is the case in the current situation.

### 1NR – AT: Unsustainable 2AC 1 + 3

#### Financialization’s sustainable — criticism’s unwarranted reductionism

Konings, PhD, 18 (Martijn, Associate Professor of Political Economy at the University of Sydney, author of *The Emotional Logic of Capitalism* and *Capital and Time: For a New Critique of Neoliberal Reason*, series editor for the Stanford University Press book series, Currencies. 02-07-18. “A Critique of the Critique of Finance.” Stanford University Press Blog. https://stanfordpress.typepad.com/blog/2018/02/a-critique-of-the-critique-of-finance.html)

Critics of neoliberal capitalism rarely recognize the productive power of speculation. If there is one theme that unites the various critiques of contemporary finance, it is the emphasis on its speculative character. Financial growth is said to be driven not by the logic of efficient markets, but rather by irrational sentiment, “animal spirits” that do not respect fundamental values. Emphasizing the role of volatility in contemporary capitalism (evident at the time of writing, as the stock market is experiencing a downturn) is important as an antidote to notions of market efficiency and equilibrium. But it is a mistake to think that it provides a sufficient basis for effective critique. Predictions regarding the limits or collapse of neoliberal finance have simply not enjoyed a good track record. Over and over, the contemporary financial system has proven capable of sustaining higher levels of speculative activity than anticipated. This has certainly been true of the past decade. Capital and Time: For a New Critique of Neoliberal Reason is my attempt to make sense of this—that is, to understand what might be wrong or missing in the existing heterodox critique of speculation, and to advance a more accurate understanding of the role of uncertainty, risk, and speculation in contemporary capitalism. At the heart of the critique of speculation we find a distinction between real and fictitious forms of value. Although “essentialist” (or “foundationalist”) modes of explanation have been under fire across the social sciences for several decades now, when it comes to the critique of finance they have had considerable staying-power: without a notion of real value, it often seems, we lose any objective standard against which to assess the speculative gyrations of capitalist markets. Capital and Time asks what kind of critical theory we might develop if we bracket the anxious attachment to a notion of fundamental value. To that end, it turns to the work of economist Hyman Minsky. Although Minsky has been popularized precisely as a critic of speculation, he in fact insisted that almost all value judgments and investments were to some degree speculative—their success or failure would be determined in an unknown future. For him, the key economic question is how order emerges in a world that offers no guarantees, how more or less stable standards and norms arise amidst uncertainty. Of course, the “endogenous” origin of financial standards is a well-rehearsed theme in heterodox economics—indeed, it is a staple of the “post-Keynesian” literature that claims Minsky’s legacy. But such perspectives have never been able to break with the idea that financial stability is at its core dependent on external interventions that suppress speculative impulses. For Minsky, however, this is to miss the point about endogeneity. To his mind, there was no clear dividing line between financial practices and their governance: central banks and other public authorities are no more able to see into the future and to transcend uncertainty than private investors are. Minsky was therefore highly skeptical about official claims of discretionary precision management: financial governance is always embroiled in the very risk logic that it is charged with managing. That also means that financial policy can appear quite ordinary, even banal: at the heart of capitalist financial management is a logic of backstopping and bailout that responds to the possibility that the failure of an institution may take down wider financial structures. The stability of the post-New Deal financial system is often attributed to the Glass-Steagall separation of the stock market and commercial banking. But Minsky tended to view Glass-Steagall as one of several measures to direct bank credit away from the stock market towards other, no less speculative ends, notably consumer and mortgage financing. To his mind, the stability of the post-war period derived rather from the creation of an extensive financial safety net (which included, for instance, deposit insurance, which removed the rationale behind bank runs) that served to socialize risk. This institutional arrangement turned out to have a significant drawback: a pattern of chronic inflation emerged that, by the late 1970s, was widely perceived as a major problem. Minsky’s lack of faith in the possibility of cleanly staged external interventions led him to feel that that there was no real way out of this predicament. Monetarist doctrines, ascendant during the 1970s under the influence of Milton Friedman, relied on exactly the belief in an arbitrarily defined monetary standard that Minsky rejected as naïve. Muddling through, it seemed, was the price of avoiding another financial crash and depression. The Volcker shock of 1979 changed this dynamic in a way that Minsky had not foreseen but that is comprehensible when seen through the lens he provided us with. Paul Volcker looked to monetarism not as a means to enforce an external limit or standard on the financial system, but as a politically expedient way to break with accommodating policies and to proactively engage the endogenous dynamics of finance. The consequences of the Volcker shock were predictable (which is exactly why the Federal Reserve had been reluctant to pursue similar policies in previous years): inflation gave way to instability and crisis. Inflation was conquered as jobs were lost and wages stagnated. And, far from money being returned to its neutral exchange function, opportunities for speculation multiplied. The American state was never going to sit idly by as the financial system returned to dynamics of boom and bust: when instability took the form of systemic threats, authorities would bail out the institutions that had overextended themselves. Of course, Volcker would not have been able to predict the specific features of the too-big-to-fail regime as it emerged during the 1980s and evolved subsequently; but the very point of the neoliberal turn in financial management that he had overseen was to create a context where risk could be socialized in ways that were more selective and therefore did not entail generalized inflation. The inflation of asset values that has been such a marked feature of the past four decades has always been premised centrally on the willingness of authorities to view the “moral hazard” of the too-big-to-fail logic as a policy instrument—even if they may have decried it officially as a regrettable corruption of market principles. Spectacular bailouts, mundane policies to protect the key nodes of the payment systems, the “Greenspan put”, the different iterations of quantitative easing—these are all variations on that basic too-important-to-fail logic. Existing critical perspectives tend to view crisis and the need for bank bailouts as manifesting the essential incoherence of neoliberal finance, its lack of solid foundations and the irrationality of speculation. Capital and Time breaks with such moralistic assessments. The way deepening inequality and the speculative growth of asset values continue to feed off each other is troubling for any number of reasons, but there is nothing inherently “unsustainable” about it—the process does not have a natural or objective limit. At this point in time, the critique of speculation does little more than lend credibility to official discourses that present crises as preventable and bailouts as one-off, never-to-be-repeated interventions. In that way, it prevents us from critically relating to a neoliberal reality that has been shaped to its core by the speculative exploitation of risk and uncertainty, and in which regressive risk socialization serves as the everyday logic of financial governance.

#### Knowledge, tech, and innovation.

Zimet 20 (Saul, Writer for the the Foundation for Economic Education. Capitalism or the Climate? 5-17-20. [https://quillette.com/2020/05/17/capitalism-or-the-climate /](about:blank)/shree)

Knowledge, Deutsch argues, is the variable most relevant to our potential flourishing. When Arctic populations survive in the Arctic and Amazonian populations survive in the Amazon, they do it by means of specific knowledge. If Deutsch were suddenly transported to the primeval Great Rift Valley, he would die for lack of knowledge. Without the requisite knowledge, humans will die virtually anywhere. With the requisite knowledge, encoded in brains, genes, computers, or other substrates, humans can survive virtually anywhere, on the Earth or elsewhere in space:

Whether humans could live entirely outside the biosphere—say, on the moon—does not depend on the quirks of human biochemistry. Just as humans currently cause over a tonne of vitamin C to appear in Oxfordshire every week (from their farms and factories), so they could do the same on the moon—and the same goes for breathable air, water, and comfortable temperature and all their other parochial needs. Those needs can all be met, given the right knowledge, by transforming other resources.

Deutsch explains that even today humans possess the technology to colonize the Moon and other stereotypically harsh environments. At this time in history, colonizing the moon would be prohibitively expensive. But right now you can buy a 4-terabyte hard-drive on Amazon for under 100 dollars. In 1980, that much storage cost about 772 million dollars. The price of technology frequently undergoes enormous reductions as science moves forward. Given that the price of digital memory was divided by millions in just a few decades, imagine the extraterrestrial societies we could conceivably build after perhaps a few centuries of compounding scientific and economic growth.

However, my argument is not that we will ever colonize space, nor that we should plan to do so. As Neil deGrasse Tyson argues, it will probably be trivial to adapt to a wide range of Earth climates long before it is feasible to colonize the Moon or Mars. Rather, I am pointing out that any dependence we have on specific environmental conditions is the result of insufficient knowledge.

Capitalism and the production of knowledge

Throughout nearly all of human history, widespread economic growth per capita did not exist. Productivity per capita was ubiquitously stagnant; generation after generation, millennium after millennium, extreme poverty remained nearly universal and large-scale economic progress was not even imaginable. Virtually everyone lived on less than $3.50 per day in today’s dollars according to research from University of Oxford economist Max Roser, and the average person lived on much less. That’s even worse than it sounds, because (among other reasons) most of the things we can buy today had yet to be invented, and people didn’t have access to most of the information that informs our purchases in the 21st century.

Then, starting in Western Europe in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, an unprecedented breadth of optimism emerged and turned wealth (resources hoarded away in vaults and mattresses) into capital (resources invested in future production and discovery). Thus, capitalism was born, and with it, exponential economic growth began to spread across most of the Earth (a process that continues to this day). As a result, both the rich and the poor are consistently getting rapidly richer for the first time in human history. Whereas 94 percent of the population was in extreme poverty as recently as 1820, in 1990 the number was down to 36 percent, and in 2015 the number was less than 10 percent. And as the world gets wealthier, countless important things proliferate, such as access to nutrition, freedom from violence, improvements in life expectancy, and of course, the access to and production of scientific and technological knowledge.

Knowledge is produced and spread in many ways. Education is one crucial variable, for the purpose of having both an educated population of innovators and a thriving research community. According to research from the Brookings Institute, educational opportunities and outcomes for the affluent radically exceed those for the poor—not just between countries, or within them, but everywhere. This is to be expected. Whether funded by individuals or government programs, it costs a lot of resources to build strong educational institutions and invest in educating generations of students. Poor populations who can barely afford shelter, clean water, food, and medicine don’t have much left over to invest in less immediate necessities such as education. And of course, this creates a feedback loop with causation running in both directions—if a population is uneducated, escaping poverty is much more difficult; if a population is poor, investing in education is much more difficult.

Another foundational tool for knowledge production is innovation, which capital and profit motive facilitate. A large amount of innovation comes from excess capital being invested in new research and development. Poorer populations, whether subnational, national, or global, have less to invest in prospective new inventions and processes of which the details are unpredictable in advance. No system incentivizes useful investments and disincentivizes wasteful investments better than the capitalist system, in which the investor’s own capital is on the line. Incentives and wealth are two main reasons why all of the most innovative nations, such as the top 10 on the 2020 Bloomberg Innovation Index, are capitalist countries. The sociologist Susan Cozzens at the Georgia Institute of Technology offers a succinct description of the process:

In the classic literature of the economics of innovation, private firms are the driving force. They seek competitive advantage in the market by introducing new products that give them a temporary monopoly. By charging high prices during the period of temporary monopoly, the firm makes profits and grows. Introducing new processes can result in competitive advantage if that step reduces costs or increases productivity. In this view, firms drive innovation in order to survive and win in the marketplace.

Indeed, no serious critics of capitalism argue that any other system produces greater material wealth and innovation. Even Marxists, capitalism’s most vehement antagonists, generally acknowledge that no system has ever produced more innovation and abundance. In The Communist Manifesto in 1848, Marx and Engels wrote this:

The bourgeoisie [capitalist class], during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground—what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

If only Marx and Engels could see how drastically the affluence of the proletariat has grown under global capitalism since then.

Environmental technology

In 1894, just 21 years before Einstein’s theory of general relativity, the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Albert Michelson famously proclaimed, “The more important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been

discovered, and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being supplanted in consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote.” Some phenomena, like blizzards and thunderstorms, are somewhat predictable to those with the requisite equipment and training. But the future of human knowledge is no such phenomenon. Discoveries, by their very nature, are unknown until they are not. Innovations are often unimaginable until they occur because the act of imagining them is what brings them into existence.

The history of failures to predict future knowledge is long and robust. In 1901, two years before they both achieved flight by aircraft, Wilbur Wright said to his brother, “Don’t think men will fly for a thousand years.” In 1932, just six years before the successful splitting of the atom, Albert Einstein said, ”There is not the slightest indication that nuclear energy will ever be obtainable.” In 1957, 12 years before Neil Armstrong set foot on the Moon, the father of radio Lee de Forest stated, “Man will never reach the Moon regardless of all future scientific advances.”

Even after world-changing technologies are invented, estimates of their utility are often wildly inaccurate. The Internet, cars, and telephones were all dismissed as insignificant inventions in the years preceding their universal ascendance. So we should be skeptical when we see publications like the BBC, Bloomberg, and Forbes denying the plausibility of imminent technological advances on our climate problems. The truth is nobody has any idea what salutary innovations and discoveries do or do not exist in our imminent future.

Many popular technological solutions to environmental issues have already been proposed in recent years. Carbon capture and sequestration technology is endorsed by climate scientists at the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well as by United States Congress members from both the Democratic and Republican parties. Inventions are being implemented to remove plastic from the oceans. Sea walls are being engineered in some coastal communities and considered at larger scales to mitigate sea level rise.

In The Climate Casino, Nordhaus writes: “Current estimates are that geoengineering would cost between one tenth and one hundredth as much as reducing CO2 emissions for an equivalent amount of cooling.” But at their present level of development, such technologies are inadequate to the full scope of the problem because they don’t sufficiently address certain dangers such as ocean acidification. Therefore, many environmentalists prefer extreme reductions in carbon emissions, which would stop anthropogenic climate change at its root. But anthropogenic climate change is not just a phenomenon of the future. The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, CNN, and other news organizations have noted that it is already having serious effects here and now. The transition from predicted impact to experienced impact took place decades ago. So, how well are we adapting so far?

Scientific American reports that global warming may already be responsible for 150,000 deaths worldwide each year due to its effects on the frequency and scale of floods and hurricanes, droughts and heat waves, spread of vector-borne diseases, and other factors. However, research from the Reason Foundation shows that deaths caused by extreme weather events have declined by more than 90 percent since 1920. University of Oxford economist Max Roser’s research shows that the burden of disease, famine, and other relevant problems have also declined in recent years and decades (the disease statistics cited above are older than the COVID-19 pandemic, but there is no evidence that COVID-19 is directly exacerbated by climate change like vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue are). And overall life expectancy has risen globally from about 34 years in 1900 to about 72 years in 2019.

Why are climate-related death rates declining overall while climate change seems to be causing more deaths? Because as economic activity continues to drive up carbon emissions, the resulting growth rates give more communities access to strongly built and climate-controlled buildings, medical education and supplies, life-saving infrastructure such as hospitals and clean water, and many other enormous advantages. When the media and activists argue that burning fossil fuels has not been worth the climate-related damage to human life, they are counting the victims of climate catastrophe while ignoring the beneficiaries of economic growth in developing countries and elsewhere. That is a mistake because the two are inextricably linked.

Choose your own extinction

Of course, just because we’ve adapted extremely well so far doesn’t mean the trend will continue. Dangerous tipping points may yet accelerate the problem beyond our capacity to respond. As living organisms, we have a problem of evolutionary magnitude: we adapt gradually in an environment that can change rapidly. If we go on existing like any other animal, our niche will eventually change so quickly that we won’t be able to adapt fast enough. This has happened to 99.9 percent of all known species since the beginning of life on Earth roughly four billion years ago. These changes have ranged from asteroid impacts, to volcanic eruptions, to viral pandemics, and of course to human activity in recent millennia, and are typically unpredictable to the species they eliminate because they come from outside the limited context in which those species evolved.

Some argue that humans are just another mammal like any other, and that all our claims of exceptionality have been ignorant hubris. If this is true, we are almost certainly doomed to relatively imminent extinction by forces beyond our influence. But thinking this way about the human species does not quite account for the implications of the economic growth trend of the last few centuries. In his book Scale, former Santa Fe Institute president Geoffrey West, whose renowned scientific research put him on Time Magazine’s 2006 list of the 100 most influential people in the world, discusses a profound biological fact about mammal species: they virtually all have the same average number of heartbeats per capita. An average elephant has a long lifespan but a slow heart-rate, and an average mouse has a short lifespan but a fast heart-rate. It all balances out to roughly one-and-a-half billion heartbeats over the course of a lifetime. Other classes of animals follow similar metabolic scaling laws.

A few hundred years ago, before the rise of capitalism, humans were no different—they lived roughly 35 years on average and had about one-and-a-half billion heartbeats just like any other mammal. But gains in knowledge since then, such as innovations in medicine, agriculture, and government, have roughly doubled our life expectancy and with it our average number of heartbeats per lifetime (some dogs and other domesticated animals have been similarly altered by access to human innovations). This constitutes a totally unprecedented departure from the biological status quo.

Technological knowledge, fueled by capital, has allowed us to do many things categorically unlike the achievements of other species as far as we know. The universal extinction paradigm, which has limited all mammal species so far to one million years or less, should be high on our list of patterns to break. We don’t know what existential threats will come or how long we have to prepare for them, but we can’t expect human ingenuity to rush us past the finish line at the last minute without a context of widespread continuous technological and scientific progress until that point—a project it seems only capitalism can hope to fund.

David Deutsch observes that the word “sustain” generally refers to the absence or prevention of change. This is what environmentalists such as Naomi Klein and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez would like to do with our environment by ending capitalism. Their solution to climate change is what all non-human animals have always done: leave the environment basically unaltered by refraining from large-scale production, and wait around to go extinct. Unfortunately, as Deutsch writes, “Static societies eventually fail because their characteristic inability to create knowledge rapidly must eventually turn some problem into a catastrophe.” Thus, it is not that capitalism is the problem and sustainability is the solution, but that sustainability is the problem and capitalism is the solution.

Every year, global capitalism allows more research and development departments to be funded. Every day it gives more citizens of affluent and developing nations the material wealth required for better education and information technology. Economic growth, coupled with rising carbon emissions, might lead to a climate apocalypse—or it might continue to bring us material and technological salvation. We cannot really know in advance. But we would be crazy to choose the time-tested alternative to capitalism: extinction by stagnation.

#### COVID proves sustainablility

Colville 20 (Robert, Director of Center for Policy Studies. Capitalism is not to blame, it’s our escape route out of this mess. 5-1-20. <https://www.ft.com/content/10db1944-8b85-11ea-a109-483c62d17528> ///shree)

The coronavirus crisis represents a reckoning for capitalism. And it’s not just Jeremy Corbyn saying so. A host of virtuous voices are insisting that any bailouts must separate the corporate sheep and goats, with exemplary punishment for firms that have used such abominations as offshore registration, share buybacks and dividends. Even the FT insists that “one of the consequences of the pandemic must be a redrawing of the relationship between business and society”.

This misreads not just how we got into this mess, but how we can get out of it. Obviously, no one wanted a pandemic. Yet if it had to happen, now is arguably the best time in history. Imagine coping with the last few weeks of lockdown without Zoom, Netflix or Amazon. Imagine how quickly the government’s furlough website would have fallen over without cloud computing behind it. Imagine how much longer it would take to produce a vaccine without the efforts of official bodies, NGOs and pharmaceutical companies cutting the likely development time from years to months.

None of this progress was made in a vacuum. It was possible because the UK is a rich, sophisticated, free-market economy. One in which firms like Barbour can retool to make surgical gowns and scrubs for the National Health Service, or BrewDog can make hand gel. In which AstraZeneca can pile in behind Oxford university to scale up vaccine production. In which we have the wealth and creditworthiness to sustain the economy, albeit at enormous cost, through months in the deep freeze.

The one blessing of this epidemic is that the burden has, so far, fallen largely on countries that are able to cope. This is in sharp contrast to pre-crisis predictions. Economists such as Larry Summers, who warned of the risk of pandemics, universally assumed that the developing world would bear the brunt. A World Bank study in 2013, for example, predicted that a severe pandemic “would bring shared misery . . . with the poor and those in fragile states hit the hardest”.

The reason for such forecasts was simple and well-founded. As with the effects of climate change, it is wealth that is the best long-term guarantor of resilience. In recovering from this crisis, it is vital that we remember that lesson. The reason that Rishi Sunak is breaking the bank to preserve the private sector is because the chancellor knows that it is on the private sector that recovery will rest. We will not just be relying on the private sector to mass-produce and mass-market vaccines, tests and Personal Protective Equipment, but to deliver the growth, jobs and tax revenue that pull us out of this hole.

In the wake of the 2008 crisis, Britain benefited not just from an independent monetary policy, but from a far more flexible labour market than many of its European counterparts. The result — coupled with tax cuts on business and employment — was that we put on more jobs between 2010 and 2015 than the rest of the EU put together.

With millions more people now heading for the dole queue, the most valuable thing that ministers can do is not mouth pieties about social contracts but focus on bulldozing any and every obstacle to growth and job creation. That means spending less time pinpointing which businesses are “good” and which are “bad”, and more on supporting businesses of every kind — on genuinely making Britain the best place to start, grow and run a company.

It’s true that this crisis has things to teach us. We have very clearly optimised the economy — and indeed the health service — for efficiency rather than resilience. Vast interconnected supply chains are wonderful things but acutely vulnerable to the disappearance of individual components. Construction businesses who have attempted to keep working, with appropriate disinfection and distancing, have found themselves thwarted by the shuttering of builders’ merchants, or suppliers of components such as mortar or interior doors.

Yet, at the same time, government command and control does not have a much better record: it is striking that the health systems that coped best with the epidemic, in Germany and South Korea, had a much wider range of provision and much more decentralisation of functions like testing.

In the wake of the corona crash, there will inevitably be sectors that struggle. Making it as easy as possible for workers to move elsewhere has to be a key aim of policy. So does preserving Britain’s small and family businesses, which create the lion’s share of jobs and have long been neglected by Whitehall.

But the lesson of this crisis is not that the free market needs to be fixed. It is that it is still the best tool we have for delivering prosperity. Let’s stop obsessing about what kind of capitalism we want to have after the crisis and be grateful we have it at all.

#### Cap is the only way to solve crises.

Hill ‘20 [Victor; 11/3/20; Financial Economist with the International Finance Corporation at the World Bank, lead writer for Master Investor, holds degrees from the University of Oxford, Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires, and Canterbury Christ Church University; "Only capitalism will save the planet," https://masterinvestor.co.uk/economics/only-capitalism-will-save-the-planet/]

While the global coronavirus pandemic has diverted attention away from the fraught issue of climate change and what to do about it, the environmental activism of groups such as Extinction Rebellion (XR) has continued to simmer. In fact, this year XR has blended with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement such that explicitly anti-capitalist environmental protest and anti-patriarchal, anti-colonial wokery have become intimately entwined. The underlying message is: If you want to save the planet you have to change the system. In practice, all protest movements have many threads – just look at the two-year campaign of the gilets jaunes in France – but the unifying thread is always resentment.

The irony is that both aspects of this counterculture are out-of-date. Rapid advances in technology, facilitated by the free market, have transformed the climate conversation. Whatever Mr Trump’s rhetoric on the issue (and he may well be in the departure lounge by the time you read this), the big energy companies, backed by a raft of environmentally conscious investors, are already transitioning towards renewable and zero-fossil fuel energy precisely because it is now economically viable to do so. And in that process, they are making money. Win-win.

Outright climate change denial was always a marginal school of thought. Thinking people – of which the business and investment community – understand well that manmade carbon emissions increase the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere and thus precipitate a greenhouse effect by which the Earth’s atmosphere and seas warm up. That said, there is a respectable scientific debate about how quickly that process is taking place and how quickly it will cause irreversible results such as desertification. And it is perfectly legitimate to question the climate models which climate scientists construct to estimate these outcomes, since many have questionable inputs and methodologies. Claims that we have ten years left to save the planet can and should be challenged, though that should not be an argument for further delay in taking action.

The global policy framework has been constructed by the ongoing work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an agency of the United Nations (UN). This body laid down two years ago that our target should be to limit the rise in ambient temperature to no more than 1.5 Celsius above pre-industrial levels. That said, there are many climate rebels who believe that this level will itself be disastrous to human and animal life; and still others who claim that even this target is entirely unrealistic given the direction of travel.

Ms Thunberg and her disciples would have us shut down the carbon-based economy forthwith. That would cause unparalleled economic disruption, mass unemployment, poverty, adverse health outcomes and – let us be honest – starvation. No mainstream politician is going to get behind that.

Zion Lights is a writer who has been an environmental campaigner all her adult life. She doesn’t drive, fly or eat meat. In April 2018 she joined XR because she thought it was evidence-based. She soon found that many of its claims were indefensible. She wrote recently:

That is the single biggest problem with most environmental groups: they don’t offer realistic solutions to the very real climate change threat. What they offer, if you follow their arguments to their logical conclusion, is eco-austerity: that we should all use less energy, stop going on holiday, live in colder homes, and so on[i].

In the latest papal encyclical published on 04 October (the feast day of St. Francis of Assisi), Fratelli Tutti (Brothers All), Papa Francisco wrote that the Covid-19 pandemic had proven that the “magical theories” of market capitalism have failed and that the world needs a new type of politics that promotes dialogue and solidarity. (Perhaps the unjustified restrictionism pursued by First Minister Drakeford in Wales?)

In fact, much as I respect Catholic social teaching (having been brought up with it), the best chance we have to solve the immense challenge of climate change and other environmental problems (such as plastic waste in the oceans) is to harness market forces. In this way, the profit motives of finance and technology will re-engineer the global economy completely.

Big money already decided that the fossil fuel economy is doomed and that renewable energy is the future long before Dame Emma Thompson swept in from LA (business class, of course) to gesticulate on Oxford Street, in those languorous pre-Covid days. The billionaire Davos Boys have been preaching climate orthodoxy for years. And the Great Transition is already well underway.

Renewable profitability

The good news is (don’t tell XR) that the United Kingdom has managed to reduce its carbon emissions by over 40 percent since 1990 by all but phasing out coal and investing massively in renewable power generation. As I write this on a blustery day in late October, according to the GB National Grid Status website, coal powered generation is contributing precisely zero to UK power generation. The UK has the world’s largest offshore wind power market with capacity still increasing rapidly. Earlier this year the UK government effectively dropped the ban on onshore wind turbine arrays in the drive to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050.

As the shift from carbon-heavy sources to carbon-free electricity generation has accelerated so economies of scale have kicked in and new technologies have come online. Recent data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance shows that the latest generation of solar and wind power plants can produce electricity cheaper than the most modern coal plants even without subsidy for two thirds of the global population. The price of solar panels has dropped by almost 90 percent over the past decade. By mid-decade, solar and wind power will outcompete all existing coal plants on price – at which point a swath of coal plants will be deemed uneconomic and closed.

The economics of energy storage – battery technology – are also improving. On 22 September Tesla (NASDAQ:TSLA) unveiled its new battery known as the 4680[ii]. This fuel cell reportedly offers six times the power of Tesla’s previous cells, and five times the energy capacity. The company confirmed that the new cell measures 46 millimetres by 80 millimetres – hence the name. The iconic automaker says that these new fuel cells will be able to increase the range of a vehicle by 16 percent – that could be up to about 500 miles for its latest models. That kind of range makes medium-distance travel without recharging (say, London to Edinburgh in a UK context) quite feasible.

Red China goes green

China currently has new coal plants under construction which will have a capacity of another 94 Gigawatts of electricity per annum. China already emits more CO2 than all of Europe and America combined. But China now has a target of going carbon neutral by 2060, and by so aspiring has upped the moral ante with Mr Trump’s America. Now, some analysts predict that China may abandon its programme of building coal-fired power stations as much on economic grounds as on environmental ones.

China might yet gain a strategic advantage from global warming. Last month the UK First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin (the military head of the Royal Navy), warned that the melting of ice in the Arctic would create new maritime trade routes across the top of the world – the Arctic Ocean – which would halve the transit time between East Asia and Western Europe. China already has, according to the Pentagon, the world’s largest navy with 350 warships and submarines. That opens the prospect of Chinese naval vessels being able to penetrate the North Atlantic rapidly, and possibly threatening the European and American undersea cable network.

Hydrogen in three colours

The downside with the current generation of electric vehicles is that they require batteries which use expensive rare earth minerals of which lithium, and which are costly and messy to recycle at the end of their economic life. The extraction of these rare earth minerals in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is itself a cause of environmental degradation and carbon emissions. That is why there is renewed focus of attention on hydrogen.

Hydrogen comes in three colours. Gray hydrogen is made using fossil fuels like oil and coal, which emit CO2 into the air as they combust. The blue variety is made in the same way, but carbon capture prevents CO2 being released, enabling the captured carbon to be safely stored deep underground or utilised in industry. BP (LON:BP.) is working on that. As its name suggests, green hydrogen is the cleanest variety, producing zero carbon emissions. It is produced by electrolysis powered by renewable energy i.e. offshore wind.

The holy grail in energy now is to extract hydrogen cheaply and cleanly from water by electrolysis (i.e. separating the hydrogen and carbon atoms). Hitherto the energy required to perform the electrolysis has been unequal to the energy value of the hydrogen thus produced. That could be about to change.

Bill Brown, founder of NET Power has claimed that his firm’s techniques can produce clean hydrogen at 0.57 cents a kilo. This is a developmental technology based on the Allam Cycle which has been around in theory for some time.

Hydrogen can power vehicles, trains, ships and even aeroplanes. When hydrogen is ignited the only by-product is water. Hydrogen could also be used to facilitate the manufacture of steel, cement, glass, chemicals and fertilisers. Goldman Sachs reckons that, if the efficiency of hydrogen electrolysis could be sufficiently improved, then about 45 percent of all global carbon emissions could be eliminated.

Electric cars

Some estimates suggest that electric battery-powered cars could compete on price with conventional cars powered by internal combustion engines (ICEs) as soon as 2024. That is one reason why Tesla shares have rocketed this year. But even if you are not a true believer in Tesla, consider that established automotive giants such as Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz are fully committed to the phase-out of ICEs. In Germany, sales of electric and hybrid cars overtook diesel cars for the first time last month.

I’ll have a lot more to say about the outlook for electric cars soon.

From coal to wind

Dalmellington in Ayrshire, Scotland, was once known as a coal-mining town. But in future it is likely to be known as the location of a 50-turbine wind farm. The new 240 Megawatt facility will be built and run by Vattenfall (owned by the Kingdom of Sweden). But the array will be owned by the infrastructure fund, Greencoat UK Wind PLC(LON:UKW), which has acquired the project for £320 million.

Greencoat has emerged as a growing renewables fund which is now included in the FTSE-250 index and which has a market capitalisation of around £2.5 billion – that’s more than the better-known UK energy company Centrica PLC (LON:CAN), the owner of British Gas. The fund has acquired 36 wind power sites which collectively produce enough electricity to power about one million homes – that’s about five percent of all wind power generated in the UK. Some of those arrays were acquired from Scottish & Southern Energy (LON:SSE). Wind power now accounts for about 20 percent of Britain’s total electricity consumption.

Greencoat’s strategy is to encourage energy giants to green up their portfolios by taking all the development risk. It then buys the asset from the generator and pockets the cash flow arising. Greencoat UK Wind is run by Greencoat Capital, a specialist investor in renewable energy which has £5 billion of assets under management across both wind and solar energy. Greencoat raised £375 million from investors in May 2019.

A report last year by the research firm, Hardman & Co. found that returns for listed renewable energy funds over five years approached 10 percent. Such funds often carry a share price premium over their net asset value. At a moment when the share prices of the oil majors are under pressure and when BP and Shell have slashed their dividends, Greencoat’s 4.8 percent dividend yield is pleasing.

Nuclear

The latest thinking is that carbon-free energy capacity could be ramped up quickly by means of a cluster of British designed and manufactured small modular reactors (SMRs) which have a footprint smaller than two football pitches. A consortium of Rolls Royce (LON:RR), WS Atkins (LON:ATK), Laing O’Rourke (LON:JLG) and the National Nuclear Laboratory is in the vanguard of this technology. Rolls-Royce has experience and expertise in building nuclear reactors to power Britain’s fleet of nuclear submarines, so this is not new technology. Reportedly, the UK government is considering the injection of up to £2 billion of state funds to invigorate the concept – assuming it is permitted to do so by the EU (if there is an agreement).

The idea is that by 2050 more than 12 of these SMRs will be operational in the UK, each with a capacity of about 440 Megawatts – so about one seventh of the conventional nuclear plant currently under construction at Hinkley Point, Somerset. Hinkley Point C is a project led by France’s EDF (EPA:EDF), the costs of which have spiralled up to an estimated £22.5 billion. Cost considerations have caused Toshiba (TYO:6502) and Hitachi (TYO:6501) to pull out of projects to build nuclear plants in Wales and Cumbria. In contrast, SMRs might have a price tag of around £2 billion each.

SMRs are easier to switch on and off than conventional large-scale reactors; thus, they can be held on standby for when wind and solar power wanes. Thereafter, the remaining gas turbine plants that are currently used for that purpose can be phased out. But it does not follow that the new roll-out of SMRs would entail the closure of Britain’s conventional large-scale nuclear reactors which, as I write, are supplying 17.2 percent of total power to the national grid.

A US consortium, NuScale, is also looking at SMRs with a capacity of 60 Megawatts.

The fate of the oil majors

I wrote in the February 2020 edition of the MI magazine that the oil majors are here to stay. I meant by that that there would still be continued demand for oil, if much attenuated, after the transition to a net-zero carbon economy, not least because of the need for oil in petroleum derivatives (of which plastic). I did not foresee even then that the economic case for renewables would advance quite as rapidly as it has done this year; nor was it then apparent how the coronavirus pandemic would reduce the global demand for oil, at least in the short-term.

Another reason why the oil majors may not go extinct quite yet is that they have embraced carbon capture and storage (CCS). Indeed, they have become advocates of high carbon pricing, calculating that it will mobilise technology to accelerate CCS. Under US legislation enacted under the auspices of the US Department for Energy, operators can claim $50 for each tonne of CO2 sequestered underground and $35 per tonne if pumped back into declining wells.

A number of large players, including Saudi Aramco (TADAWUL:2222), ExxonMobil (NYSE:XOM), BP (LON:BP.), Shell (LON:RDSA), Total (LON:TTA) and others, have jointly formed the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative(OGCI) to drive CCS projects. The OGCI is a consortium that aims to accelerate the industry response to climate change. OGCI member companies explicitly support the Paris Agreement and its goals.

Just as with wind power and solar, the costs of CCS are in free fall. ExxonMobil has teamed up with FuelCell Energy to extract CO2 using carbonate fuel cells. Total, Shell and Equinor (NYSE:EQNR) are part of the Longship project in Norway which is planning to take CO2 captured in Europe’s industrial heartlands and pipe it to storage caverns beneath the North Sea. It hopes to lock in eight million tonnes of CO2 per year by the middle of this decade, for which they will charge around €60 per tonne. Memoranda have already been signed with ArcelorMittal and Heidelberg Cement.

Cement is responsible for an estimated eight percent of global carbon emissions. Under the auspices of the OGCI, a venture with LafargeHolcim, the materials giant, uses CO2 rather than water to cure concrete at much lower temperatures than in conventional manufacture, thereby breaking down the CO2 molecules and turning carbon into a form of glue. This enables a 70 percent reduction in CO2 emissions and an 80 percent reduction in water use.

In terms of their market capitalisations, ExxonMobil, BP and Shell combined are now worth less than Tesla alone. Exxon was once the world’s largest company by market cap. As I write it is worth just $136 billion against Tesla’s $390 billion.

The oil price is down from around $53 a barrel 12 months ago to around $37 today. That is partly a function of reduced global demand arising from the lockdowns across the world; but one should not assume that it will rebound even if the pandemic is behind us one year from now. That means that a lot of new exploration and drilling activity will be regarded as uneconomic – and a lot of known reserves will remain beneath the Earth for evermore. But if the oil majors can really crack the challenge of CCS and prospectively begin to reduce the volume of CO2 in the atmosphere, they will succeed in reinventing themselves.

#### Economic urbanization drives constant breakthroughs.

Sanderson et al 18 – Eric W. Sanderson is a landscape ecologist for the Wildlife Conservation Society at the Bronx Zoo, director of the Mannahatta Project and the author of Mannahatta: A Natural History of New York City. John G. Robinson is Senior Vice-President and Director of the International Conservation programs of Wildlife Conservation Society. Joe Walston · Senior Vice President at Wildlife Conservation Society (From Bottleneck to Breakthrough: Urbanization and the Future of Biodiversity Conservation. Bioscience. 2018 Jun 1;68(6):412-426. doi: 10.1093/biosci/biy039. Epub 2018 Apr 22. PMID: 29867252; PMCID: PMC5972570)//gcd

Finally, we note briefly that urban places are hubs of ideation and technological development, including ideas such as conservation. Given good governance, health, safety, and amenable circumstances, people working in close proximity generate new ideas, rapidly innovate and iterate, and have the capital and interconnectivity to deploy improvements widely (Glaeser 2011). Historically, cities have been centers of arts, science, and communication, developing everything from writing and religion to electric engines and the automobile (Sanderson 2013). Recent work has shown how new patent applications, economic activity, and even the pace at which people walk scale superlinearly with city size (Bettencourt et  al. 2007). Cities are also the places where many social movements begin (Nicholls 2008), including campaigns to conserve nature and natural resources. As an example, our organization was founded in 1895 in New York City with the goal to save wildlife and connect New Yorkers to nature. Many other conservation organizations have been founded in cities, including the first Audubon Society (New York City, New York, 1886), the Royal Society for Protection of Birds (Manchester, United Kingdom, 1889), the Sierra Club (San Francisco, California, 1892), The Nature Conservancy (Arlington, Virginia, 1951), Greenpeace (Vancouver, British Columbia, 1971), and Conservation International (Washington, DC, 1987). Many rural residents care deeply about and contribute vitally to conservation efforts, but it is difficult to imagine the long-term success of conservation without also enlisting the support, creativity, and collective power of the more than half of the world’s population who live in towns and cities (Rees and Wackernagel 1996, Sanderson 2013).

### XT 2AC 2: Growth Sustainable + S/Environment

#### The aff causes backlash, fails to resolve environmental challenges, and causes chaos – growth solves.

Karlsson 21 – (Rasmus, "Learning in the Anthropocene" Soc. Sci. 10, no. 6: 233. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10060233> 18 June 2021)// gcd

Unpacking this argument, it is perhaps useful to first recognize that, stable as the Holocene may have seemed from a human perspective, life was always vulnerable to a number of cosmic risks, such as bolide collisions, risks that only advanced technologies can mitigate. Similarly, the Black Death of the 14th century should serve as a powerful reminder of the extreme vulnerability of pre-industrial societies at a microbiological level. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think of the Holocene as providing a relatively stable baseline against which the ecological effects of technological interventions could hypothetically be evaluated. With most human activities being distinctively local, nature would for the most part “bounce back” (even if the deforestation of the Mediterranean basin during the Roman period is an example of that not always being the case) while larger geophysical processes, such as the carbon cycle, remained entirely beyond human intentional control. Even if there has been some debate about what influence human activities had on the preindustrial climate (Ruddiman 2007), anthropogenic forcing was in any case both marginal and gradual. All this changed with the onset of the Great Acceleration by which humans came to overwhelm the great forces of nature, causing untold damage to fragile ecosystems and habitats everywhere, forever altering the trajectory of life on the planet (Steffen et al. 2011b). In a grander perspective, humanity may one day become an interplanetary species and thus instrumental in safeguarding the long-term existence of biological life, but for the moment, its impact is ethically dubious at best as the glaciers melt, the oceans fill up with plastics, and vast number of species are driven to extinction. Faced with these grim realities, it is of course not surprising that the first impulse is to seek to restore some kind primordial harmony and restrain human activities. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that, even if their aggregate impact may have been within the pattern of Holocene variability, pre-modern Western agricultural societies were hardly “sustainable” in any meaningful sense. Experiencing permanent scarcity, violent conflict was endemic (Gat 2013), and as much as some contemporary academics like to attribute all evils to “capitalism” (Malm 2016), pre-capitalist societies exhibited no shortage of religious intolerance and other forms of social domination. It is thus not surprising that some have argued the need to reverse the civilizational arc further yet and return to a preliterate hunter-gather existence (Zerzan 2008) even if this, obviously, has very little to do with existing political realities and social formations. Under Holocene conditions, the short-term human tragedy may have been the same, but it did not undermine the long-term ability of the planet to support life. In a world of eight billion people, already accumulated emissions in the atmosphere have committed the planet to significant warming under the coming centuries, with an increasing probability that committed warming already exceeds the 1.5-degree target of the Paris Agreement even if all fossil-fuel emissions were to stop today (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). This means that sustained negative emissions, presumably in combination with SRM, will most likely be needed just to stabilize global temperatures, not to mentioning countering the flow of future emissions. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), assuming that all the pledges submitted under the Paris Agreement are fulfilled, limiting warming to 1.5 degrees will still require negative emissions in the range of 100—1000 gigatons of CO2 (Hilaire et al. 2019, p. 190). The removal of carbon dioxide at gigaton scales from the atmosphere will presumably require the existence of an advanced industrial society since low-tech options, such as afforestation, will be of limited use (Gundersen et al. 2021; Seddon et al. 2020), especially in a future of competing land-uses. It is against this backdrop of worsening climate harms that the limits of “precaution”, at least as conventionally understood, become apparent. While degrowth advocates tend to insist that behavioral change, even explicitly betting on a “social miracle” (Kallis 2019, p. 195), is always preferable to any technological risk-taking (Heikkurinen 2018), that overlooks both the scope of the sustainability challenge and the lack of public consent to any sufficiently radical political project (Buch-Hansen 2018). While there may be growing willingness to pay for, say, an electric vehicle (Hulshof and Mulder 2020), giving up private automobile use altogether is obviously a different animal, to say nothing about a more fundamental rematerialization of the economy (Hausknost 2020). Again, the problem is one in which change either (a) remains marginal yet ecologically insufficient or (b) becomes sufficiently radical yet provokes a strong political counterreaction. A similar dynamic can be expected to play out at the international level where countries that remain committed to growth would quickly gain a military advantage. To make matters worse, there is also a temporal element to this dynamic since any regime of frugality and localism would have to be policed indefinitely in order to prevent new unsustainable patterns of development from re-emerging later on. All this begs the obvious question, if the political and economic enforcement of the planetary boundaries are fraught with such political and social difficulties, would it not be better to instead try to transcend them through technological innovation? Surprisingly, any high-energy future would most likely be subject to many of the same motivational and psychological constraints that hinder a low-energy future. While history shows that existing nuclear technologies could in theory displace all fossil fuels and meet the most stringent climate targets (Qvist and Brook 2015), it seems extremely unlikely, to put it mildly, that thousands of new reactors will be built over the course of the coming decades in response to climate change. Outside the world of abstract computer modelling, real world psychological and cultural inertia tends to ensure that political decision-making, at least for the most part, gravitates to what is considered “reasonable” and “common sense”—such as medium emissions electricity grids in which wind and solar are backed by biomass and gas—rather than what any utilitarian optimization scenario may suggest. Even if the global benefits of climate stabilization would be immense, the standards by which local nuclear risks are assessed, as clearly illustrated by the Fukushima accident which led to a worldwide retreat from nuclear energy despite only causing one confirmed death (which, though obviously regrettable, has to be put in relation to the hundred and thousands of people dying every year from the use of fossil fuels), underscores the uneven distribution of perceived local risks versus global benefits and the associated problem of socio-political learning across spatial scales. Almost two decades ago, Ingolfur Blühdorn identified “simulative eco-politics” as a key strategy by which liberal democracies reconcile an ever-heightened rhetoric of environmental crisis with their simultaneous defense of the core principles of consumer capitalism (Blühdorn 2007). Since then, declarations that we only have “ten years to save the planet” have proliferated, and so have seemingly bold investments in renewable energy, most recently in the form of US President Joseph Biden’s USD 2.25 trillion climate and infrastructure plan. Still, without a meaningful commitment to either radical innovation or effective degrowth, it is difficult to see how the deployment of yet more wind turbines or the building of new highways will in any way be qualitatively different from what Blühdorn pertinently described as sustaining “what is known to be unsustainable” (Blühdorn 2007, p. 253). However, all is not lost in lieu of more authentic forms of eco-politics. Independent of political interventions, accelerating technological change, in particular with regard to computing and intelligent machine labor, may one day make large-scale precision manipulation of the physical world possible in ways that may solve many problems that today seem intractable (Dorr 2016). Similarly, breakthroughs in synthetic biology may hold the key to environmentally benign biofuels and carbon utilization technologies. Yet, all such progress remains hypothetical and uncertain for now. Given what is at stake, there is an obvious danger in submitting to naïve technological optimism. What is less commonly recognized is that naïve optimism with regard to the prospects of behavioral change may be equally dangerous. While late-capitalist affluence has enabled many postmaterial identities and behaviors, such as bicycling, hobby farming, and other forms of emancipatory self-expression, a collapsing economy could quickly lead to a reversal back to survivalist values, traditional hierarchical forms of domination, and violence (Quilley 2011, p. 77). As such, it is far from obvious what actions would actually take the world as a whole closer to long-term sustainability. If sustainability could be achieved by a relatively modest reduction in consumption rates or behavioral changes, such as a ban on all leisure flights, then there would be a strong moral case for embracing degrowth. Yet, recognizing how farreaching measures in terms of population control and consumption restrictions that would be needed, the case quickly becomes more ambiguous. While traditional environmentalism may suggest that retreating from the global economy and adopting a low-tech lifestyle would increase resilience (Alexander and Yacoumis 2018), it may do very much the opposite by further fragmenting global efforts and slowing the pace of technological innovation. Without an orderly and functioning world trade system, local resources scarcities would be exacerbated, as seen most recently with the different disruptions to vaccine supply chains. In essence, given the lack of a stable Holocene baselineto revert to, it becomes more difficult to distinguish proactionary “risk-taking” from “precaution”, especially as many ecosystems have already been damaged beyond natural recovery. In this context, it is noteworthy that many of the technologies that can be expected to be most crucial for managing a period of prolonged overshoot (such as next-generation nuclear, engineering biology, large-scale carbon capture and SRM) are also ones that traditional environmentalism is most strongly opposed to. 3. Finding Indicators From the vantage point of the far-future, at least the kind depicted in the fictional universe of Star Trek, human evolution is a fairly straightforward affair along an Enlightenment trajectory by which ever greater instrumental capacity is matched by similar leaps in psychological maturity and expanding circles of moral concern. With the risk of sounding Panglossian, one may argue that the waning of interstate war in general and the fact that there has not been any major nuclear exchange in particular, does vindicate such an optimistic reading of history. While there will always be ups and downs, as long as the most disastrous outcomes are avoided, there will still be room for learning and gradual political accommodation. Taking such a longer view, it would nevertheless be strange if development was simply linear, that former oppressors would just accept moral responsibility or that calls for gender or racial justice would not lead to self-reinforcing cycles of conservative backlash and increasingly polarizing claims. Still, over the last couple of centuries, there is little doubt that human civilization has advanced significantly, both technologically and ethically (Pinker 2011), at least from a liberal and secular perspective. However, unless one subscribes to teleology, there is nothing inexorable with this development and, it may be that the ecological, social, and political obstacles are simply too great to ever allow for the creation of a Wellsian borderless world (Pedersen 2015) that would allow everyone to live a life free from material want and political domination. On the other hand, much environmental discourse tends to rush ahead in the opposite direction and treat the c limate crisis as ultimate evidence of humanity’s fallen nature when the counter-factual case, that it would be possible for a technological civilization to emerge without at some point endangering its biophysical foundations, would presumably be much less plausible. From an astrobiological perspective, it is easy to imagine how the atmospheric chemistry of a different planet would be more volatile and thus more vulnerable to the effects of industrial processes (Haqq-Misra and Baum 2009), leaving a shorter time window for mitigation. Nick Bostrom has explored this possibility of greater climate sensitivity further in his “vulnerable world hypothesis” (Bostrom 2019) and it begs to reason that mitigation efforts would be more focused in such a world. However, since climate response times are longer and sensitivity less pronounced, climate mitigation policies have become mired in culture and media politics (Newman et al. 2018) but also a statist logic (Karlsson 2018) by which it has become more important for states to focus on their own marginal emission reductions in the present rather than asking what technologies would be needed to stabilize the climate in a future where all people can live a modern life.

#### No environment impact.

Hance ’18 [Jeremy, “Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point?” Environment Analyst at *The Guardian*. Internally cites scientific researchers, including experts from Paul Sabatier Univeristy. Trinity College, and Duke University who are global experts on biodiversity loss and extinction. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary]

But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales.

Even as the Permian-Triassic extinction event shows the fragility of life, it also proves its resilience in the long-term. The lessons of such mass extinctions – five to date and arguably a sixth happening as I write – inform science today. Given that extinction levels are currently 1,000 (some even say 10,000) times the background rate, researchers have long worried about our current destruction of biodiversity – and what that may mean for our future Earth and ourselves.

In 2009, a group of researchers identified nine global boundaries for the planet that if passed could theoretically push the Earth into an uninhabitable state for our species. These global boundaries include climate change, freshwater use, ocean acidification and, yes, biodiversity loss (among others). The group has since updated the terminology surrounding biodiversity, now calling it “biosphere integrity,” but that hasn’t spared it from critique.

A paper last year in Trends in Ecology & Evolution scathingly attacked the idea of any global biodiversity boundary.

“It makes no sense that there exists a tipping point of biodiversity loss beyond which the Earth will collapse,” said co-author and ecologist, José Montoya, with Paul Sabatier Univeristy in France. **“**There is no rationale for this.”

Montoya wrote the paper along with Ian Donohue, an ecologist at Trinity College in Ireland and Stuart Pimm, one of the world’s leading experts on extinctions, with Duke University in the US.

Montoya, Donohue and Pimm argue that there isn’t evidence of a point at which loss of species leads to ecosystem collapse, globally or even locally. If the planet didn’t collapse after the Permian-Triassic extinction event, it won’t collapse now – though our descendants may well curse us for the damage we’ve done.

#### Crisis narratives are wrong – peak growth and absolute decoupling are coming – only crisis causes overconsumption.

Nordhaus 20 – founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute. (Ted, “Must Growth Doom the Planet?,” The New Atlantis, Number 61, Winter 2020, pp. 76-86)//gcd

But the solution, such as it is, turns out to be right in front of us. Mainstream economic theory may posit that endless economic growth is desirable and possible, but what most macroeconomists actually fret about today is stagnation. The growth rate of developed economies has been [falling for decades](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2018&locations=XD&start=1961&type=shaded&view=chart). This is due not to biophysical limits to consumption, but rather to the simple mathematical reality that the richer an economy becomes, the more wealth it needs to gain each year to maintain the same growth rate. Economic growth in wealthy post-industrial economies, in other words, appears to be inexorably slowing without the need for eco-austerity.

Each additional increment of growth in advanced economies also typically becomes less material-intensive, as sectors like manufacturing, mining, and refining account for a smaller share of total economic output, and knowledge and service sectors account for a larger share.

Population growth is slowing even faster than economic growth, as fertility rates typically fall as incomes and education rise — a dynamic that has been as robust a feature of global modernity as rising consumption. Japan, now 126 million people, could see its population fall by as much as half, to less than [60 million by 2100](http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/Rf_1_e.html). The European Union, currently about 500 million, could shrink to as low as [300 million by 2100.](https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/total-population-outlook-from-unstat-3/assessment-1) Projections vary about when exactly global population will peak and begin to decline, but all major demographic forecasts project population growth trending in the same direction. Absent a radical change in the demography of a rapidly modernizing and urbanizing planet, global population [is likely to peak](https://population.un.org/wpp/Graphs/DemographicProfiles/Line/900) and begin to decline late in this century or early in the next.

Taken together, declining fertility, slowing per capita economic growth, the changing composition of economic activity, and continuing improvements in technology and resource productivity are likely, toward the end of this century, to bring a peak and decline in the consumption of most important resources, and in impacts upon the environment. In fact, for absolute material demands upon the natural environment not to decline over the long term, one of these three robust trends would need to reverse itself. Global fertility trends would need to start rising again. Long-term slowing of growth rates in industrialized economies would need to reverse. Or a broad swath of food, energy, and resource technologies would need to start to become less resource-efficient.

Smil, like a number of other environmental scholars, contests this notion. Instead, he argues that increases in resource productivity will not be put toward lower resource demands but toward more consumption and faster economic growth. Increasingly efficient steam engines in the nineteenth century famously did not result in a reduction in the use of coal but the opposite. One hundred fifty years of improving lighting efficiency hasn’t resulted in lower use of energy for lighting but rather has inspired us to light up many more things. Much of the long-term improvement in the efficiency of internal combustion engines, Smil notes, has gone toward creating larger and more powerful vehicles. As long as there is pent up demand for more consumption, some portion of productivity gains will be put toward more consumption rather than less resource use.

But the claim that these “rebound” effects assure the endless growth of material consumption assumes that demand for them will never saturate. For that to be true, it must also be the case that the wealthier we get, the more material consumption we will demand, forever. Thirty-six-ounce steaks must become 72-ounce steaks, SUVs must become eighteen-wheelers, 2,000-square-foot split-level ranch homes must become 4,000-square-foot McMansions, and so on.

There is really not much evidence for that proposition. Despite our affinity for supersizing our homes, our automobiles, and our portions, the U.S. economy has nonetheless been following the same basic trajectory as all other developed economies: toward slower national and per capita income growth and consumption of material goods and services. Rockefeller University’s [Jesse Ausubel has studied one hundred key resources](https://thebreakthrough.org/journal/issue-5/the-return-of-nature) in the United States over the past century, such as cropland, water, electricity, nickel, and petroleum. Over a third of them are past peak consumption. Similarly, the [United States](https://www.c2es.org/content/u-s-emissions/) and much of the [European Union](https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/greenhouse-gas-emission-trends-6/assessment-3) have seen falling greenhouse gas emissions over the last decade or more, even [accounting for the outsourcing](https://twitter.com/MaxCRoser/status/1205057947103092741) of industrial production to places like China.

Globally, by contrast, resource use and carbon emissions continue to rise, despite long-term and ongoing improvements in resource productivity. This is the reason that Smil characterizes claims that economic growth might decouple from material and energy inputs as “highly misleading.” But the fact that overall demand for material goods and services has risen during the postwar period, when the global population has tripled and billions of people have moved from deep agrarian poverty to urban and industrial living arrangements provides no strong basis for Smil’s argument.

As both population and economic growth rates flatten out over the course of this century, it is likely that resource-productivity gains will overtake global economic growth rates, resulting in falling global demand for material resources over the long term. As [a 2019 Breakthrough Institute report](https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food/livestock-revolution) showed, global pasture land, the largest single human use of land, peaked in 2000 and continues to decline even as global beef production continues to rise. In [a 2013 paper](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00561.x), Ausubel and colleagues argued that global cropland too appears close to peaking, even as global crop production continues to rise.

As with all growth curves, peak consumption of various material resources is not guaranteed to last. These trends could represent the top of a bell curve, the bottom of a new S-curve, or just a long plateau. But what they do demonstrate is that absolute decoupling of resources from economic growth is possible, even given a global economy today that still features robust population and income growth.

Smil’s case for establishing limits to growth depends upon a further claim: that preserving economic growth while reducing environmental impacts can’t happen soon enough to avoid surpassing key biophysical boundaries, which would lead to catastrophe for human societies. But Smil is too aware of the many failed proclamations of environmental scientists to make any strong or specific claim about what those biophysical limits might be. “Forecasting the state of modern civilization for generations or centuries to come remains an impossible exercise,” he acknowledges.

Elsewhere — for example in his 2010 book [Energy Myths and Realities](https://www.aei.org/research-products/book/energy-myths-and-realities/) — Smil has been less than catastrophic about global warming, the environmental risk most commonly thought to threaten the long-term survival of human societies. Nor does he worry that we will run out of resources. Instead, he invokes poorly defined challenges having to do with arable land, soil erosion, depleted aquifers, and crop productivity, combined with a changing climate. He is quite certain, though, that none of it can be sustained. “Pursuit of the highest possible economic growth rates, extending the culture of excessive consumption to additional billions of people, and treating the biosphere as a mere assembly of goods and services to be exploited (and used as a dumping ground) with impunity,” he argues, “must change in radical ways.”

In the end, Smil does offer a prediction of sorts, if not a very strong one. By the end of this century, he argues, human societies will need to impose limits upon economic growth in order to sustain human wellbeing for the long term. But as prophecy, Smil’s prediction is less provocative than it might first appear. By the end of this century, global population will likely be approaching zero growth anyway and a much more industrialized global economy will likely be struggling with the same headwinds to sustained rates of per capita growth that developed economies have been struggling with for decades.

In this regard, Smil’s prognostication, should it come to pass, would follow a similar pattern to many other environmental laws and regulations. Environmental restrictions have often lagged, not led, the peaking of pollution and other environmental impacts. We “saved” the whales only after we had hunted many global populations to extirpation, and developed better substitutes for most of the resources we depended upon them for. Forests have returned across many parts of the United States, Europe, and Latin America after we no longer needed those lands to grow food. [One 2005 study found](http://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.energy.30.050504.164507) that 76 percent of protected areas across Latin America and the Caribbean was under little threat of human development without protection, a dynamic that [appears to be the case globally as well](https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0008273). We reached a global agreement to protect the ozone only after [DuPont](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0836(199711)6:5%3C276::AID-BSE123%3E3.0.CO;2-A) had developed a cheap substitute for chlorofluorocarbons.

In answer to modern environmentalism’s tautology, Smil offers redundancy. Human societies will need to impose global limits to growth, he suggests, around the time that growth, or at least growing demands upon resources, will likely be coming to an end anyway.

Given how much damage two centuries of unprecedented growth and economic development have done to the biosphere, many imagine, understandably, that the end of growth might be a panacea for the natural world. But we should not be so quick to assume that a smaller and less affluent human population will necessarily bring lower demands upon natural resources.

History is replete with episodes where much smaller human populations accounted for environmental destruction at large scales. Early North Americans in the paleolithic era cleared most of the continent’s forests and hunted mammoths and other megafauna into extinction. Across human history, roughly [three-quarters](http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3010e.pdf#page=21) of deforestation in temperate forests occurred before the Industrial Revolution, when the human population was less than a billion people, almost all of whom lived in deep poverty compared to today’s industrial standards.

More recently, economic crises in relatively developed regions, such as [Southeast Asia](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-5436.1999.mp30003005.x), the [former Soviet Union](https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12450), and [Greece](https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2013.799731) have led to serious environmental consequences, as economically struggling populations turned to forests for firewood and to illegal hunting and fishing for food, to devastating effect.

For this reason, degrowth offers no guarantee that environmental impacts will decline. This is all the more so as calls for degrowth are frequently coupled with demands for a return to simpler, less technological, and non-synthetic systems for the provision of food and energy and for production of material goods and services. Less affluent economies more dependent upon production systems that use less technology would substantially increase the resource demands associated with consumption, and would erode or even entirely offset the benefits of lower levels of consumption.

#### Studies across countries prove decoupling works.

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Prior to comment on the results, their consistency has to be examined. This can be done by checking whether the sum of correlations and the average correlation have the same sign in Table 8. This is true for both lags and leads in both correlations, which means that the overall changes in the per capita income induce a consistent pattern of changes in the ecological deficit and in the GHG emissions. Concerning the association GDPpc&EDF, Table 8 shows that the average lag cross-correlations, CCEtGt (k0 is positive and the average lead crosscorrelations, CCEtGt (k>0) >0 is positive and the average lead crosscorrelations, CCEtGt (k>0)>0 is negative. The latter implies that while an increase in the per capita income has increased the ecological deficit in past, this will change in the future. The incidence of growth will reduce the pressure on the natural resources. The latter may be the joint product attributed to two distinct processes. First, such an event could be the result of a rise in the “eco-efficiency” which means that a unit of GDP is produced now with less environmental resources York et al. [30]. Beyond that, there might be a change in the consumption patterns, which involve substitution of environmentally harmful with less harmful goods and services. Very often, eco-efficiency and substitution are mentioned as requirements for the economy’s dematerialization [84]. Some advocate that the link between dematerialization and the resulting decoupling is a matter of society’s choice since it depends on the “appropriate” policy measures that mobilize technology and put forward incentives to reduce human pressure on the environment [85]. Notwithstanding, the whole issue is far from settled, see Bithas and Kalimeris [86] and Fletcher and Rammelt [87] for a critique. Gómez-Baggethun [88] refers to the resource efficiency and the policy induced substitution as technological and political utopias that cannot be sustained ad infinitum. By contrast, Table 8 shows that both the average lag and lead cross-correlations for the link GDPpc&GHG are negative. That means that the past reduction of GHG emissions as a result of growth will continue to exist in the future. Put it in the EKC jargon, Poland has reached a position, where the composition and technological effects dominates the scale effect. Hence, growth reduces the environmental impacts. Narayan et al. [82] have identified similar pattern for Poland’s CO2 emissions as well as for Germany, Czech Republic, Iraq, Slovak Republic and Sweden among others. The positive role of the eco-efficiency and substitution, discussed above, applies here as well. To recapitulate, the likely policy implications of the decoupling indices are examined by the cross correlation analysis. The analysis tried to investigate whether economic growth determines the changes in the ecological deficit and in the level of GHG emissions. The results provide evidence that economic growth in Poland will bring about a decline in the ecological deficit. Likewise, economic growth has reduced GHG emissions and will continue to do so in the future. The previous argument seems to echo a Parsonian modernization postulate, in the sense that economic growth is treated as a crucial determinant (“evolutionary universal”) of society’s change (implicitly through its impact on democracy, institutions and organizational capacity) [89]. This line of argument is not new, and the criticism raised is sound and fair [90, 91]. Notwithstanding, such a hypothesis prevails the EKC literature [92]. To cut a long story short, it seems that modernization theory, albeit severely criticized, is not dead. Various revivals and modifications have been put forward in the scholarly literature. Just to name a few: ecological modernization [93], reflexive modernization [94], re-modernization [95], global modernity [96]. Conclusions The paper applied the most appropriate decoupling indices in order to map the development trajectory of Polish economy. In the period between 1990 and 2016, Poland has achieved remarkable things. Primarily, growth seems that did not deteriorate the quality of the environment, since the human pressure on the environment, as captured by the resource and impact decoupling indices, was not associated with growth. Furthermore, from the cross-correlation analysis has emerged some rather interesting observations with profound policy implications. Poland has been a successful paradigm in terms of the ecological modernization theory. Growth seems to unfold without imposing significant pressure on the natural resources (a captured by the ecological deficit) and without causing environmental degradation (as captured by the GHG emissions).

#### Affluence ensures sustainability

McAfee 20 – a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management. (Andrew, "Why Degrowth Is the Worst Idea on the Planet," Wired, <https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-why-degrowth-is-the-worst-idea-on-the-planet/> 10.06.2020)//gcd

Over that same span, an unexpected and encouraging pattern has emerged: The world's richest countries have learned how to reduce their footprint on Earth. They're polluting less, using less land and water, consuming smaller amounts of important natural resources, and doing better in many other ways. Some of these trends are also now visible in less affluent countries.

However, many in the degrowth movement seem to have trouble taking yes for an answer. The claims I just made are widely resisted or ignored. Some say they’ve been debunked. Of course, debate over empirical claims like these is normal and healthy. Our impact on our planet is hugely important. But something less healthy is at work here. As Upton Sinclair put it, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Some voices in the conversation about the environment seem wedded to the idea that degrowth is necessary, and they are unwilling or unable to walk away from it, no matter the evidence.

But evidence remains a powerful way to persuade the persuadable. The one thing everyone agrees on is that the last 50 years have been a period of growth, not degrowth. In fact, growth has never been faster, except for the 25-year rebuilding period after World War II. The population and economic growth rates of the past half-century are remarkably fast by historical standards. Between 1800 and 1945, for example, the world’s economy grew less than 1.5 percent per year, on average. Between 1970 and 2019, that average increased to almost 3.5 percent.

It's natural to assume that, as this growth continued, every nation’s planetary footprint would only increase. After all, as people become more numerous and prosperous they consume more, and producing all the goods and services they consume uses up resources, takes over ecosystems, and generates pollution. The logic seems ironclad that our gains have to be the environment’s losses.

Easing Pollution, Not Exporting It

In some important areas, however, a very different pattern emerged after 1970: Growth continued, but environmental harm decreased. This decoupling occurred first with pollution, and first in the rich world. In the US, for example, [aggregate levels of six common air pollutants](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-05/2019_baby_graphic_1970.png) have declined by 77 percent, even as gross domestic product increased by 285 percent and population by 60 percent. In the UK, [annual tonnage of particulate emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/emissions-of-particulate-matter?time=1970..2016) dropped by more than 75 percent between 1970 and 2016, and of the [main polluting chemicals](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/air-pollutant-emissions?time=1970..2016) by about 85 percent. Similar gains are common across the highest-income countries.

How were these reductions achieved? The two possibilities are cleanup and offshoring. Either rich countries figured out how to reduce their “air pollution per dollar” so much that overall pollution went down even as their economies grew, or they sent so much of their dirty production overseas that the air at home got cleaner. The first of these paths reduces the total burden of human-caused pollution; the second just rearranges it.

The evidence is overwhelming that rich countries cleaned up their air pollution much more than they outsourced it. For one, a great deal of air pollution comes from highway vehicles and power plants, and rich countries haven’t outsourced driving and generating electricity to low-income ones. In fact, high-income countries haven't even offshored most of their industry. The [US](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO) and [UK](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GBRPROMANMISMEI) both manufacture more than they did 50 years ago (at least until the Covid-19 pandemic sharply reduced output), and Germany has been [a net exporter](https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/DEU/germany/trade-balance-deficit#:~:text=Germany%20trade%20balance%20for%202019,a%200.45%25%20increase%20from%202015.) since 2000 while continuing to [drive down air pollution](https://iir-de-2014.wikidot.com/explanation-of-key-trends) The rest of the world has been exporting its manufacturing pollution to Germany (to use degrowthers’ phrasing), yet Germans are breathing cleaner air than they were 20 years ago..

Rich countries have reduced their air pollution not by embracing degrowth or offshoring, but instead by enacting and enforcing smart regulation. As economists Joseph Shapiro and Reed Walker concluded in a [2018 study](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20151272) about the US, “changes in environmental regulation, rather than changes in productivity and trade, account for most of the emissions reductions.” Research about the [cleanup of US waters](https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/134/1/349/5092609) also concludes that well-designed and enforced regulations have successfully reduced pollution.

It is true that the US and other rich countries now import lots of products from China and other nations with higher pollution levels. But if there were no international trade at all, and rich countries had to rely exclusively on their domestic industries to make everything they consume, they’d still have much cleaner air and water than they did 50 years ago. As a [2004 Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy study](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4748469_Trade_Liberalization_and_Pollution_Havens) summarized: “We find no evidence that domestic production of pollution-intensive goods in the US is being replaced by imports from overseas.”

The rich world’s success at decoupling growth from pollution is an inconvenient fact for degrowthers. Even more inconvenient is China's recent success at doing the same. China’s export-led, manufacturing-heavy economy has been growing at meteoric rates, but between 2013 and 2017 [air pollution in densely populated areas declined by more than 30 percent](https://news.uchicago.edu/story/chinas-war-against-pollution-shows-promising-results-study-finds). Here again the government mandated and monitored pollution declines and so decoupled growth from an important category of environmental harm.

Prosperity Bends the Curve

China's progress with air pollution is heartening, but it's not surprising to most economists. It's a clear example of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) in action. Named for the economist Simon Kuznets, EKC posits a relationship between a country's affluence and the condition of its environment. As GDP per capita rises from an initial low level, so too does environmental damage; but as affluence continues to increase, the harms level off and then start to decline. The EKC is clearly visible in the pollution histories of today's rich countries, and it's now taking shape in China and elsewhere.

Also consider air pollution death rates around the world. As the invaluable website Our World in Data [puts it](https://ourworldindata.org/outdoor-air-pollution), “Rates have typically fallen across high-income countries: almost everywhere in Europe, but also in Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel and South Korea and other countries. But rates have also fallen across upper-middle income countries too, including China and Brazil. In low and lower-middle income countries, rates have increased over this period.”

The EKC is a direct refutation of a core idea of degrowth: that environmental harms must always rise as populations and economies do. It's not surprising that today's degrowth advocates rarely discuss the large reductions in air and water pollution that have accompanied higher prosperity in so many places around the world. Instead, degrowthers now focus heavily on one kind of pollution: greenhouse gas emissions.

The claims made are familiar ones: that any apparent reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in rich countries are due to offshoring rather than actual decarbonization. Thanks to the [Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/), we can see if this is the case. GCP has calculated “consumption-based emissions” for many countries going back to 1990, taking into account imports and exports, yielding the greenhouse gas emissions embodied in all the goods and services consumed in each country each year.

For several of the world's richest countries, including Germany, Italy, France, the UK, and the US, graphs of consumption-based carbon emissions follow the familiar EKC. The US, for example, has 22[reduced its total (not per capita) consumption-based CO2 emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/consumption-based-co2) by more than 13 percent since 2007.

These reductions are not mainly due to enhanced regulation. Instead, they've come about because of a combination of tech progress and market forces. Solar and wind power have become much cheaper in recent years and have displaced coal for electricity generation. Natural gas, which when burned emits fewer greenhouse gases per unit of energy than does coal (even after [taking methane leakage into account](https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/howarth-natural-gas)), has also become much cheaper and more abundant in the US as a result of the fracking revolution.

To ensure that these greenhouse gas declines continue to spread and accelerate, we should apply the lessons we've learned from previous pollution reduction success. In particular, we should make it expensive to emit carbon, then watch the emitters work hard to reduce this expense. The best way to do this is with a carbon dividend, which is a tax on carbon emissions where the revenues are not kept by the government but instead are rebated to people as a dividend. William Nordhaus won the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics in part for his work on the carbon dividend, and [an open letter](https://clcouncil.org/economists-statement/) advocating its implementation in the US has been signed by more than 3,500 economists. It's an idea whose time has come.

How We Learned to Lighten Up

Tech progress and price pressure aren't just leading to the demise of coal. They're also causing us to exploit the planet less in many other important ways, even as growth continues. In other words, EKCs are not just about pollution any more.

A good place to start examining this broad phenomenon of getting more from less is US agriculture, where we have decades of [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1K2hDd1jGxznxIWJXvtkW0vVyxLDBkVZSlZmtDMVFvHQ/edit#gid=1111912651) on both outputs—crop tonnage—and the key inputs of cropland, water, and fertilizer. Domestic crop tonnage has risen steadily over the years and in 2015 was more than 55 percent higher than in 1980. Over that same period, though, total water used for irrigation declined by 18 percent, total cropland by more than 7 percent. That is, over that 35-year period, US crop agriculture increased its output by more than half while giving an area of land larger than Indiana back to nature and eventually using a Lake Champlain less water each year. This was not accomplished by increasing fertilizer use; total US fertilizer consumption in 2014 (the most recent year for which data are available) was within 2 percent of its 1980 level.

The three main fertilizers of nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus (NKP) are an interesting case study. Their [total US consumption](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NXenB6ngIrezPVHypZcP8e-D7-gvEBix3maurDZGRX0/edit#gid=1409598042) (once other uses in addition to agriculture are taken into account) has declined by 23 percent since 1980, according to the United States Geological Survey. Yet some within the degrowth movement find ways to argue that these declines are also an illusion. These materials thus serve to clearly illustrate the differences in methodology, evidence, and worldview between ecomodernists like myself and degrowthers.

The USGS tracks annual domestic production, imports, and exports of NKP and uses these figures to calculate “apparent consumption” each year. Consumption of each of the three resources has declined by 16 percent or more from their peaks, which occurred no later than 1998. This seems like a clear and convincing example of dematerialization—getting more output from fewer material inputs.

As I argue in my book More From Less, dematerialization doesn’t happen for any complicated or idiosyncratic reason. It happens because resources cost money that companies would rather not spend, and tech progress keeps opening up new ways to produce more output (like crops) while spending less on material inputs (like fertilizers). Modern digital technologies are so good at helping producers get more from less that they're now allowing the US and other technologically sophisticated countries to use less in total of important materials like NKP.

#### Try or die for innovation.

Kalaniemi 20 – [RESEARCH TECHNICIAN](https://www2.helsinki.fi/en/people/people-finder?title.id%5B%5D=57250) in [Molecular and Integrative Biosciences Research Programme](https://www2.helsinki.fi/en/people/people-finder?organizations.id%5B%5D=30232763) at University of Helsinki (Salla Kalaniemi, Juudit Ottelin, Jukka Heinonen, Seppo Junnila, Downscaling consumption to universal basic income level falls short of sustainable carbon footprint in Finland, Environmental Science & Policy, Volume 114, 2020, Pages 377-383, ISSN 1462-9011, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.09.006)//> gcd

4.1. Comparison of UBI level footprints to carbon budgets The UBI carbon footprint determined in this study, 4.8 tCO2-eq per capita, is notably smaller than the average carbon footprints for Finnish households in the comparison groups. Yet, they are still around three times as high as the long-term sustainable level suggested by O’Neill et al. (2018), but close to the global average. If the current global CO2 emissions (Le Qu´er´e et al., 2018) were shared equally among all the people, everyone would have approximately a carbon budget of 5.6 tCO2 in 2017 following the IPCC (2018) 1.5-degree mitigation pathway. This number is quite close to the carbon footprint value estimated in this study for the UBI consumption level. However, this study only included the personal consumption component of carbon footprint excluding capital goods and governmental consumption, which have been shown to be significant globally and for European countries (e.g. Ivanova et al., 2016; Sodersten ¨ et al., 2018; Heinonen et al., 2020). In a recent study on Finland, Ottelin et al. (2018a) estimated that the final demand of households causes 77 % of the carbon footprint of total final demand in Finland. If the government consumption (14 %) and investments (5%), and the final demand of non-profit institutions (4%) are added to the UBI carbon footprint estimated in this study by following Ottelin et al. (2018a), the average carbon footprint at the UBI level would be 6.2 tCO2-eq per capita. However, Ottelin et al. show how the share of these emissions is larger in low-income than in high-income households. Thus, the UBI households probably use public services more than an average household, so the total average carbon footprint is likely to be more than 6.2 tCO2-eq., and thus higher than the global 1.5-degree mitigation pathway level. Moreover, to stay on the pathway, the emissions would need to be cut by approximately 10 % annually in addition to first reaching the current pathway level. Similarly, previous studies on the interaction between environmental and social Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have shown that bringing the global population to a moderate expenditure level (still lower than the UBI level in this study), would lead to difficulties in achieving the climate targets unless additional mitigation measures are taken (Hubacek et al., 2017; Scherer et al., 2018). 4.2. Implications for downscaling consumption and degrowth As shown above, even the carbon footprints determined at the UBI level excluding earned incomes are quite high considering the remaining global carbon budget. This is partly because low-income households don’t have similar possibilities to make sustainable choices as higher income households. For example, the energy consumption per square meter was around 30 % lower in the highest income deciles compared to the lowest income decile in 2012 according to the HBS and the applied carbon footprint model. In vehicle efficiency there wasn’t much difference though, since low-income households had older but smaller cars. In order to reach the climate targets, low-carbon housing, food, and mobility should be available and affordable to everyone. Considering middle- and high-income consumers who wish to reach their “fair share” of the global carbon budgets, they need additional mitigation solutions alongside downscaling consumption, given the current average GHG intensity (kg/€) of the economy. Ivanova et al. (2020) list in their recent review article renewable energy, sustainable diets, and shifting to public transport or electric vehicles as some of the most efficient sustainable consumption choices. Increased recycling and recovery of carbon (Shigetomi et al., 2019), and wooden construction (particularly in Nordic countries) (Amiri et al., 2020), could have significant impacts as well. In practice, downscaling of consumption is usually linked to worktime reduction or work-sharing, which have been emphasized as important elements of degrowth (Schneider et al., 2010; Buhl and Acosta, 2016) and sustainable economies in general (Schor, 2005; Pullinger, 2014; Zwickl et al., 2016). Significant changes to the division between work- and leisure time could also have implications for expenditure shares (Buhl and Acosta, 2016), which we could not take into account in this study. However, among the studied low-income Finnish households, consumption behaviour is very similar between working and unemployed adult households. Among families with children, at least one of the parents is working in most cases. In general, it seems that as low-income households as studied here have very little latitude to make consumption choices, since housing and food take the majority of their income. As discussed above, middle- and high-income households need additional (technological) solutions to reach sustainable carbon footprints. At the societal level, the reduction of the overall GHG intensity of the economy calls for innovation, which is typically driven by economic activity and profit seeking. This is a serious challenge for the degrowth concept. Tackling climate change and other environmental problems in a society where there is less money to share to different purposes is troublesome (Bailey, 2015). It raises a question on how the needed green investments would be financed. New technologies including renewable energy solutions and negative emission technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, are necessary in order to keep within the 1.5-degree pathway (van Vuuren et al., 2018). Yet, technological development (increasing efficiency in particular) is currently unable to overcome the impact of growing output (macro-economic rebound), which is one of the main arguments for the need of downscaling production and consumption in the first place (Wiedmann et al., 2020). From a social perspective, downscaling is a very difficult concept for European welfare states. Maintaining the current level of social security in a shrinking economy would be hard if not impossible, since social benefits and welfare services are funded mainly with income and consumption related taxes that rely on strong economy. Thus, shifting taxation from labour and low-carbon consumption to carbon intensive sectors combined with strong public and private sustainable investments would be socially more acceptable approach to transforming current welfare states into eco-states (Ottelin et al., 2018a). In addition, fossil-based energy should be phased-out by regulation (Le Qu´er´e et al., 2019) to avoid leakage effects. The policies should also cover the imported emissions to avoid so-called “low-carbon” illusion, meaning that the domestic energy production is clean, but GHG intensive products are imported from elsewhere (Clarke et al., 2017; Ottelin et al., 2019a).

#### 7. Largest study proves.

Kacprzyk 20 – Andrzej P. Kacprzyk. Is an Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at the University of Lodz. Zbigniew Kuchta is a PhD student at Lodz (Andrzej Kacprzyk and Zbigniew Kuchta, Shining a new light on the environmental Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions, Energy Economics, Volume 87, 2020, 104704, ISSN 0140-9883, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104704)//> gcd

4. Conclusion Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of researchers have attempted to test the validity of the EKC hypothesis and determine whether environmental quality eventually improves with economic growth. This study used a new indicator of GDP, based on satellite nighttime light data from Lessmann and Seidel (2017), to reexamine the empirical evidence documenting an inverse U-shaped relationship between income and CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Given that measurement errors in nighttime lights are orthogonal to the measurement errors in national accounts, the measure based on luminosity may serve as a very useful proxy for GDP in large and heterogeneous samples of countries. Using this new indicator, we reran the regression specification used by HE-S and Sheldon (2019) for a panel of 161 countries. Our estimates confirm the EKC hypothesis for CO2 emissions. The implied turning point, beyond which CO2 emissions start to decrease as income increases, is at 44 thousand in 2011 USD in our baseline model and is much lower than the turning points estimated by HES and Sheldon (2019). To check the robustness of our estimates, we repeat them for two subsamples. The results hold well after a substantial reduction in sample size. Finally, we apply the inverse U test, which confirms that the relationship of interest is really nonmonotone within the data range for each of our three samples. It has to be noted that Eq. (1) is in reduced-form. For this reason we are far away from drawing strong policy conclusions. Nevertheless, based on our results, a more optimistic picture of the income-CO2 emissions nexus emerges. Since our implied turning point is lower than in the replicated papers, the environmental benefits of economic growth may thus be easier to achieve. Therefore our findings suggest that it is worthwhile studying mechanisms that underlie the observed correlation between CO2 and GDP. We are also aware that our results should be interpreted with some caution since the time dimension of our dataset (T = 21) is relatively short, compared with those in the main strand of the EKC literature. A longer time frame could give more reliable estimates. Therefore, our findings serve as a pilot study and should be confirmed by future studies. Nevertheless, we believe that the advantages of nighttime light data outweigh their disadvantages, as they are available with the same quality for all countries, including those for which official statistics either do not exist or are of poor quality. Moreover, these data may be applied at various levels of aggregation – country, state, sub-state, and municipal. These features open a promising avenue for further research, as an increasing amount of luminosity data becomes available.

#### 8. and robust study on Chinese emissions.

Kun Wang 20 – Professor at Guangdong Ocean University Cunjin College, Department of Economics and Finance, China (Yu Kun Wang\* and Li Zhang, Reconsidering the relationship between CO2 emissions and economic growth: New evidence from China during 1990–2016 IJRES 7 (2020) 1-16 doi.org/10.33500/ ijres.2020.07.001)//gcd

Although EKC theory has been widely used to describe the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions, limited knowledge exists regarding its empirical validity. To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach, we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. We performed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise (Wang et al., 2019). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance. Unlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship. The breakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance. To confirm the robustness of our results. We assumed that this mutation point pattern was selected at random, and that the mutation point of the time series was completely unknown in advance. This study is the first to combine EKC theory and the RD approach to perform empirical analysis for observing the structural change in the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. For various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered. This result indicated that a Kuznets inflection point did not exist between China's lnGDP growth and lnCO2 emissions during 1990–2016. However, the Chow test and RD test results indicated that regardless of the effect of other policies, China's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve. Numerous regressions reported in this study indicated that a statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China. Another important finding of our analysis is that although the overall structural model was stable when using Equation 10, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999. The substantial reduction in the coal demand in 1999 played an important role in the structural change in the nonlinear correlation between lnGDP and lnCO2. However, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009, which indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked. China has the highest population in the world, and its TPES increased every year from 1990 to 2016, in which the TPES was 2958 Mtoe. However, during the past 4 years, CO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased. As per the UNFCCC 2009 Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions by 40 to 45% in 2020 compared with its carbon emissions in 2005. Data from the IEA indicated that the ratio of CO2 to GDP was 1.5 in 2005 and 0.9 in 2016. Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. Consequently, China achieved the goal of the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement 4 years in advance. We extend our results to examine the effect of emission fee levy on the cost of environmental degradation. A positive relationship was obtained between emission fee levy and CO2 emissions, which confirmed our hypothesis. This finding may be one of the reasons why the Chinese government has implemented environment protection taxes instead of penalties in the environmental regulations since 2018. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have imposed carbon taxes since 1990 (Piciu and Tricǎ, 2012). The effectiveness of the environmental protection tax implemented in China since 2018, is an important topic that can be examined in future research. Many studies have indicated that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China maintained stable economic growth, the RMB did not depreciate, and Chinese exports continued to increase. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, China's CO2 emissions decreased from 3.021 billion tons in 1998 to 2.92 billion tons in 1999. However, its GDP increased from USD1776 billion in 1997 to USD1915 billion in 1998 and USD2062 billion in 1999. Thus, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s GDP exhibited sustainable growth. Finally, our empirical results indicated that the Asian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.

#### Physical limits aren’t absolute or are chronically underestimated, AND resource use is declining now.

Bailey ’18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP]

Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that's the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth." Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity. Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person. On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent. So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita. On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent). On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita. Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively. The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306. "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer. O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century. Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages

of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields. O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air. Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass. And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities. After cranking their way through their models of doom, O'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity's footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.

#### Cap solves agriculture and deforestation.

Orr **‘**19 [Isaac; 8/1/19; Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment; "Capitalism is Saving the Planet Part 5: American Farmers Are Saving the Trees Through Innovation," <https://www.americanexperiment.org/capitalism-is-saving-the-planet-part-5-american-farmers-are-saving-the-trees-through-innovation/>]

On Tuesday, I wrote about how a recent study has found that there are more trees and vegetation today than there was 30 years ago, despite the fact that there are about 3 billion more people on the planet today than there was in 1980.

One of the key reasons for this regrowth of trees around the world was agricultural abandonment, meaning we are using fewer acres to grow our food and these acres are now free for the trees. If one were to assume the gloom and doomers are correct, this should mean that food prices have skyrocketed and that there are more hungry people today than 30 years ago, but nothing can be further than the truth.

In the real world, better agricultural practices and technology, many of them pioneered in the capitalist United States, mean we can grow much more food on a lot less land. This has resulted in people spending a much smaller percentage of their incomes on food, fewer people going hungry, and a smaller environmental footprint for our farms.

It is an unqualified win for both the environment, and human kind.

The graph below from Our World in Data shows that after increasing for more than 100 years, the amount of land in crop production in the United States has been in a free fall since 1960.

Furthermore, the United States is producing more food per acre today than at any other point in the nation’s history, and yields are increasing exponentially.

The good news isn’t just limited to the USA, it’s occurring around the globe, as the amount of land needed to produce the same amount of food has fallen by 68 percent since 1961, and this will only increase as modern farming techniques are exported to the developing world, and more scientifically advanced crops are developed to increase yields while also reducing the amount of pesticides needed to keep insects from eating the crops.

For example, a recent study found that adoption of genetically modified crops reduced chemical pesticide use by 37 percent, increased crop yields by 22 percent, and increased farmer profits by 68 percent.

Increasing farmer profits is the most important part of this sentence because it shows that profits do not preclude positive environmental outcomes. In fact, the profit motive increases the incentive for farmers to adapt these technologies faster.

#### It's sustainable---transition is impossible and alternatives risk extinction.

Schrager **‘**20 [Allison; Winter 2020; Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute; "Why Socialism Won't Work," https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/15/socialism-wont-work-capitalism-still-best/]

WITH INCREASINGLY UBIQUITOUS IPHONES, internet, central air conditioning, flat-screen TVs, and indoor plumbing, few in the developed world would want to go back to life 100, 30, or even 10 years ago. Indeed, around the world, the last two centuries have brought vast improvements in material living standards; billions of people have been lifted from poverty, and life expectancy across income levels has broadly risen. Most of that progress came from capitalist economies.

Yet those economies are not without their problems. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the gap between the rich and poor has become intolerably large as business owners and highly educated workers in urban areas have become richer while workers' wages in rural areas have stagnated. In most rich countries, more trade has brought a bigger, better variety of goods, but it has also displaced many jobs.

With social instability in the form of mass protests, Brexit, the rise of populism, and deep polarization knocking at the capitalist economies' doors, much of the progress of the last several decades is in peril. For some pundits and policymakers, the solution is clear: socialism, which tends to be cited as a method for addressing everything from inequality and injustice to climate change.

Yet the very ills that socialists identify are best addressed through innovation, productivity gains, and better rationing of risk. And capitalism is still far and away the best, if not only, way to generate those outcomes.

TODAY'S SOCIALISM IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE. Traditionally, the term meant total state ownership of capital, as in the Soviet Union, North Korea, or Maoist China. Nowadays, most people don't take such an extreme view. In Europe, social democracy means the nationalization of many industries and very generous welfare states. And today's rising socialists are rebranding the idea to mean an economic system that delivers all the best parts of capitalism (growth and rising living standards) without the bad (inequality, economic cycles).

But no perfect economic system exists; there are always trade-offs--in the most extreme form between total state ownership of capital and unfettered markets without any regulation or welfare state. Today, few would opt for either pole; what modern socialists and capitalists really disagree on is the right level of government intervention.

Modern socialists want more, but not complete, state ownership. They'd like to nationalize certain industries. In the United States, that's health care--a plan supported by Democratic presidential candidates Elizabeth Warren (who does not call herself a socialist) and Bernie Sanders (who wears the label proudly). In the United Kingdom, Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, who was trounced at the polls in mid-December, has set his sights on a longer list of industries, including the water, energy, and internet providers.

Other items on the socialist wish list may include allowing the government to be the primary investor in the economy through massive infrastructure projects that aim to replace fossil fuels with renewables, as Green New Deal socialists have proposed. They've also floated plans that would make the government the employer of a majority of Americans by offering guaranteed well-paid jobs that people can't be fired from. And then there are more limited proposals, including installing more workers on the boards of private companies and instituting national rent controls and high minimum wages.

For their part, modern capitalists want some, but less, state intervention. They are skeptical of nationalization and price controls; they argue that today's economic problems are best addressed by harnessing private enterprise. In the United States, they've argued for more regulation and progressive taxation to help ease inequality, incentives to encourage private firms to use less carbon, and a more robust welfare state through tax credits. Over the past 15 years, meanwhile, capitalist Europeans have instituted reforms to improve labor market flexibility by making it easier to hire and fire people, and there have been attempts to reduce the size of pensions.

No economic system is perfect, and the exact right balance between markets and the state may never be found. But there are good reasons to believe that keeping capital in the hands of the private sector, and empowering its owners to make decisions in the pursuit of profit, is the best we've got.

ONE REASON TO TRUST MARKETS is that they are better at setting prices than people. If you set prices too high, many a socialist government has found, citizens will be needlessly deprived of goods. Set them too low, and there will be excessive demand and ensuing shortages. This is true for all goods, including health care and labor. And there is little reason to believe that the next batch of socialists in Washington or London would be any better at setting prices than their predecessors. In fact, government-run health care systems in Canada and European countries are plagued by long wait times. A 2018 Fraser Institute study cites a median wait time of 19.8 weeks to see a specialist physician in Canada. Socialists may argue that is a small price to pay for universal access, but a market-based approach can deliver both coverage and responsive service. A full government takeover isn't the only option, nor is it the best one.

Beyond that, markets are also good at rationing risk. Fundamentally, socialists would like to reduce risk--protect workers from any personal or economywide shock. That is a noble goal, and some reduction through better functioning safety nets is desirable. But getting rid of all uncertainty--as state ownership of most industries would imply--is a bad idea. Risk is what fuels growth. People who take more chances tend to reap bigger rewards; that's why the top nine names on the Forbes 400 list of the richest Americans are not heirs to family dynasties but are self-made entrepreneurs who took a leap to build new products and created many jobs in the process.

Some leftist economists like Mariana Mazzucato argue that governments might be able to step in and become laboratories for innovation. But that would be a historical anomaly; socialist-leaning governments have typically been less innovative than others. After all, bureaucrats and worker-corporate boards have little incentive to upset the status quo or compete to build a better widget. And even when government programs have spurred innovation--as in the case of the internet--it took the private sector to recognize the value and create a market.

And that brings us to a third reason to believe in markets; productivity. Some economists, such as Robert Gordon, have looked to today's economic problems and suggested that productivity growth--the engine that fueled so much of the progress of the last several decades--is over. In this telling, the resources, products, and systems that underpin the world's economy are all optimized, and little further progress is possible.

But that is hard to square with reality. Innovation helps economies do more with fewer resources--increasingly critical to addressing climate change, for example--which is a form of productivity growth. And likewise, many of the products and technologies people rely on every day did not exist a few years ago. These goods make inaccessible services more available and are changing the nature of work, often for the better. Such gains are made possible by capitalist systems that encourage invention and growing the pie, not by socialist systems that are more concerned with how the existing pie is cut. It is far too soon, in other words, to write off productivity.

Here, it is worth considering the lessons of a previous productivity boom: the Industrial Revolution. As the economist Joel Mokyr has shown, it took new innovations like the steam engine more than 100 years to appear in productivity estimates. The same could be happening today with smartphones and the internet. Meanwhile, even as that upheaval transformed the human experience, creating a more comfortable existence for most everyone, it was also messy and disruptive. The early part of that innovative cycle--like others since--displaced existing workers while the gains flowed to the owners of capital first, causing social instability.